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Abstract
When voters face uncertainty over their optimal choice, the outcome of today’s
policy making influences their future beliefs. This generates incentives for politicians
to engage in information control. In this dissertation, I formally analyze how these
incentives influence the conflict both within and between political parties.
My first paper begins with the observation that political leaders are often publicly
attacked by their own ideological allies. Yet, evidence indicates that this form dissent
is electorally costly, thus harming both the leader and his allies. Why, then, does it
emerge in the first place? I address this puzzle within a model in which voters face
uncertainty about their ideal policy and learn via experience. In particular, I propose a
new framework to think about policy experimentation, whereby the amount of learning
depends on the location of the implemented policy on the left-right spectrum. I show
that, within this setting, dissent emerges precisely because it is electorally costly. By
hurting the incumbent’s electoral chances, dissent alters his incentives to adopt more or
less informative (and therefore extreme) policies. This creates a potential trade-o  for
the incumbent’s allies which, under some conditions, is resolved in favour of dissent.
This policy experimentation framework can be adapted to study several phenomena.
In my second paper, I apply it to investigate whether ideological parties may have
strategic incentives to lose elections. Parties often take extreme positions even if this
means losing for sure. Extant explanations rely on expressive motivations. I instead
show that a party whose ideological stance is ex-ante unpopular faces a trade-o  between
winning the upcoming election and changing voters’ future preferences. Under some
conditions, the party chooses to lose today to win big tomorrow.
Finally, my third paper focuses on electoral selection, addressing a crucial question:
do the right candidates for o ce choose to run at the right time? In the model, vot-
ers learn about o ce holders’ competence by observing governance outcomes. Because
competence matters most in times of crisis, this is also when outcomes reveal most
information. I show that electoral accountability has the perverse consequence of dis-
couraging good candidates from running in times of crisis, that is, precisely when voters
would need them the most.
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Playing with Fire or Playing it Safe, a Brief
Introduction
Free and fair elections are the defining feature of a democratic system. Ideally,
elections should in fact allow ‘the people’ to both select the best candidate for o ce,
and incentivise him or her to undertake their preferred course of action. However, the
political world is complicated: there is often substantial uncertainty over what is the
optimal choice for the voters. This uncertainty may refer to which policies best suit
the voters’ interests, to which candidate is most capable of advancing them, or both.
Indeed, it is often hard to anticipate the exact consequences of each policy choice.
Similarly, it is di cult to tell ex-ante whether a candidate possesses the right qualities
to e↵ectively deal with a situation of crisis.
There are two ways in which voters may potentially solve this uncertainty. First,
they may learn via information transmission. Politicians often possess information that
is unavailable to the voters. Then, by observing what politicians say or do, voters
update their beliefs over which policy or candidate is the ‘correct’ one. However, it
is not always the case that politicians ‘know better’. Politicians and voters may often
have access to the same information on how the world works. Even when they have
di↵erent views of the world, these may be the result of di↵erent ideologies rather than
information asymmetries. Then, the only way that the voters can learn is via experi-
ence. When facing uncertainty over which platform would produce the best outcome,
voters turn to the consequences of today’s policy making to refine their expectations,
accordingly update their preferences and consequently modify their electoral choices.
Similarly, when the uncertainty refers to politicians’ true ability, the incumbent’s per-
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formance in dealing with complicated tasks allows voters to review their assessment of
his competence relative to the other candidates’.
A large strand of the formal literature in political science and political economy
focuses on the consequences of voters’ uncertainty under the assumption that learning
occurs via information transmission. In contrast (with few exceptions, that are discussed
in more detail in the chapters below), very little attention is devoted to understanding
how this uncertainty influences politicians’ strategic behaviour (and, in turn, electoral
and policy outcomes) when voters learn via experience. This question is precisely what
this thesis is concerned with.
This thesis builds on a simple intuition: when voters face electorally relevant uncer-
tainty and learn via experience, the amount of information they observe is a function of
the politicians’ strategic behaviour. As such, politicians may face a trade-o↵ between
taking their preferred action today and generating the optimal amount of information
to maximize their future electoral chances. They may have incentives to gamble by tak-
ing an action that allows voters to learn, or may instead fear that information would
hurt them and thus prefer to play it safe. In the three papers of this thesis I present
formal models to analyse how these incentives influence the ideological conflict both
within and between political parties (respectively, in ‘With Friends Like These,
Who Needs Enemies?’ and ‘Ideology for the Future’ ), as well as the quality of politi-
cal candidates (in ‘Do We Get the Best Candidates When We Need Them the Most? ).
In the remainder of this introduction I provide a brief summary of the three papers,
thus highlighting both the methodological and substantive contributions of the thesis.
With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?
As recent events have highlighted, deep divisions exist within political parties in the
US. Similarly, open conflict between competing factions characterizes many European
parties. Italy’s Democratic Party, the French Socialists and the British Conservatives
o↵er obvious examples. Yet, the importance of factionalism and intra-party dynamics
is often overlooked in the formal theory literature. My first paper ‘With Friends Like
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These, Who Needs Enemies?’ contributes to this literature by analysing the causes
and consequences of the emergence of open conflicts within political parties. While the
few extant works focus on intra-party cohesion in legislatures, my paper begins with
the observation that intra-party dissent often takes the form of public attacks against
the party leader by his own ideological allies (such as a minority faction within the
party, or an ideologically aligned media outlet). Yet, evidence indicates that this form
of dissent damages the party’s electoral chances. As such, it harms both the leader and
the dissenters themselves. Why, then, does it emerge in the first place?
I argue that this form of public dissent occurs precisely because it is electorally costly,
in order to induce a policy response. Dissent hurts the leader’s chances of winning re-
election. This, in turn, changes his incentives to take policy gambles. As such, when
gambles take the form of more extreme policies (as they will do endogenously in my
framework), the allies face a potential trade-o↵ between maximizing the probability that
the leader wins the upcoming elections and inducing him to adopt a policy more in line
with their own ideological preferences. If the gain from changing today’s equilibrium
policy is su ciently large, public dissent emerges in equilibrium.
In the paper I micro-found this argument within the context of a principal-agent
model. The incumbent’s ideological allies (that come from the same side of the political
spectrum but do not share exactly the same policy preferences) must decide whether to
attack him, thus damaging the party’s electoral chances, or stay quiet. The incumbent
then chooses which policy to implement. After the voter observes the outcome of the
implemented policy, she chooses whether to retain the incumbent or replace him with
this challenger. The key innovation of the paper is to consider a setting in which the
voter faces uncertainty about her own policy preferences, and learns via experience.
In order to analyse a world with these features, I propose a new framework to think
about policy experimentation, whereby the amount of learning depends on the location
of the implemented policy along the left-right spectrum. Voters learn about their own
ideological preferences by observing how much they like the outcome of today’s policy.
The presence of a random shock complicates their inference problem. Within this
framework, I show, voters learn more about their ideal policy when extreme platforms
10
are implemented. The extent to which voters’ preferences change over time then depends
endogenously on the incumbent’s policy choice.
As a consequence, the o ce holder has incentives to engage in information control.
Leading incumbents (that have high chances of being re-elected) experience fear of fail-
ure: they have incentives to adopt moderate policies that prevent information genera-
tion. In contrast, trailing ones (that have a low re-election probability) have incentives
to gamble for resurrection: they want to engage in extreme policies that allow voters
to learn, in hopes of improving their electoral prospects. Within this setting, dissent
emerges precisely because it is electorally costly. By dissenting, the incumbent’s allies
hurt his chances of winning the upcoming election. This, in turn, alters his incentives to
implement more or less informative (i.e. extreme) policies. As such, the allies face a po-
tential trade-o↵ between maximizing the incumbent’s re-election chances and inducing
him to implement a platform more in line with their own ideological preferences. If the
gain from changing today’s equilibrium policy is su ciently large, optimally balancing
the trade-o↵ involves active dissent that damages the party electorally.
The paper then concludes by analysing the normative and empirical implications
of the results. First, I show that the presence of the incumbent’s extreme ally can be
welfare improving for the voter. By dissenting the ally can in fact induce an optimal
level of policy experimentation by the o ce holder, thereby mitigating an ine ciency
that has its roots in electoral accountability. Finally, the results also have important
implications for empirical research, showing that existing estimates of the electoral
rewards of party unity are inevitably biased.
Ideology for the Future
In my second paper, I move from intra-party to inter-party conflict. My starting point
is the observation that political parties sometimes take extreme positions, even if this
means losing for sure. Existing explanations rely on the assumption that their members
have expressive rather than strategic motivations, and care about ideological purity.
Corbyn’s election as leader of the UK Labour party has been interpreted in this light.
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Similarly, a desire for ideological purity is assumed to lie at the roots of the ‘Sanders
phenomenon’ in the US. In ‘Ideology For the Future’, I ask whether ideological parties
may instead have strategic incentives to lose election, even absent any concern for purity.
I argue that a party whose ideological stance is unpopular with the electorate faces a
trade o↵, between winning the upcoming election so as to secure policy influence, and
changing the voters’ preferences so as to win with a better platform in the future. Under
some conditions, the party therefore gambles on the future: chooses to lose today to
change voters’ views and win big tomorrow.
I micro-found this argument by presenting a model of repeated spatial elections with
two time periods, in which I embed the policy experimentation framework developed
in my first paper. A key feature of the model is that the players have di↵erent priors
over the location of the voter’s true ideal policy (i.e., the state of the world), but agree
to disagree. In particular, I think about the parties’ beliefs as a second dimension of
their ideology. Thus, parties truly believe that their own ideological preferences are
in line with the state of the world. Crucially, the voter’s ex-ante preferences (i.e.,
her prior beliefs over the location of her ideal policy) are common knowledge. This
implies that, given any pair of platforms, parties face no uncertainty over the outcome
of the upcoming election. However, uncertainty – and, given heterogeneous priors,
disagreement – exist over what the voter will learn upon observing the first period
policy outcome.
Given these assumptions, the second period election is equivalent to a one-shot
Downsian game: the parties always converge on the voter’s preferred policy. Not so
much in the first period. Suppose that the voter’s prior is such that her ex-ante preferred
policy is a right-wing one, and consider the problem faced by unpopular the left-wing
party. The party always has incentives to converge towards the voter’s preferences,
in order to win the upcoming election and move the implemented platform closer to
its own bliss point. This is the usual centripetal tendency that arises in Downsian
models. However, the unpopular party also has an incentive to increase the amount of
voter learning, in hopes of changing the voter’s future policy preferences and being able
to implement a better platform tomorrow. The problem the unpopular party faces is
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that it cannot achieve both goals at once. This is a direct consequence of the voter’s
‘bias’ against the party. Given the voters prior, for any pair of policies that leave her
indi↵erent in the first period, the right-wing one is always further away from zero.
Thus, the popular right-wing party can win with relatively more extreme platforms,
that would generate a larger amount of information. This creates a trade-o↵ for the
unpopular party. It may move slightly closer to the voter and win, thus minimizing
the immediate policy losses. However, this would imply that a more moderate policy
is implemented and less information is generated. The voter is unlikely to change
her mind, and the party will probably have to compromise on a right-wing platform
again tomorrow. Conversely, if the unpopular party allows its opponent to win with
an extreme right-wing policy, the amount of voter learning increases. If the voter
learns that such policy is not aligned with the true state of the world, the unpopular
party will be able to win with a left-wing platform in the future. In other words, the
unpopular party must choose between compromising in order to minimize immediate
losses but this means having to compromise again tomorrow and going all-in hoping
to be able to win with a better platform in the future. If the incentives to force the
voter to experiment are su ciently strong, the unpopular party chooses to gamble on
the future: lose today to win big tomorrow. This paper characterizes the conditions
under which this occurs in equilibrium. Crucially, it shows that ‘extremism’ in both
preferences and beliefs is necessary: ideological beliefs are therefore an essential part of
the story.
Do We Get the Best Candidates When We Need
Them the Most?
While the first two chapters focus on the ideological conflict that emerges both between
and within parties, my third paper considers a world in which political candidates di↵er
only in their expected ability. As several empirical paper highlight, the competence of
political leaders has a crucial impact on a country’s performance. As such, it is impor-
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tant to understand under which conditions high-quality politicians are willing to run
for o ce in the first place. One question is particularly relevant to evaluate the e↵ec-
tiveness of democratic elections in improving voters’ welfare: do the right candidates
self-select at the right time? More specifically, are the most competent politicians will-
ing to run for o ce during times of crisis, when competence matters the most? This is
the question that I address in ‘Do We Get the Best Candidates When We Need Them
the Most?’.
The formal literature has so far placed little emphasis on the topic of political
self-selection. Most extant models of elections in fact take the pool of candidates as ex-
ogenous, focusing instead on voters’ ability to identify good politicians to be (re)elected
and bad ones to be thrown out. A small recent literature allows for endogenous can-
didate entry, thereby analysing the equilibrium supply of good politicians. However,
these works typically consider a static setting, highlighting the di culty of attracting
competent politicians if o ce rents are too low compared to private market salaries.
In this paper, I adopt a very di↵erent perspective. I consider a world in which
potential candidates are career politicians, for whom o ce is always more valuable than
the outside option. As such, entering the race is always the statically optimal choice for
all potential candidates, irrespective of their expected ability and the conditions in the
country. I show that this does not always hold true when we take into account their
dynamic incentives. Under some conditions, ‘good’ candidates are not willing to run
for o ce during times of crisis.
This result emerges within the context of a model of repeated elections in which
potential candidates di↵er in the probability of being competent. The crucial element
of the set-up is that in each period the country either experiences a crisis, or a period
of ‘business as usual’. A crisis (economic or otherwise) is an exogenous shock that has
two key features: it amplifies the impact of the o ce holder’s competence and, at the
same time, the informativeness of his performance. In other words, precisely because
competence matters the most during times of crisis, this is also when the governance
outcomes reveals most information about the o ce holder’s ability.
Within this framework, all potential candidates are willing to run for o ce during
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normal times. Not so much during periods of crisis. In fact, the politician who is
most likely to solve the crisis also has the most to lose from failing. This politician in
fact has a valuable electoral advantage. As such, he would want to prevent the voter
from learning about his true ability, since information can only hurt his future electoral
chances. Unfortunately, it is precisely during times of crisis (that is, when competence
matters the most) that governance outcomes reveal most information about the o ce
holder’s type. Then, the politician who is most likely to be competent experiences
fear of failure and chooses to stay out of the race in order to preserve his electoral
capital for the future. In contrast, the ‘worst’ (in expectation) potential candidate has
nothing to lose. He is therefore always willing to take the gamble, and run for o ce
during challenging times. Thus, the voters gets the wrong candidates at the wrong time.
Crucially, this adverse selection does not arise due to weak electoral incentives, as it is
the case the extant literature. Quite the opposite, it emerges precisely as a perverse
consequence of accountability.
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With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?
Abstract
Why are political leaders often attacked by their ideological allies? The paper
addresses this puzzle by presenting a model in which the conflict between the
incumbent and his allies is ideological, dissent is electorally costly, and voters
are learning about their own policy preferences over time. Here, by dissenting
against the incumbent (and thereby harming the party in the upcoming election),
the allies can change his incentives to choose more or less extreme policies, which
a↵ects the amount of voter learning. This induces a trade-o↵ between winning the
current election and inducing the party leadership to pursue the allies’ all-things-
considered more-preferred policy. Optimally balancing this trade-o↵ sometimes
involves active dissent that damages the party in the short-run. In equilibrium
dissent arises precisely because it is electorally costly.
Introduction
‘Renzi is not apt for his role, he does not have the stature of a leader’ (Cuperlo 2016). ‘He
says a lot of things, that do not always coincide with the truth’ (Bersani 2015). These
are public statements made by prominent Italian politicians about Matteo Renzi, former
prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party (PD), the biggest Left-wing party
in the country. And these are not isolated examples: Renzi was often publicly accused
of being a liar, incompetent and even ‘worse than the devil’ (D’Alema 2016). Quite
surprisingly, the authors of these public attacks were not members of the opposition.
Renzi’s worst critics were in fact all members of his own party: the leaders of the so
called “Minoranza Dem”, the extreme minority faction within the PD.
Similar phenomena have emerged in other European countries as well as in the US. In
the UK, the Labour Party is currently undergoing a ‘civil war’ (Jones 2016). The mem-
bers of the party’s minority often openly denigrate the leader Jeremy Corbyn whom,
they argue, ‘literally has no idea (...) how to conduct himself as a leader’ (Mandelson
2017). In France, a group of rebel Socialist MPs (the Frondeurs) regularly manifested
their dissent against President and party leader Francois Holland. Similarly, divisions
within the US Republican party are apparent. Prominent Republican lawmakers have
publicly attacked President Trump, arguing that ‘he shows a growing inability, and even
unwillingness, to separate truth from lies’ (McCain 2017).
Interestingly, this phenomenon is not solely an intra-party issue. Media outlets often
denigrate political leaders with whom they are ideologically aligned. The right-leaning
Evening Standard has openly attacked UK Conservative prime minister Theresa May,
depicting her cabinet as ‘stale’ and ‘enfeebled’ (Urwin 2017). Similarly The Guardian,
historically left-leaning, has described Labour leader Corbyn as ‘dismal, lifeless, spine-
less’ (Toynbee 2016).
These examples show that political leaders are often publicly attacked and deni-
grated by their own ideological allies. Yet, evidence indicates that this form of dissent
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typically damages a party’s electoral chances, since voters dislike parties that appear
divided (Greene and Haber 2016; YouGov 2016; Kam 2009; Groeling 2010). As such,
public dissent hurts both the leader and the dissenters themselves. This raises the ques-
tion: why would a leader’s ideological allies choose to publicly attack him despite this
being electorally harmful?
In this paper, I argue that this form of public dissent emerges precisely because it
is electorally costly, in order to induce a policy response. Dissent hurts the leader’s
chances of winning re-election. This, in turn, changes his incentives to take policy
gambles. As such, when gambles take the form of more extreme policies (as they
will do endogenously in my framework), the allies face a potential trade-o↵ between
maximizing the probability that the leader wins the upcoming elections and inducing
him to adopt a policy more in line with their own ideological preferences. If the gain
from changing today’s equilibrium policy is su ciently large, public dissent emerges in
equilibrium.
Focusing on dissent against an incumbent, I micro-found this argument by presenting
a model with four key ingredients. First, the incumbent and his allies come from the
same side of the political spectrum, but do not have exactly the same policy preferences.
The allies can represent a minority faction within the party, a media outlet, an external
donor or even a special interest group: any actor whose policy preferences are closer to
the incumbent’s than the challenger’s. Second, dissent is electorally costly: it generates
a negative valence shock that potentially damages the party’s electoral prospect. Dissent
can entail publicly criticizing the party leader, dispraising his policy choices, revealing a
scandal or even ‘mechanically’ reducing his electoral chances (for example, a donor may
choose to reduce its electoral contributions). Third, the model assumes that voters face
uncertainty about their ideal policy. For example, voters may not know which policy is
most likely to produce their desired outcome. Finally, a crucial feature of the model is
that voters can reduce their uncertainty by learning through experience. In particular,
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I propose a new framework to think about policy experimentation. Voters learn about
the optimal decision for the future by observing how much they like the outcome of
today’s policy. The presence of a random shock complicates their inference problem.
Within this framework, I show, the amount of voter learning depends on the location of
the implemented policy along the left-right spectrum. The more extreme the policy is,
the more the voters learn about their ideal platform. Suppose that an extreme policy
is implemented. If a voter obtains a high (low) payo↵ from the resulting outcome, the
policy is likely (unlikely) to be in line with her true preferences. Conversely, because
of the presence of the random shock, the outcome of a moderate policy is much less
informative.
In this setting, the incumbent has incentives to engage in information control. His
equilibrium policy choice maximizes the trade-o↵ between implementing his bliss point
today and generating the optimal amount of information in order to be re-elected to-
morrow. This, I show, is a function of the incumbent’s ex-ante electoral strength. A
leading incumbent, who is going to be re-elected even if the voters receive no new in-
formation, has incentives to implement moderate platforms that prevent information
generation. In contrast, a trailing one will want to engage in extreme policies that
increase the amount of voter learning, in hopes of improving his electoral prospects. Fi-
nally, an incumbent who can never be re-elected (irrespective of what the voters learn)
is indi↵erent with respect to the amount of information that is generated, and will
simply follow his ideological preferences.
Within this framework, dissent may allow the allies to solve the ideological con-
flict with the incumbent. By dissenting, the allies generate a negative valence shock
against the incumbent, thereby reducing his ex-ante electoral strength. This, in turn,
creates incentives to implement more or less informative (i.e. extreme) policies. As
such, dissent changes the incumbent’s equilibrium policy choice, while also harming the
party electorally. This generates a potential trade-o↵ for the incumbent’s allies, be-
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tween ensuring that their preferred party wins the upcoming election and inducing the
incumbent to implement a policy more in line with their own ideological preferences.
Optimally balancing this trade-o↵ sometimes involves active dissent that damages the
party in the short run. Thus, dissent emerges precisely because it is electorally costly,
and it produces unity of interests between the incumbent and his allies even if no player
actually cares about unity per se. Surprisingly, the analysis reveals that improving the
incumbent’s electoral prospects or reducing his ideological conflict with the allies may
make dissent more likely to emerge.
Further, the results highlight that the presence of an extreme ally to the incumbent
party may be welfare improving for the voters. In the model, voters benefit from infor-
mative policies being implemented as this increases the probability of making the correct
electoral decision in the future. However, under some conditions, electoral accountabil-
ity has the perverse consequence of inducing lower levels of policy experimentation
relative to both the incumbent’s ideological preferences and the voter’s optimum. The
incumbent’s extreme ally may mitigate such ine ciency. By dissenting, the ally can
create incentives for the incumbent to implement extreme policies that allow the voters
to learn. If the value of acquiring new information is su ciently large, this strictly
increases the voters’ welfare.
The results of the model also have an important implication for empirical research on
the topic. Existing estimates of the electoral rewards of party unity, that are obtained by
comparing treated and control units (i.e. parties that do and do not experience dissent),
are inevitably biased. In addition, it is hard to know ex-ante what the direction of the
bias will be. However, this does not imply that the model is not falsifiable. Indeed,
the theory suggests where else to look in order to empirically investigate the electoral
consequences of dissent. The model generates testable comparative statics regarding
parties’ electoral performance conditional on experiencing dissent. Focusing on this
restricted sample, and thereby avoiding the problem of selection bias described above,
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researchers can empirically investigate the conditions under which dissent is expected
to hurt parties the most. The theory predicts that parties’ performance conditional
on dissent should be positively correlated with variables such as the level of education,
news media consumption and political engagement in the electorate. Finally, I discuss
how the model’s comparative static predictions may allow us to distinguish it from other
possible explanations for the emergence of dissent.
Related Literature
This paper relates first and foremost to the literature on intra-party politics. In the
formal literature, the interaction between di↵erent factions is typically analysed as a
bargaining game. Mutlu-Eren (2015) considers how the threat of a split influences
the party’s behaviour in the legislature. Similarly, Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015)
consider a model in which the threat of defection by the minority can induce the party
leadership to democratize the candidates’ selection process. In these papers, the threat
is credible when the faction is su ciently likely to win the upcoming election if running
alone after a split. Turning to the empirical literature, we find similar references to
the competing factions bargaining over a prize. In Parties and Party Systems, Sartori
(1976) describes factions as blackmailing the leadership, and seeking side payments.
Belloni (1976) and Boucek (2009) express similar ideas. More recently Budge et al.
(2010) explain parties’ policy shifts away from the center as a result of the minority
faction vetoing a moderation.
Yet this approach has some issues when we consider dissent as public attacks against
the leader, rather than dissent as formal defection. In a bargaining game dissent would
be used as a threat, to be executed after the incumbent has made his policy choice.
However, at this point dissent has no e↵ect but to reduce the probability that the party
wins the upcoming election. This strictly decreases both the incumbent’s and the ally’s
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expected payo↵. As such, the threat can never be credible and we should never observe
dissent in equilibrium. Further, even beyond the issue of credibility, in a bargaining
game the materialization of the threat typically lies o↵ the equilibrium path. Hence,
this is arguably not an appropriate framework to understand why political parties so
often experience open dissent.
A second strand of literature considers politicians’ incentives to pander to their
own individual constituencies (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995 and Buisseret and Prato
2018). Politicians may face a trade-o↵ between the national party’s electoral fortunes
and their own success. In particular, this trade-o↵ may emerge if a politician’s local
constituency is opposed to the national party line. Within this framework, dissent may
serve the purpose of signaling the politician’s misalignment with the leadership (and
thus alignment with the constituency’s preferences).
This argument is certainly intuitive (and potentially applies to formal defections as
well as public attacks against the leadership). However, both anecdotal and system-
atic evidence seem to suggest that it does not fully capture the rationale behind this
phenomenon. In particular, according to this framework we should expect the individ-
ual dissenters to be in a relatively weak electoral position (i.e., not to come from safe
constituencies). However, Proksch and Slapin (2015) analyze data from the UK and
Germany and show that, if anything, the opposite holds. Public attacks against the
leadership are (weakly) more likely to come from members of parliament elected with a
larger margin. Further, the authors exploit the features of the German mixed-member
proportional electoral system, and show that members elected with a party-list vote are
as likely to dissent as those elected with a constituency vote. Similarly hard to reconcile
with the ‘pandering’ argument is the emergence of dissent under a closed-list system
such as the Italian one, where the party leader controls the list composition and as such
the dissenter’s electoral fate. This calls for a theory that allows us to make sense of this
phenomenon even when the party members’ individual electoral motives do not provide
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incentives (or worse, provide disincentives) to attack the leadership.
Thus, this paper presents a substantially di↵erent type of model, in which dissent
precedes rather than following the party leader’s strategic choice (in contrast with a
bargaining set-up), and emerges in order to induce a policy response (in contrast with
the pandering set-up).
The core ingredient of the model is the voters’ uncertainty over their optimal choice.
Given the symmetric lack of information, such uncertainty may only be resolved via
experience. This connects the paper with the research on learning and experimentation.
The key intuition therein is that, when deciding which policy to implement today,
politicians consider how the outcome will influence the voters’ future beliefs. Most
extant works assume that the voters must learn about the incumbent’s type, i.e. his
ability or competence. The incumbent chooses between a safe and a risky policy, with
a success on the latter being conditional on the politician being a ‘good type’ (see for
example Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2016; Majumdar and Mukand 2004). Under the
assumption of symmetric uncertainty, a risky policy is always a gamble. This paper
di↵erentiates itself from the extant literature by considering a setting in which the
incumbent’s incentives to gamble arise endogenously from his allies’ strategic behaviour.
Further, the voters must learn about their own policy preferences (i.e. the state of the
world), and not about the o ce holder’s competence.
In this perspective, the paper is closely related to recent work by Callander (2011).
The author considers a world in which players face uncertainty about how policies map
into outcomes: they know the slope of the mapping function (representing the state of
the world), but try to fine-tune their predictions by learning about the exact realization
of the variance. The nature of the uncertainty is reversed in this paper: the voters
must learn the fundamental underlying state of the world. This generates the result
that extreme policies, rather than small incremental changes as in Callander, produce
more information. As such, this paper provides a new framework to think about policy
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experimentation. Additionally, Callander focuses on the statically optimal choice for a
decision maker. He thus chooses to abstract from dynamic considerations, by assuming
either myopic players (Callander 2011) or exogenous retention probabilities (Callander
and Hummel 2014). In contrast, the focus of this paper is precisely on the incumbent’s
dynamic incentives to control information, and on how these impact his policy choices
and the conflict with his ideological allies.
Finally, the paper relates to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion, originated from
the work of Austen-Smith (1998) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In my model, as
in the Bayesian Persuasion framework, the incumbent can engage in information con-
trol by manipulating the receiver’s posterior distribution. In the Bayesian Persuasion
framework the mechanism through which this occurs is somewhat black-boxed. The as-
sumption is that the persuader can choose any desired signal (i.e., realization space and
conditional probability distributions) by designing a ‘test’ or a ‘policy experiment’. The
results of the test do not directly influence the players’ payo↵s, therefore the persuader
must be able to credibly commit to truthfully revealing them to the public. The key
innovation of my paper is therefore to explicitly model how the incumbent can engage
in information control, by looking at the impact that the implemented policy has on
voter learning.
The Model Set-Up
Dissent is analysed within the framework of a principal-agent model, under the assump-
tion that the voters face uncertainty over their ideal policy (the state of the world) and
learn by experience. I focus on dissent within the incumbent party. The players are
therefore the incumbent (I), his ideological ally (A), a challenger (C), and a representa-
tive voter (V ). The incumbent’s ally can represent a minority faction within the party,
media outlets ideological close to the incumbent, donors or even interest groups: any
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actor whose ideological preferences are closer to the incumbent’s than the challenger’s.
At the beginning of the game, the incumbent’s ally chooses whether to dissent
against him. The choice is binary: D 2 {0, 1}. Dissent may entail publicly criticizing
the incumbent’s personality, or manifesting a disagreement with the party line. After
observing his ally’s choice, the incumbent implements a policy x1 along the real line.
The voter chooses whether to retain the incumbent or replace him with his challenger.
The second-period o ce-holder implements a new policy x2 (under the assumption of
no credible commitment).
The voter faces uncertainty over the exact value of her ideal policy xv.1 One way to
interpret this assumption is that the voter does not know which policy is most likely to
produce her preferred outcome. Thus, her uncertainty refers to the slope of the function
mapping policies into outcomes. An alternative interpretation would consider a voter
that knows how di↵erent policies map into outcomes, but can not perfectly anticipate
how these outcomes will impact her payo↵s. The voter’s ideal policy can take one
of two values: xv 2 {↵, ↵¯}. For simplicity (but without loss of generality) I assume
↵ =  ↵¯ < 0. The qualitative results survive if ↵ and ↵¯ have the same sign, that is
if the voter knows whether her ideal policy is a left-wing one or a right-wing one, but
faces uncertainty over its exact location.
The model features no asymmetry of information: no player knows the true value of
xv, and all players assign the same prior probability   to the voter’s ideal policy being
a right-wing one (  = prob(xv = ↵¯)). Given this symmetric uncertainty, learning only
happens via experience. The voter observes how much she liked (or disliked) the first
period policy, and updates on the true value of xv by using Bayes rule.2 Formally, the
1While the model only considers a representative voter, the results do not require all voters to face
such uncertainty. Indeed, some voters may be ideological and have well-defined policy preferences.
The results presented below go through as long as the ‘uncertain’ voters are pivotal in determining the
electoral outcome.
2Whether the incumbent, his allies, and the challenger also observe the voter’s payo↵ realization
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voter’s payo↵ realization is a noisy signal of the state of the world:
U vt =  (xv   xt)2 + ✏t   I  (1)






As I will discuss in more details below, the assumption that the random shock ✏ is
uniformly distributed is not necessary for the results. The parameter   captures the
observation that, everything else being equal, voters dislike parties that appear divided:
if the incumbent experiences dissent in the first period, the voter’s expected utility from
re-electing him is reduced by   (I = 1 if D = 1 and the incumbent is re-elected and
I = 0 otherwise). In other words, I assume that dissent generates an endogenous valence
shock against the party. In order to simplify the analysis and presentation of the results,
I leave the cost of dissent black-boxed. I will discuss possible micro-foundations of this
assumption in a separate section.
Finally, I A and C are policy motivated, and their bliss points are common knowl-
edge:3
U it =  (xi   xt)2 8i 2 {I, A, C} (2)
Without loss of generality, I will consider a right-wing incumbent and a left-wing
challenger: xC  0  xI . For simplicity, I also assume that the candidates’ bliss points
are symmetric around 0: xI =  xC   0. The incumbent and his ally come from
the same side of the ideological spectrum (i.e. are both right-wing), but do not have
is inconsequential for the equilibrium results.
3For purposes of presentation (and to focus on learning via experience) the model assumes away
any asymmetry of information. However, the key insights of the paper would (under some conditions)
survive if we allow the incumbent to have private information about his own preferences or the voter’s
bliss point.
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exactly the same bliss point. However, the ally’s preferences are always closer to the
incumbent’s than to the challenger’s:
|xA   xI | < |xA   xC | (3)






In the Appendix, I show that within this framework dissent can emerge even when
the ally is more moderate than the incumbent, and identify the conditions under which
this occurs in equilibrium.
Timing
1. Nature determines the value of xv 2 {↵, ↵¯}
2. The Incumbent’s Ally chooses whether to dissent against him: D 2 {0, 1}
3. The Incumbent implements a policy x1 2 R
4. The Voter’s first-period payo↵s realize
5. The Voter chooses whether to re-elect the Incumbent or replace him with the
Challenger
6. The second-period o ce holder implements policy x2 2 R (no credible commit-
ment)
7. Second-period payo↵s realize and game ends
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The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In order to avoid trivial
results, I assume that when indi↵erent the incumbent’s ally chooses not to dissent. This
is formally equivalent to assuming an infinitely small material cost of dissenting.
In order to isolate the impact of ideological disagreements, I do not include o ce
rents in the players’ utility function. Whenever the incumbent and his ally do not attach
the same value to winning o ce per se, o ce rents would in fact represent a second
source of conflict. Suppose for example that the ally represents a minority faction within
the party. Should the party win the upcoming election, the incumbent (i.e. the leader
of the majority faction) would arguably grab a larger share of the o ce rents relative to
his ally. This potentially translates into di↵erent risk appetite in policy making, thereby
increasing the conflict of preferences between the incumbent and his allies. Hence, as
long as the value of o ce is not too large, including o ce payo↵s would make dissent
even easier to sustain in equilibrium.
Equilibrium Analysis
As usual, we proceed by backwards induction, starting from the second period’s o ce
holder’s choice. Politicians have no credible commitment ability. As such, given the
absence of re-elections incentives, the second period o ce-holder will always implement
his preferred platform. The voter therefore faces a selection problem. Her electoral
choice will then be determined by the (posterior) beliefs that her own ideal policy is
aligned with the incumbent’s preferred platform, as well as by the presence or absence
of dissent within the incumbent party. Specifically, in any PBE of the game, the voter
re-elects the right wing incumbent if and only if the posterior probability of being






The indi↵erence breaking assumption is without loss of generality. Notice that,
absent dissent, the incumbent is always re-elected as long as µ > 12 . When the incumbent
experiences dissent, the higher the cost  , the higher the voter’s posterior needs to be
to guarantee re-election
Learning and Experimentation
Moving one step backwards, consider the voter’s inference problem. The voter observes
how much she liked or disliked the first period policy, and updates her beliefs on her
ideal policy by using Bayes’ rule. The analysis reveals a crucial feature of the learning
process: the amount of information obtained by the voter depends on the location of
the policy implemented in the first period. Specifically, the voter learns more from more
extreme policies. As the implemented policy becomes more extreme, the distance in
the expected outcomes as a function of the true state increases. As a consequence, each
signal is more informative. In more substantive terms, if the voter likes (dislikes) the
outcome of an extreme policy, such policy is likely (unlikely) to be in line with her true
ideology. However, given the presence of the random shock, the outcome of a moderate
policy is much less informative. This feature emerges in a very stark form in a world in
which the shock is drawn from a uniform distribution.
Lemma 1: The voter learning satisfies the following properties:
(i) Her posterior µ takes one of three values: µ 2 {0,  , 1};
(ii) The more extreme the policy implemented in the first period x1, the higher the prob-
ability that µ 6=  ;





Figure 1: Voter’s payo↵ realization as a function of first-period policy. The thick
increasing (thin decreasing) curves represent the case in which xV = ↵ (xV = ↵). The
solid curves represent the voter’s expected payo↵ E[U v1 ], while the dashed ones represent
E[U v1 ]  12 and E[U v1 ] + 12 
Lemma 1 tells us that the voter either learns everything or nothing. Further, the
probability that the voter discovers her true preferences increases as the implemented
policy becomes more extreme. While a formal proof of this Lemma is presented in
the Appendix A, the underlying reasoning is easy to illustrate graphically. In Figure
1, the solid lines represent the voter’s expected period 1 payo↵ as a function of the
implemented policy, for the two possible values of xv. Thus, the thick increasing solid
curve is  (x1 ↵¯)2 and the thin decreasing solid curve is  (x1 ↵)2. The dashed curves
instead represent the maximum and minimum possible values of the payo↵ realization
when we take the random shock into account. Thus, the thick increasing dashed curves
(representing the state of the world in which xv = ↵¯) are, respectively,  (x1  ↵¯)2 + 12 
and  (x1   ↵¯)2   12 .
The presence of the shock creates a partial overlap in the support of the payo↵
realization for a positive and negative state of the world: for any given policy x1 2
( x0, x0), there exist values of the voter’s payo↵ that may be observed whatever her
true bliss point. Consider, for example, policy x as represented in the graph. Any
payo↵ realization falling between the gray and black bullets may be observed with
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positive probability under both states of the world. Clearly, if the payo↵ realization
falls outside this range of overlap, it constitutes a fully informative signal. There is only
one state of the world that could have generated that specific realization: the voter
simply likes the policy too much, or too little, for this to be justified as a consequence
of the shock. Thus, upon observing her payo↵, the voter learns the true state (i.e.
discovers the true value of xV ). Conversely, any payo↵ realization that falls inside the
range of overlap is completely uninformative. Due to the assumption that the shock is
uniformly distributed, any such realization has exactly the same probability of being
observed under the two states of the world. Thus, the voter learns nothing and must go
back to her prior beliefs. As the implemented policy becomes more extreme, the gray
and black bullets get closer and closer to each other. The range of overlap becomes
smaller, and the voter is more likely to learn the true value of her ideal policy.
Let me emphasize that the results presented below are robust to alternative as-
sumptions about the distribution of the shock, as long as extreme policies are more
informative than moderate ones. Consider for example a world in which the shock is
normally distributed with full support. The learning process would be much smoother:
any outcome realization would be somewhat informative, but never fully so. However,
it would still be the case that extreme policies generate more information. As the im-
plemented policy becomes more extreme, the distance in the expected outcomes as a
function of the state increases. This in turn increases each signal’s informativeness.
Generally speaking, the mechanism that I uncover in this paper relies on the fact that
the policy choice influences the amount of information the voter receives. This is what
allows a dissenting ally to influence the equilibrium policy. As such, the main insights of
the paper would survive in a world in which more moderate (rather than more extreme)
policies are more informative.
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The Incumbent
The voter’s posterior beliefs determine her electoral decision, as shown in Lemma 1.
Since the amount of information the voter observes is a function of the implemented
policy, the incumbent has an incentive to engage in information control. The incumbent
cannot control exactly which signal the voter will observe, but he can determine the
expected probability of such a signal being informative. In other words, he cannot influ-
ence the voter’s expected posterior (which is indeed always equal to the prior), but can
influence its ‘decomposition’. Hence, the first period equilibrium policy maximises the
incumbent’s trade-o↵ between implementing his bliss point today and generating the
optimal amount of information in order to get re-elected tomorrow. The way that this
trade-o↵ is optimised depends on the incumbent’s ex-ante electoral strength. Define
a leading incumbent as one who is guaranteed re-election if the voter receives no new
information (condition (4) is satisfied at µ =  ), and a trailing incumbent as one who
will only be re-elected if the voter updates in his favour (condition (4) fails at µ =  
but is satisfied at µ = 1). A certain loser is an incumbent who is replaced even if the
voter updates in his favour (condition (4) fails to be satisfied at µ = 1). The following
Lemma holds:
Lemma 2: In any PBE of the game
• A certain loser implements his bliss point
(x⇤1 = x
I)
• A leading incumbent implements a policy weakly more moderate than his bliss
point
(x⇤1  xI)




For the incumbent, information revelation is risky. Even if   > 12 , i.e. information is
more likely to help him than hurt him, there is still a chance that the voter will instead
learn that he own ideal policy is aligned with the challenger’s (i.e. that xv = ↵). A
leading incumbent has no reason to accept the risk since he is guaranteed re-election
when the voter does not update. Thus, he has incentives to prevent the voter from
learning, and will always implement a policy that is (weakly) more moderate than his
bliss point. Following Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2017), I say that a leading incumbent
experiences fear of failure. On the contrary, a trailing incumbent needs the voter to
update (in his favour) in order to be re-elected. No matter how small the probability
of success, a trailing incumbent always wants to engage in policy experimentation, so
as to generate as much information as possible and improve its electoral prospects.
Borrowing terminology from the IR literature (Downs and Rocke 1994), I say that this
incumbent has incentives to gamble for resurrection, and always implements a policy
(weakly) more extreme than his bliss point.4 A certain loser trivially has no reason to
engage in information control, since he cannot change the electoral outcome. Hence, he
will always implement exactly his bliss point.5 The exact policies adopted by a leading
and a trailing incumbent are calculated in the Appendix. Such policies are a function
of the bliss point xI , the prior  , and the probability of learning for any given policy
(4↵ ). The following Lemma defines the relationship between the equilibrium policy
4Notice that the incumbent’s behaviour is reminiscent of the results in Groseclose (2001), despite
the two models considering very di↵erent settings. In both papers a leading incumbent moderates
in order to maximise his electoral advantage, while a trailing one moves to the extreme in order to
exploit the variance in the distribution - of expected outcomes in this paper, of voters’ bliss points in
Groseclose.
5The same would apply to an incumbent is always re-elected, for all values of µ and I . However,
given the symmetry assumption, such a case never occurs.
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and the relevant parameters.
In Lemma 3 and the remainder of the paper I will be assuming that xI < x0, where
x0 is the smallest (positive) policy that produces an informative signal with probability
1. The assumption is without loss of generality, and imposed in order to reduce the
number of cases under consideration.
Lemma 3:
• A trailing incumbent’s equilibrium policy
1. becomes (weakly) more extreme as his disadvantage decreases (  increases)
2. becomes (weakly) more extreme as his bliss point increases
• A leading incumbent’s equilibrium policy
1. becomes more extreme as his lead ( ) increases
2. is always increasing in his bliss point when he enjoys a large lead (  > 34).
When his lead is small (  < 34), the policy is non monotonic and concave in
the bliss point
The lower  , the lower the probability that information will be in the incumbent’s
favor. As such, a leading incumbent’s incentives to prevent information generation are
stronger when   is small, and a trailing incumbent’s willingness to gamble is stronger
when   is large. Consider now the incumbent’s bliss point. A trailing incumbent’s
policy choice is always increasing in his bliss point: as the incumbent becomes more
extreme gambling becomes less costly and more valuable (since losing is more costly).
Instead, a leading incumbent faces a trade o↵. As his bliss point becomes more extreme,
preventing information generation becomes more costly today, but also more valuable
for the future (as the challenger is further away and the payo↵ from winning increases).
When the incumbent is too moderate, incentives to prevent information generation are
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weak since the gain from winning the next election is small. The direct e↵ect dominates,
and the equilibrium policy increases in the bliss point. Conversely, when the incumbent
is too extreme, and the prior   is su ciently low, the electoral impact of the policy
choice becomes dominant. As the incumbent’s bliss point increases, winning the next
election is more valuable, and the equilibrium policy becomes more moderate.
Dissent by an Extreme Ally
Moving one step back, we can now focus on the ally’s decision whether to dissent against
the incumbent. First of all, I establish that in equilibrium dissent is always harmful
for the party’s expected electoral performance, even if the incumbent best responds by
modifying his policy choice precisely with the aim of minimizing this e↵ect (as discussed
in Lemma 3).
Lemma 4: In equilibrium dissent always reduces the probability that the incumbent will
be re-elected.
Thus, by dissenting the ally reduces both his own and the incumbent’s expected
second period payo↵. Nonetheless, dissent is sometimes observed in equilibrium. I
show that, under some conditions, the ally faces a trade-o↵ between maximizing the
incumbent’s electoral chances and inducing him to implement a policy more in line with
his (i.e the ally’s) own preferences.
The incumbent’s ideological preferences are always more moderate than his ally’s.
However, by dissenting (and thereby harming the party in the upcoming election), the
ally can induce him to implement a more extreme policy. Consider a leading incumbent.
Absent dissent, he would always implement a policy (weakly) more moderate than his
bliss point, in order to reduce the probability that the voter updates her beliefs about
her true preferences. Suppose now that the incumbent’s ally chooses to dissent against
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him. If the electoral cost is su ciently large, this turns the leading incumbent into a
trailing one. As Lemma 2 indicates, this creates incentives for the incumbent to gamble
on resurrection: engage in extreme policies that increase the amount of voter learning.
Thus, electorally costly dissent would move the incumbent’s equilibrium policy choice
to the extreme, closer to the ally’s own preferences. When the gain is su ciently large
relative to the cost of losing the upcoming election, the ally chooses to dissent in equi-
librium. Proposition 1 identifies necessary and su cient conditions for this to occur
(the proofs can be found in Appendix A). 6
Proposition 1: There exist  ,  , xA and xI such that the incumbent’s extreme ally
chooses to dissent if and only if:
• Absent dissent, the incumbent is leading, but his advantage is not too large
  <   <  , where     12
• The electoral cost of dissent is su ciently high that it turns the leading incumbent
into a trailing one, but not so high that the incumbent loses for sure
(2    1)4↵¯xI    < 4↵¯xI
• Both the incumbent and his ally are su ciently extreme
xI > xI and xA > xA > xI
The thresholds in Proposition 1 are a function of the other parameters in the model.
6In this paper I focus on dissent against an incumbent. However, the model can also be applied
to explain the emergence of dissent within challenger parties. The challenger’s ideological allies may
want to openly attack him, thereby damaging the party in the upcoming election, so as to alter the
incumbent’s incentives to engage in information control. Within this framework, the challenger’s allies
use dissent to modify the incumbent’s strategic choice, rather than to solve an ideological conflict
within their own party. As such, dissent can emerge even absent any ideological disagreement, i.e. if
the challenger and his allies have perfectly aligned preferences.
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Intuition may suggest that dissent is more likely to materialize during periods of
electoral crisis. The party is expected to perform poorly, and the ensuing internal
turmoil degenerates into an open manifestation of conflict. The first result shows that,
in the case of an extreme ally, the opposite is true. Suppose the incumbent is trailing
even without experiencing dissent. Absent dissent, he will implement a policy that is
weakly more extreme than his bliss point: he needs to generate information in order to
be re-elected. Dissent either has no impact on his policy choice (if   is so small that it
does not a↵ect the voter’s electoral decision), or induces him to implement exactly his
bliss point (if   is su ciently large to turn him into a sure loser). Hence, by dissenting
the ally causes the incumbent to adopt a (weakly) more moderate policy, while also
(weakly) reducing his own future expected payo↵. Then, dissent is never observed
in equilibrium. It is only when the incumbent is leading (i.e.   > 12) that the ally
(potentially) gains from dissent by creating incentives to gamble for resurrection.
The second set of results refers to the electoral cost of dissent ( ). Quite intuitively,
dissent never emerges in equilibrium when its electoral cost is so large that it makes
the incumbent lose for sure. In this scenario the expected loss would be maximized,
while the gain for the extreme ally would be minimized. Recall that an incumbent
who is a sure loser has no reason to control information, and will always implement
exactly his bliss point. Thus, while dissent would be somewhat e↵ective in modifying
the equilibrium policy, it could not induce the incumbent to move beyond his bliss
point. The policy gain would be too small for the incumbent’s ally to be willing to pay
the cost of losing the upcoming election for sure. However, perhaps more surprisingly,
the analysis also reveals that for dissent to be observed in equilibrium its electoral cost
( ) cannot be too small either. Recall that an incumbent is leading if the voter would
choose to re-elect him upon receiving no new information. If   is too small (relative to
the prior  ), then the incumbent is still leading even after experiencing dissent. In this

















Figure 2: E↵ect of dissent on the equilibrium policy ((x⇤1|D = 1)  (x⇤1|D = 0))
equilibrium policy. Trivially, the incumbent’s ally has no reason to dissent in the first
place. Thus, the electoral cost of dissent ( ) must be su ciently large so as to turn a
leading incumbent into a trailing one.
The second set of conditions on the prior   (  <   <  ) ensures that the ally’s gain
from dissent outweighs the future expected cost. Recall that   is the probability that
the voter’s true preferences are aligned with the incumbent’s (i.e. xv = ↵). As such, the
higher  , the lower a leading incumbent’s incentives to prevent the voter from learning
by implementing a moderate policy. As a consequence, the e↵ect of dissent on the
equilibrium policy is (weakly) decreasing in  . When   is too large (i.e. the incumbent
enjoys a large lead) dissent therefore has a very small impact on the equilibrium policy,
and the ally has no reason to pay the associated electoral cost. Conversely, if   is too
small the probability that the party would win the election after experiencing dissent
is too low (recall that a trailing incumbent is re-elected only if the voter updates in his
favor). Losing the upcoming election is very costly for the incumbent’s extreme ally,
therefore dissent is never observed in equilibrium.
Finally, let us now focus on the ideological misalignment between the incumbent
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and his allies. Such misalignment represents the only source of conflict in the model.
Yet, Proposition 1 shows that increasing the ideological distance between the incumbent
and his ally does not always make dissent more likely to emerge. Indeed, while only a
su ciently extreme ally may be willing to dissent, for this to occur in equilibrium the
incumbent himself must be su ciently extreme. Dissent cannot force the incumbent to
implement any specific policy. The incumbent’s ally can only influence his equilibrium
choice by creating incentives to gamble on resurrection by engaging in policy experi-
mentation. However, if the incumbent is too moderate, such incentives are too weak:
gambling is too costly, and not very valuable. It is costly as it entails implementing
extreme policies, potentially very far from the incumbent’s bliss point. It is not very
valuable since for a moderate incumbent the gain from winning the upcoming election is
small (the distance from the opposition is small). Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the impact
of dissent on the incumbent’s choice is increasing in his bliss point (the vertical axis
represents the di↵erence between the equilibrium policy with and without dissent). If
the incumbent is too moderate dissent will have a very small e↵ect on the equilibrium
policy. This reduces the ally’s gain, and hence incentives to dissent in the first place.
This result highlights the peculiar nature of dissent. in this model, which brings about
unity even if no player actually cares about unity per se. Dissent serves the purpose of
realigning the interests of the incumbent and his ally, thereby recomposing the existing
ideological conflict. However, for dissent to be e↵ective, such conflict cannot be too
deep.
Comparative Statics: the Ambiguous Impact of the Ideological Conflict be-
tween the Incumbent and His Allies
Proposition 1 indicates that a necessary condition for dissent to occur in equilibrium
is that   falls within a certain range. The larger this range, the ‘more likely’ it is that
dissent will be observed in equilibrium (in the sense of set inclusion). Proposition 2
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describes how the size of this range (and therefore the likelihood of observing dissent)
varies with the incumbent’s and his ally’s bliss points.
Proposition 2:
• The likelihood of observing dissent (weakly) increases as the ally becomes more
extreme
• There exists a unique bxI(xA) > xI such that if xI < bxI(xA), then the likelihood of
observing dissent increases as the incumbent becomes more extreme
In line with the above discussion, Proposition 2 further highlights that the ideolog-
ical conflict between the incumbent and his ally (i.e the distance between their bliss
points) has an ambiguous e↵ect on the probability of observing dissent. Increasing the
ideological conflict either increases or decreases the likelihood of dissent, depending on
whether the incumbent becomes more moderate or his ally more extreme. When the
ideological misalignment increases due to the incumbent’s ally becoming more extreme,
dissent always becomes more likely. The more extreme the ally is, the more he gains
by moving the equilibrium policy closer to his bliss point. However, the same is not
necessarily true when the ideological conflict deepens due to the incumbent becoming
more moderate. The intuition is exactly the same as discussed in relation to Propo-
sition 1. As the incumbent becomes more extreme both a direct and indirect e↵ects
emerge. The direct e↵ect is straightforward: the distance in the policy preferences of
the incumbent and his ally decreases. This reduces the ally’s incentives to dissent. The
indirect e↵ect goes in the opposite direction. As the incumbent becomes more extreme,
dissent has a larger impact on his equilibrium policy choice. This in turn increases the
ally’s gain from dissent. If the incumbent’s bliss point is su ciently close to zero, this




Can the presence of the incumbent’s extreme ally be welfare improving for the voter? In
the model, the voter values policy experimentation as it increases the probability that
she will make the correct electoral decision. As such, her first-period preferred platform
maximizes the trade-o↵ between her ex-ante ideological preferences (as dictated by her
prior beliefs) and the need to learn about her ideal policy. However, the results pre-
sented above indicate that, under some conditions, electoral accountability may have
the perverse consequence of inducing a lower lever of experimentation than what is
optimal for the voter. The incumbent’s extreme ally may mitigate such ine ciency, by
inducing the incumbent to engage in extreme policies that increase the amount of voter
learning. If the value of acquiring new information is su ciently large, this strictly in-
creases the voter’s expected utility in the whole game. Proposition 3 identifies su cient
conditions for this to be true.
Proposition 3: In equilibrium the voter benefits from the presence of an extreme ally
to the incumbent party if:
• The cost of dissent   is su ciently large that it turns the leading incumbent into
a trailing one, but not so large that it always hurts the voter ex ante (  <   <  w)
• The value of information is su ciently high
– The prior ( ) is su ciently close to 12 (
1
2 <   <  w)
– Incumbent and challenger are moderately polarized (xIw < x
I < xIw)
– Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s prefer-
ences (↵¯ > ↵¯w)
• The incumbent’s ally is su ciently extreme (xA > xAw)
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The first two conditions are intuitive: the voter must not dislike dissent too much,
and obtaining new information must be su ciently valuable. For this to be true, the
voter’s prior must be su ciently uninformative (i.e. close to 12), and the value of making
the correct electoral decision must to be large enough. The third condition seems more
puzzling: as the ally becomes more extreme the ideological misalignment with the
voter increases. However, recall that the ally’s bliss point has no direct e↵ect on the
equilibrium policy choice, thus on the voter’s welfare. The e↵ect is only an indirect
one, through the ally’s willingness to dissent. Since the first conditions impose further
restrictions on the parameters, for the incumbent’s ally to be willing to dissent when
such conditions are satisfied (and therefore dissent is beneficial for the voter) he must
be su ciently extreme.
The normative implications of the results presented above are reminiscent of the
‘case for responsible parties’, presented by Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009).
The authors find that, in a world in which the exact location of voters’ preferences is un-
known, all voters ex-ante prefer some degree of platform divergence between competing
parties. However, electoral incentives may induce an excessive convergence in parties’
platforms, thus ultimately hurting the voters. Therefore, as in this paper, a positive
role of ideological extremism in the political elite emerges. In Bernhardt, Duggan and
Squintani, all voters benefit from a moderate degree of parties’ ideological extremism
(polarization), that can guarantee an optimal level of platform divergence. In this pa-
per, the incumbent’s extreme ally can mitigate the perverse consequences created by
electoral incentives, inducing an optimal level of policy experimentation.7
These results also speak to the debate on the normative evaluation of party factions.
7It is important to highlight that other mechanisms through which politicians’ ideological polar-
ization may prove welfare improving have also been identified. Van Weelden (2015) for example shows
that polarization in the candidates’ preferences decreases rent-seeking in equilibrium, unambiguously
increasing voters’ welfare for appropriate parameters.
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The debate dates back to the 19th century. As noted by Boucek (2009), negative per-
ceptions of factionalism originated with Hume (1877) and are still predominant. The
main argument within this tradition is that factions ‘exacerbate non-cooperative be-
haviour and so are antithetical to achievement of common goals’ (Dewan and Squintani
2015, 861). A ‘defence of factions’ comes from the claim that organized and ideolog-
ically cohesive subgroups within political parties facilitate deliberation and pooling of
valuable information, and therefore enhance the quality of the party’s policy proposals.
The argument is advanced initially by Bouceck herself (2009), investigated empirically
by McAllister (1991), and proven formally by Dewan and Squintani (2015). The more
or less implicit assumption is that factions engage in accommodative rather than dis-
ruptive activities (McAllister 1991). This paper moves one step further, showing that
factionalism may have a positive value even when factions engage in ‘disruptive’ activ-
ities.
Micro Founding the Electoral Cost of Dissent
A key assumption of the paper is that dissent is electorally costly: everything else
being equal, dissent reduces the probability that the incumbent is re-elected. In the
model this cost is black-boxed, as this substantially simplifies both the analysis and
interpretation of the results. However, it is worth discussing about potential ways to
micro-found this assumption. Why do voters dislike parties that experience dissent?
One possibility is that dissent ‘mechanically’ reduces voters’ appreciation of political
parties. In this sense, the parameter   would represent a behavioral ‘bias’ in the voters’
preferences. It is well recognized that voters tend to like charismatic leaders (Groseclose
2001). Perhaps when the incumbent is publicly criticized by his own allies, or ridiculed
by the media, this negatively a↵ects voters’ perception of the party.
However, dissent may be electorally costly even if voters are fully rational. Dissent
43
may harm the party electorally because it conveys negative information to the voters.
Voters do not dislike divided parties per se, rather the observation of dissent causes
them to negatively update their beliefs over the incumbent’s honesty, competence, etc.
Dissent may convey such information in two di↵erent ways.
First, if the incumbent’s allies have access to verifiable information, by dissenting
they can expose him as a liar, corrupt or incompetent. The specification and results of
this model would be exactly as presented above, with   representing the electoral value
of competence (net of the probability that the challenger is a good type). Under the
conditions identified in Proposition 1, the allies choose to dissent whenever they can
reveal evidence that the incumbent is a bad type. If the conditions are not met, the allies
always keep quiet. The only di↵erence with the model presented here is that, because
verifiable information cannot be fabricated, dissent can never emerge in equilibrium if
the incumbent is a good type.
Alternatively, we may assume that the incumbent’s allies do not have access to such
verifiable evidence. Nonetheless, they may have an informational advantage with re-
spect to the voters. For example, the allies may scrutinize the incumbent’s previous
actions and performance, thereby obtaining additional information about his true com-
petence (see Caillaud and Tirole 1999, Fox and Van Weelden 2010). As such, the allies
can engage in a signaling game with the electorate. Dissent is electorally costly when,
in equilibrium, it constitutes a negative signal of the incumbent’s type. However, for
dissent to emerge when it is electorally costly (i.e. under separation or semi-separation),
the gain from changing the incumbent’s policy choice must be su ciently large. The
qualitative results would then be as in the reduced-form model presented above.8
In concluding this section let me emphasize that, while the assumption of electorally
8Some additional conditions are however required to sustain separation. The ally must care su -
ciently about quality, and he cannot be too extreme, as otherwise he would have incentives to dissent
even when the incumbent is a good type.
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costly dissent is motivated by both empirical evidence and the theoretical reasoning
presented above, the mechanism identified in this paper relies only on the voters not
being indi↵erent to dissent (i.e.   6= 0). Indeed, it would survive in a world in which
dissent produces a positive valence shock (i.e.   < 0), thus improving rather than
damaging a party’s electoral prospects. Clearly, under such an assumption the puzzle
would be reversed: if dissent is beneficial to a party, how do we explain cases in which
we do not observe dissent? The mechanism identified in this paper would provide a
potential answer. An extreme ally may choose not to improve its party’s electoral
prospects, in order to preserve the incumbent’s incentives to gamble for resurrection.
Extension: What if the Ally Has Bargaining Power?
So far I have assumed that the incumbent is essentially a policy dictator. His allies have
no formal bargaining power, and dissent is the only tool to influence the equilibrium
policy. This assumption is plausible if we consider dissent by ideological allies external
to the party (such as ideologically aligned media), but perhaps less so if we focus
on factional dissent. To be sure, institutional features such as the vote of confidence
procedure (in parliamentary systems) may grant large discretion to the party leader.
However, it is also possible that the minority faction will have some bargaining power
(perhaps due to the credible threat of a formal defection/party split) and therefore
influence over policy.
Are the results of this paper robust to assuming that the incumbent’s allies have
bargaining power over the policy making process? To address this question, I analyse
the model under the assumption that, in the first period, the incumbent maximises a
weighted average of his own and his ally’s utility:
UW1 = (1   )U I +  UA (5)
45
This is equivalent to considering (in a reduced form) a game in which after the
incumbent’s ally chooses whether to dissent against him, the two engage in in a bar-
gaining game over the policy choice.   thus represents the ally’s influence over policy
making in the first period. There are two reasons to consider a setting in which the
ally has bargaining power in the first period only. First, it is plausible to argue that
faction’s bargaining power comes from the threat of a formal defection. Such a threat
is credible when the ally (i.e. the dissenting faction) has a su ciently high chance of
winning the upcoming election if running alone after a party split (as for example in
Mutlu-Eren 2015; Hortala-Vallve and Mueller 2015). Since there is no election after
the second period, the ally has no way to make a credible threat. Additionally, as-
suming that the ally has bargaining power only over the first period policy is a way
to obtain a meaningful comparison with the baseline model. Suppose that the second
period policy is also determined via a bargaining process. Recall that dissent occurs
in equilibrium only if the incumbent is leading. In the baseline model this requires
  > 12 (since incumbent and challenger are assumed to be symmetric). If the extreme





2 . Therefore, when comparing the bargaining extension
to the baseline model, I would not only be altering the   parameter, but also imposing
further conditions on  , which would make the comparison less meaningful.
It is straightforward to see why bargaining power and dissent are, to a certain extent,
substitutes. Dissent is a tool to influence the incumbent’s equilibrium policy choice.
When the ally has some formal control over policy making (  > 0), the incentives to
pay the electoral cost of dissent are weaker. Indeed, in the limiting case in which the
ally is given full authority over policy (  = 1), he will never choose to dissent against
himself.
However, the results uncover a second and more subtle e↵ect. Bargaining power and
dissent will sometimes complement rather than substitute each other, so that dissent
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is more likely to be observed compared to the case in which the incumbent is a policy
dictator. Recall that, in the no-bargaining baseline, dissent emerges in equilibrium only
if the incumbent is su ciently extreme; if the incumbent is too moderate, the incen-
tives to gamble are too weak and dissent has too little an e↵ect on the equilibrium
policy. However, if the ally is given formal authority over policy making, it can e↵ec-
tively ‘compensate’ for an excessively moderate incumbent, so that dissent can emerge
in equilibrium for every (positive) value of the incumbent’s bliss point. The following
holds:
Proposition 4: For all xI   0, there exist non-measure zero sets  (xI) and B(xI) such
that if   2  (xI) and   2 B(xI) then dissent by an extreme ally occurs in equilibrium
The sets B(xI) and  (xI) also depend on the other parameters. Proposition 4 shows
that the mechanism uncovered in the paper is robust to assuming that the ally has for-
mal bargaining power, arising for example from a credible threat of defection or party
split. Additionally – as discussed above – when the incumbent is su ciently moderate
(xI is su ciently close to zero)   > 0 is a necessary condition to observe dissent in
equilibrium. The following corollary also holds:
Corollary 1: Suppose that 18↵ < x
I and 14↵ < x
A < 14↵ (1 2↵ xI) . Then, for all
  2 [0, 1), there exists a non-measure zero set  ( ) such that if   2  ( ) dissent by an
extreme ally occurs in equilibrium
The corollary shows that even if the ally is granted almost full discretion over the
first period policy (  approaches 1), he will still choose to dissent under some conditions.
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Empirical Implications and Falsifiability
Before concluding, it is important to explore the theory’s implications for empirical
research, and to discuss how the model’s predictions may allow us to adjudicate between
competing explanations for the emergence of dissent.
Several scholars have recognized that, as highlighted in this paper, party unity
may have a crucial impact on electoral outcomes. Trying to quantify the electoral
cost of dissent is therefore an important empirical exercise, useful to complete our
understanding of electoral competition and accountability. The strategy employed in the
extant literature is to regress the probability of winning (or other measures of electoral
success) at time t on a binary variable indicating whether the party experienced dissent
at time t  1 (e.g. Clark 2009, Kam 2009, Groeling 2010):
prob(Wi = 1) = ↵ +  1Xi +  2Di + ✏i (6)
Where Xi is a vector of covariates, and  2 is the coe cient of interest. Graphically,
the quantity of interest is the average distance between the two curves in Figure 3,
representing the probability of winning as a function of the party’s ex-ante electoral
strength ( ), with and without dissent.
The results of the model have two key implications. First of all, they show that it
is impossible to isolate the direct e↵ect, i.e. voter’s dislike of parties that experience
dissent. The incumbent modifies his policy choice precisely with the aim of mitigating
the electoral cost of dissent. Thus, any estimate would at best reflect the equilibrium
e↵ect of dissent on electoral success: the cost mediated through the incumbent’s best
response. Additionally, the model shows that any such estimate would inevitably suf-
fer from selection bias. Proposition 1 shows that whether parties experience dissent
depends precisely on their ex-ante electoral strength (  needs to be moderately high).


















Figure 3: Probability of Winning as Function of Ex-ante Strength ( ).
The blue line represents the probability of winning when the incumbent experiences no
dissent. The red line represents the probability of winning conditional on experiencing
dissent.
ex-ante electoral strength. Figure 4 represents what the researcher can actually observe:
treated units, i.e. parties that experience dissent, at moderately high levels of electoral
strength and untreated ones at   close to 12 and 1. Comparing parties that experience
dissent with their untreated counterparts means comparing parties with di↵erent levels
of ex-ante electoral strength. Thus, it is impossible to recover an unbiased estimate of
the (equilibrium) e↵ect of dissent on parties’ electoral performance.
Further, it is hard to know ex-ante what the direction of the bias in the results
will be. In the example of Figure 4, the direction of the bias would be upward: the
estimated electoral cost of dissent would be higher than the true one. However, under
di↵erent parameter values, the dissenting region shifts. Consider for example Figure 5,
obtained by increasing the ally’s bliss point: dissent emerges only at higher values of
  (compared to the case illustrated in Figure 4). In this case the direction of the bias
is no longer clear. Indeed, the estimate may even have the wrong sign. Due to the
selection bias, parties that experience dissent may perform better than ‘control’ units.
















Figure 4: Probability of Winning as Function of Ex-ante Strength ( ) - Observable
of this type of analysis.
However, this does not imply that the theory is not falsifiable. Indeed, the model
generates predictions regarding the electoral performance of parties that do experience
dissent. If we focus on this restricted sample, thereby avoiding the problem of selection
bias described above, we can still say something on when dissent is expected to harm
parties the most.
When a party experiences dissent, winning the upcoming election requires the voter
to discover her true preferences (and update in favour of the party). The probability of
the voter learning is obviously higher in high information environments. The larger the
amount of information received by the voters, and their ability to interpret such infor-
mation, the higher the probability of winning conditional on experiencing dissent. Thus,
when considering a regression with the probability of winning conditional on dissent as
dependent variable, we should expect to see a positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient for variables such as news media consumption, education or political engagement
in the population. Additionally, irrespective of the noisiness of the information environ-
ment, the incumbent must be willing to gamble and engage in policy experimentation.
















Figure 5: Probability of Winning as Function of Ex-ante Strength, xA > xA
cess to be increasing in the leader’s ideological extremism. The more extreme the party
leader is, the more he will be willing to gamble (gambling is both less costly and more
valuable), the more likely it is that the policy outcome will be informative.
Finally, it is important to discuss whether the theory’s empirical implications may
allow us to distinguish it from alternative explanations for the emergence of electorally
costly dissent.One possibility is that dissent emerges when politicians face a trade-o↵
between the national party’s electoral fortune and their individual success. This theory,
and the di↵erences with the argument presented here, have already been discussed in
the literature review. Here, it is important to add that the mechanism identified in this
paper applies not only to intra-party dissent but also to cases in which the party leader
is attacked by ideological allies external to the party (such as media outlets, as discusses
in the introduction). The same does not seem to hold for the explanation relying on
the trade o↵ between individual and collective reputation.
Another possibility is that the dissenters are trying to damage the leader so as to
make it easier to depose him. Within this framework, dissent should emerge when the
leader is expected to perform poorly in the upcoming elections. Yet, this is not always
the case. In the Italian example, dissent exploded against a leader who was expected to
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bring the party to electoral success. This is in line with the predictions of Proposition
1, according to which dissent by an extreme ally emerges when the incumbent is leading
and expected to win with a su ciently high probability. Finally, it is important to stress
that if the dissenters’ goal is to replace the dominant faction and take over the party
(rather than simply depose the incumbent leader), then this argument complements
the one proposed in this paper. For an extreme faction to take over, it has to believe
that it has a chance of winning the election. When the electorate is too moderate,
this requires changing voters’ policy preferences. That is, the faction has incentives to
force the incumbent leader to experiment, just like in the present model. As such, the
framework presented here could explain dissent for pure policy-motivated reasons (as
in the current paper) or for both policy and instrumental reasons (taking over). In this
perspective allowing for replacement does not alter (and if anything strengthens) the
qualitative insights presented here.
Conclusion
Political leaders often experience dissent by their own ideological allies despite this
being electorally harmful. In order to address this puzzle, I have presented a political
agency model in which voters are learning about their own policy preferences over
time. The first contribution of the paper is to provide a new framework to study policy
experimentation. Within this framework, the amount of voter learning depends on the
location of the implemented policy, with extreme policies generating more information.
As a consequence, leading incumbents have incentives to implement moderate platforms,
while trailing ones want to engage in extreme policies that generate more information.
Within this setting, dissent emerges precisely because it is electorally costly. By
dissenting (and thereby harming the party in the upcoming election) the incumbent’s
ally can change his incentives to choose more or less extreme policies, which a↵ects
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the amount of voter learning. This creates a trade-o↵ between winning the upcoming
election and inducing the incumbent to pursue the ally’s all-things-considered more-
preferred policy. Optimally balancing this trade-o↵ sometimes involves active dissent
that damages the party in the short-run. We observe dissent in equilibrium when
the ensuing electoral cost is su ciently high, the incumbent’s bliss point is su ciently
biased in the direction of his ally, and the voter’s prior that her preferences are in line
with the incumbent’s is moderately high. The results are robust to assuming that the
allies have formal bargaining power over the first period policy. Further, the results
indicate that the presence of extremists within the incumbent party may be welfare
improving for the voter, inducing an optimal amount of policy experimentation by the
o ce holder. The theory also has relevant implications for empirical research, showing
that existing estimates of the electoral rewards of party unity obtained by comparing
treated and control units are inevitably biased. However, the model generates testable
predictions regarding parties’ electoral performance conditional on dissent.
In this paper I have assumed that an ideological conflict underlies the emergence
of this form of dissent. However, within the same framework dissent can arise even
absent any ideological disagreement. For example, the incumbent and his ally may
have the same bliss point but di↵erent access to (or evaluation of) o ce rents. This
induces di↵erent risk appetite in policy making, thereby potentially generating a conflict
in preferences. Similarly, the two actors may disagree about their beliefs over the
voters’ ideal policy. Suppose, for example, that the ally assigns a higher probability
to the voter’s true preferences being aligned with the party’s. Then, the ally would
always prefer a (weakly) more extreme policy relative to the incumbent. As in the
model presented here, electorally costly dissent would therefore serve the purpose of
incentivizing the incumbent to engage in policy experimentation, (re)creating unity of
interests with his ideological allies.
Finally, while this paper has focused on intra-party conflict, the mechanism it un-
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covers applies more generally. Indeed, it can capture the dynamics of the interaction
between political actors in any strategic situation that can be described as a principal
agent model with two key features. First, there is some (common) uncertainty on what
is the principal’s optimal retention decision, and the amount of information that is gen-
erated is a function of the agent’s action. The principal’s uncertainty can refer to her
ideal policy, as in the model presented here, or to the agent’s type, e.g. his ability or
competence. Second, the agent’s ally (i.e. an actor whose payo↵ is higher when the
agent is retained than when he is replaced) can take an action that, everything else
constant, changes the probability that the agent is retained. In this setting, the ally
can choose to manipulate the probability that the agent is retained in order to alter
his incentives to generate more or less information. This creates a trade o↵ between
ensuring that the agent is retained, and inducing him to take an action closer to the
ally’s own preferences. The agent’s action may refer to a level of e↵ort, a point in the
policy space, the degree of reform, or even the amount of rent extraction. As such, this
framework can be applied to several di↵erent settings, encompassing both developed
and developing democracies, as well as authoritarian countries.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1: The voter learning satisfies the following properties:
(i) Her posterior µ takes one of three values: µ 2 {0,  , 1};
(ii) The more extreme the policy implemented in the first period x1, the higher the prob-
ability that µ 6=  ;
(iii) There exists a policy x0 such that if |x1|   |x0|, then µ 6=   with probability 1.
Proof. The proof of Claims 1 and 2 below is necessary and su cient to prove Lemma
1.
Claim 1: Let xt   0.
(i) A payo↵ realization U vt /2 [ (xt   ↵¯)2   12 , (xt   ↵)2 + 12 ] is fully informative.
Upon observing U vt >  (xt   ↵)2 + 12 , the players form posterior beliefs that xv = ↵¯
with probability 1. Similarly, upon observing U vt <  (xt   ↵¯)2   12 the players form
beliefs that xv = ↵ with probability 1.
(ii) A payo↵ realization U vt 2 [ (xt  ↵¯)2  12 , (xt ↵)2+ 12 ], is uninformative. Upon
observing U vt , players confirm their prior belief that x
v = ↵¯ with probability  .
Symmetric results apply when xt < 0.
Proof. The proof of part (i) is trivial given the boundedness of the distribution of ✏,
and is therefore omitted. Part (ii) follows straightforwardly from applying Bayes rule.
Recall that the voter’s payo↵ realization U vt is a function of the implemented policy (xt)
the voter’s true bliss point (xv) and the noise term (✏): U vt =  (xv   xt)2 + ✏. Denote
as f(·) the PDF of ✏. Then,
prob(xv = ↵¯|U vt ) =
f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2) 
f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2)  + f(U vt + (xt   ↵)2)(1   )
(7)
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Given the assumption that ✏ is uniformly distributed
f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2) = f(U vt + (xt   ↵)2) (8)
Therefore the above simplifies to
prob(xv = ↵¯|U vt ) =   (9)
This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 proves that players either observe an uninformative or a fully informative
signal. Claim 2 shows that the policy choice determines the expected probability that
the signal will be informative. The more extreme the implemented policy, the higher
such probability.
Claim 2: Let L be a binary indicator, taking value 1 if the players learn the true value
of xv at the end of period 1, and 0 otherwise. There exists x0 = 14↵¯ such that
• For all |x1|   |x0|
Prob(L = 1|x1) = 1 (10)
• For all x1 2 [0, x0)
Prob(L = 1|x0   x1   0) = 4↵¯ x1 (11)
• For all x1 2 ( x0, 0]
Prob(L = 1|  x0  x1  0) =  4↵¯ x1 (12)
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Proof. Let me first prove the existence of point x0. From Claim 1, x0 is the point such
that for any policy |x|   |x0|, the interval [ (xt   ↵¯)2   12 , (xt   ↵)2 + 12 ] is empty.
This requires
  (xt   ↵)2 + 1
2 
+ (xt   ↵¯)2 + 1
2 
 0 (13)




To complete the proof, assume x1 2 [0, x0]. The expected probability of the realized
outcome being informative is
Prob(L = 1| , 0 < x1 < x0) =
 [Prob( (xt   ↵¯)2 + ✏1 >  (xt   ↵)2 + 12 )] + (1   )[Prob( (xt   ↵)2 + ✏1 <  (xt   ↵¯)2   12 )] (15)
Given the symmetry
Prob( (xt ↵¯)2+✏1 >  (xt ↵)2+ 1
2 




Prob(L = 1|x1 > 0) = Prob( (xt   ↵¯)2 + ✏1 >  (xt   ↵)2 + 1
2 
)) = 4↵¯ x1 (17)
Similar calculations produce the result for x1 2 ( x0, 0].
This concludes the proof of Claim 2
61
This concludes the proof of Lemma 1
In what follows I will assume that xI < 14↵¯ . This assumption is without loss of
generality, and imposed in order to reduce the number of cases under consideration;
results for the case in which xI > 14↵¯ are available upon request.
Lemma 2: In any PBE of the game
• A certain loser implements his bliss point
(x⇤1 = x
I)
• A leading incumbent implements a policy weakly more moderate than his bliss
point
(x⇤1  xI)
• A trailing incumbent implements a policy weakly more extreme than his bliss
point
(x⇤1   xI)
Proof. The proof of the first point is trivial: a certain loser is never re-elected, hence his
policy choice does not influence his future payo↵. He maximises his immediate utility
by implementing his bliss point xI . Leading and trailing incumbents will instead con-
sider the expected informativeness of the policy, and how it influences their probability
of re-election.
Consider first a trailing incumbent. Electoral concerns create incentives to imple-





 (x1   xI)2   (1  4↵¯ x1 )(xI + xI)2   4↵¯ x1 (xI   xI)2








The condition that x1  14↵ derives from the fact that any policy weakly more
extreme than x0 = 14↵ is fully informative, therefore the leading incumbent would have
no reason to move beyond x0 (recall that we assume xI < x0).
Consider now a leading incumbent. The equilibrium policy will maximise the trade-
o↵ between implementing his true bliss point today, and generating as little information
as possible, so as to increase the probability of being re-elected tomorrow. The equilib-
rium policy solves the following maximisation problem:
maximise
x1
 (x1   xI)2   4↵¯ x1(1   )(xI + xI)2   (1  4↵¯ x1(1   ))(xI   xI)2
subject to x1   0
(20)
Hence:
x⇤1 = max{xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ), 0} (21)
An incumbent may only be leading if   > 12 . Additionally, x
I < 14↵¯ by assumption.
Thus, xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ) > 0 and
x⇤1 = x
I   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ) (22)
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Lemma 3:
• A trailing incumbent’s equilibrium policy
1. becomes (weakly) more extreme as his disadvantage decreases (  increases)
2. becomes(weakly) more extreme as his bliss point increases
• A leading incumbent’s equilibrium policy
1. becomes more extreme as his lead ( ) increases
2. always becomes more extreme as his bliss point increases, when he enjoys a
large lead (  > 34). When the lead is moderate (  <
3
4), the policy is non
monotonic and concave in the bliss point
The proof is omitted since it follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4: In equilibrium dissent always (weakly) reduces the probability that the in-
cumbent will be re-elected.
Proof. Let xd be the incumbent’s policy choice after dissent, and x the policy that he
would choose otherwise. Consider first of all a leading incumbent. We must distinguish
between three cases: (i)   <   such that the incumbent’s initial advantage is not
outweighed (i.e.   >  +4↵¯ x
I
8↵¯ xI ). In this case dissent does not modify the incumbent’s
policy choice nor the voter’s electoral decision. (ii)      ¯ such that the incumbent
always loses after dissent (i.e     4↵¯xI). The claim follows straightforwardly. (iii)
  2 [ ;  ¯), such that the incumbent wins if and only if the voter updates in his favour
(i.e. dissent turns the leading incumbent into a trailing one). The following holds.
Let ⇡(x1) be the probability of the voter observing an informative signal at the end of
period 1, as a function of the implemented policy. The probability of the incumbent
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being re-elected absent dissent is 1   ⇡(x)(1    ). The probability of the incumbent
being re-elected after dissent is instead ⇡(xd) . 1   ⇡(x)(1    )   ⇡(xd) , since the
LHS is at least 1   (1    ) =   and the RHS is at most  . Finally, consider a trailing
incumbent. There are only two possibilities: (i)   >   such that after experiencing
dissent the incumbent loses for sure. The claim follows trivially (ii)      such that the
incumbent is still trailing even after experiencing dissent. Dissent has no impact on the
policy choice, nor on the voter’s electoral decision.
Proposition 1: There exist  ,  , xA and xI such that the incumbent’s extreme ally
chooses to dissent if and only if:
• Absent dissent, the incumbent is leading, but his advantage is not too large
  <   <  , where     12
• The electoral cost of dissent is su ciently high that it turns the leading incumbent
into a trailing one, but not so high that the incumbent loses for sure
(2    1)4↵¯xI    < 4↵¯xI
• Both the incumbent and his ally are su ciently extreme
xI > xI and xA > xA > xI
Proof. Let me first prove that dissent is never observed in equilibrium if the incum-
bent is trailing.9 Absent dissent, a trailing incumbent implements policy x⇤1 = min 2
{xI +8↵¯ (xI)2 , 14↵¯ }. Dissent has no impact on his policy choice (and therefore never
9The reason why we must consider this case is that, even if dissent would always induce a trailing
incumbent to moderate his policy choice, it may be the case that the ally’s bliss point lies between the
platforms that the incumbent would implement with and without dissent. It is therefore possible that
[xA   (x⇤1|D = 1,   < 12 )]2 < [xA   (x⇤1|D = 0,   < 12 )]2 even if (x⇤1|D = 1,   < 12 ) < (x⇤1|D = 0,   < 12 ).
We must therefore exclude that the ally’s gain from dissenting against a trailing incumbent is larger
than the cost.
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emerges in equilibrium) if   < 4↵¯xI . Suppose instead that     4↵¯xI . Then, after
experiencing dissent the incumbent is a sure loser: even if the voter learns that xv = ↵¯,
she will still choose to replace the incumbent with his challenger. As a consequence, in
the first period the incumbent would always implement exactly his bliss point xI upon
experiencing dissent.
Therefore, there are two pairs of equilibrium policies that we must consider:
• (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = 14↵¯ , when xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    14↵¯ 
• (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 , when xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  < 14↵¯ 
I will analyse each case separately, conjecturing the existence of an equilibrium in
which the ally chooses to dissent.
Case 1: (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = 14↵¯ 











Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
  (xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2 >  ( 1
4↵¯ 
  xA)2    (xI   xA)2   (1   )(xI + xA)2 (25)
Which reduces to
  <
 8↵¯ xA(1  4↵¯ xI)  (4↵¯ xI)2 + 1
(8↵¯ )2xIxA
(26)
Thus, we need to identify conditions under which
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Let T = 4↵¯ . The above can be rearranged as







2xA(1  (xIT )2) < xI(1  (xIT )2) (29)
Since (xIT )2 = (4↵¯ xI)2 < 1, the above can never be satisfied when xA > xI .
Case 2: (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 
The equilibrium condition for the faction is
 (xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2 > (30)
 (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    xA)2   (1  4↵¯  (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ))(xI + xA)2
 4↵¯  (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 )(xI   xA)2
Denoting   = 8↵¯  (xI)2, the above can be rearranged as
0 >   2   2 (xI   xA) + 16↵¯  (xI + )xIxA (31)





Given xA > xI , the condition can never be satisfied.
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Thus, dissent never emerges in equilibrium if xA > xI and   < 12 .
Consider now the conditions on the cost of dissent  . The proof of the first condition
(  > 4↵¯xI(2  1)) is presented in the main body of the paper. Here, I present a formal
proof of the second condition. Let     4↵¯xI . After experiencing dissent, the incumbent
would turn into a sure loser. Therefore:
(x⇤1|D = 1) = xI (33)
Conversely, (from Lemma 2) if the leading incumbent experiences no dissent:
(x⇤1|D = 0) = xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ) (34)
Dissent strictly increases the ally’s utility if and only if:
 (xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2 > (35)
 (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )  xA)2   (1  4↵¯ (1   )(xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(xI   xA)2
 4↵¯ (1   )(xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(xI + xA)2
This reduces to
xA[1 2(4↵¯ xI(1  ))(1 4↵¯ xI(1  ))]+4↵¯ (xI)2(1  )(1 4↵¯ xI(1  )) < 0 (36)
The LHS is increasing in xA and never satisfied at xA = 0. Hence, dissent by an
extremist ally emerges only if   < 4↵¯xI .
Finally, I must prove that there exist unique  ,  , xI and xA such that dissent by
an extremist ally emerges in equilibrium only if   <   <  , xI > xI and xA > xA.
Suppose that 4↵¯xI(2    1) <   < 4↵¯xI and   > 12 , and conjecture the existence of
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an equilibrium in which the ally chooses to dissent. We must consider two cases:
1. (x⇤1|D = 1) = 14↵¯ and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI 8↵¯ (1  )(xI)2, when xI+8↵¯ (xI)2   
1
4↵¯ 
2. (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI   8↵¯ (1    )(xI)2, when
xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  < 14↵¯ 
I will analyse each of the two cases separately.
Case 1: (x⇤1|D = 1) = 14↵¯ and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI   8↵¯ (1   )(xI)2












Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 ( 1
4↵¯ 
  xA)2    (xI   xA)2   (1   )(xI + xA)2 > (39)
 (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )  xA)2   [1  4↵¯ (1   )(xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))](xI   xA)2
 4↵¯ (1   )(xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(xI + xA)2
Let I = 4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )). We can rewrite the above condition as:
(1   )(1  I)((xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2) > ( 1
4↵¯ 




Which is equivalent to
(1   )(1  I)( 4xAxI) >  x
A
2↵¯ 
(1  I) + 1
(4↵¯ )2
(1 + I)(1  I) (41)
By substituting I = 4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )) and solving for   we get the following
condition:
  >
1 + (2xA   xI)(8↵¯ xI   1)(4↵¯ )
2xI(4↵¯ )2(2xA   xI) (42)
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1.   >   = max {12 , 18↵¯ xI ( 14↵¯ xI   1), 1+(2x
A xI)(8↵¯ xI 1)(4↵¯ )
2xI(4↵¯ )2(2xA xI) }
2. xI > 18↵¯ 
3. xA > 18↵¯ +
xI
2
Where the conditions on xI and xA ensure that the range [ , 1] exists.
Case 2: (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI   8↵¯ (1   )(xI)2













Additionally, the the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    xA)2(45)
 (1  4↵¯ (xI + 8↵ (xI)2 ) )(xI + xA)2   4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ) (xI   xA)2 >
 (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )  xA)2   (1  4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(1   ))(xI   xA)2
 4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(1   )(xI + xA)2
Let I = 4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ) and xD = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 . We can rewrite the above
condition as:
 (xD   xA)2   (1   I)(xI + xA)2    I(xI   xA)2 > (46)
 (xD   xA   8↵¯ (xI)2)2   (1  (1   )(I   4↵¯ (8↵¯ (xI)2)))(xI   xA)2
 (1   )(I   4↵¯ (8↵¯ (xI)2))(xI + xA)2
By expanding, letting xD = I4↵¯ and dividing both sides by 4x
I we get:
 IxA > xA   xA((1   )(I   2(4↵¯ xI)2) + xI(I   4↵¯ xA   (4↵¯ xI)2) (47)
Which is equivalent to:
xA + I(xI   xA)  4↵¯ xIxA + (4↵¯ xI)2(2xA(1   )  xI) < 0 (48)
By substituting I = 4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ) and solving for   we get the following con-
dition:
  >
4↵¯ xI(2xA   xI)(4↵¯ xI   1) + xA
32↵¯2 2(xI)2(2xA   xI) (49)
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
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satisfied:
1.   = max {12 , 4↵¯ x
I(2xA xI)(4↵¯ xI 1)+xA









3. xA > x
I(4↵¯ xI)(4↵¯ xI+1)
2(4↵¯ xI)(4↵¯ xI+1) 1
Where the conditions on xI and xA ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
The following corollary also holds, with respect to Case 2:
Corollary 1A:   = 12 =)   < 1
Proof. Corollary 1A tells us that it can never be the case that (i)   = 12 and (ii)   = 1.




4↵¯ xI(2xA   xI)(4↵¯ xI   1) + xA
32↵¯2 2(xI)2(2xA   xI) (50)
Which reduces to:




















Clearly the two conditions can never be simultaneously satisfied.
Proposition 2:
• The likelihood of observing dissent (weakly) increases as the ally becomes more
extreme
• There exists a unique bxI(xA) > xI such that if xI < bxI(xA), then the likelihood of
observing dissent increases as the incumbent becomes more extreme
Proof. Denote  (xI , xA, ↵¯ ) the set of values of   such that dissent is an equilibrium
strategy i↵   2  . From the proof of Proposition 1 is easy to verify that   is always
weakly increasing in xA. Analysing Cases 1 and 2,   is (weakly) increasing in xI if and
only if either one of the following sets of conditions is satisfied:




I < 14↵¯ and x
A > 1+4↵¯ x
I(1 4↵¯ xI
8↵¯ (1 4↵¯ xI)
2. Case 1:   = 1 4↵¯ x
I







1 2(4↵¯ xI)2 . It is easy
to verify that when   = 1 4↵¯ x
I
2(4↵¯ xI)2 in Case 1, irrespective of the bounds in Case 2
  will be weakly increasing in xI
3. Case 2:   = 4↵¯ x
I(2xA xI)(4↵¯ xI 1)+xA
32↵¯2 2(xI)2(2xA xI) and   = 1, which requires x
I < 18↵¯ .
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.Thus, necessary and su cient condition for   to be increasing in xI is that xI <bxI(xA).
xA > 1+4↵¯ x
I(1 4↵¯ xI
8↵¯ (1 4↵¯ xI) =) bxI(xA) = 14↵¯ , xI(1 (4↵¯ xI)21 2(4↵¯ xI)2 < xA < 1+4↵¯ xI(1 4↵¯ xI8↵¯ (1 4↵¯ xI) =)bxI(xA) = p5 18↵¯ , and xA < xI(1 (4↵¯ xI)21 2(4↵¯ xI)2 =) bxI(xA) = 18↵¯ 
Proposition 3: In equilibrium the voter benefits from the presence of an extreme ally
to the incumbent party if:
• The cost of dissent   is su ciently large that it turns the leading incumbent into
a trailing one, but not so large that it always hurts the voter ex ante (  <   <  w)
• The value of information is su ciently high
– The prior ( ) is su ciently close to 12 (
1
2 <   <  w)
– Incumbent and challenger are moderately polarized (xIw < x
I < xIw)
– Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s prefer-
ences (↵¯ > ↵¯w)
• The incumbent’s ally is su ciently extreme (xA > xAw)
Proof. In order to identify su cient conditions for the voter to benefit from dissent,
suppose that   < 18↵¯ xI (
1
4↵¯ xI   1). Then, (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  and (x⇤1|D =
0) = xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1    ). Dissent increases the voter’s welfare if and only if the
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following condition is satisfied:
 4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 )      (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    ↵¯)2 (55)
 (1   )(xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  + ↵¯)2   4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 )(xI   ↵¯)2
 (1  4↵¯ (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ))( (xI + ↵¯)2 + (1   )(xI   ↵¯)2) >
  (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )  ↵¯)2   (1   )(xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ) + ↵¯)2
 4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   ))(xI   ↵¯)2
 (1  4↵¯ (xI   8↵¯ (xI)2(1   )))( (xI   ↵¯)2 + (1   )(xI + ↵¯)2)
Which reduces to:
  <
(1  2 )(1  8↵¯ xI + 2(4↵¯ xI)2 + 16↵¯ 2(xI)3)  4 (xI)2 + 4(4↵¯ xI )2
  (1 + 8↵¯ xI )
=  w(56)
If the above is satisfied, the voter benefits from dissent. However, we need to make
sure that dissent would indeed emerge in equilibrium (given the incumbent’s equilibrium
policy choices with and without dissent). From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that
this requires the following conditions:
1. 4↵¯xI(2    1)    < 4↵¯xI
2.   = max {12 , 4↵¯ x
I(2xA xI)(4↵¯ xI 1)+xA









4. xA > x
I(4↵¯ xI)(4↵¯ xI+1)
2(4↵¯ xI)(4↵¯ xI+1) 1
Thus, for the voter to benefit the presence of the incumbent’s extreme ally, both
(46) and conditions 1 to 4 above must be satisfied. This requires  w > 4↵¯xI(2    1),
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which reduces to:
(1  2 )(1 + 4↵¯ xI(8↵¯ xI   2 + 4 (xI)2 + 8↵¯ xI 2 +  ))  4 (xI)2 + 4(4↵¯ xI )2 > 0(57)
The LHS is decreasing in  , therefore the above establishes an upper bound  w. For
the condition to be possible to satisfy in equilibrium we need  w >  . From the proof
of Case 2 we can verify that   = 12 when x
I > 18↵¯ and x
A > 4↵¯ (x
I)2
8↵¯ xI 1 . Additionally,
given Corollary 1A   = 12 =)   = 18↵¯ xI ( 14↵¯ xI   1). Thus, the voter benefits from the
presence of the incumbent’s extreme ally if:
1. 4↵¯xI(2    1)    <  w
2.   <  w




4↵¯ xI   1) =  
4. 18↵¯ xI (
1




6. xI > 18↵¯ = x
I
w
7. xA > 4↵¯ (x
I)2





2 if and only if the following is satisfied:


















Thus we can rewrite the su cient conditions for the voter to benefit from dissent in
equilibrium as:
1.   <   <  w
2. 12 <   < min{ ,  w}
3. xIw < x
I < xIw
4. xA > xAw
5. ↵¯ > ↵¯w
Extension: What if the Ally Has Bargaining Power?
In this section I will consider the case in which the incumbent’s ally has bargaining
power over the first period policy making. I will thus assume that in the first period
the incumbent maximises a weighted average of his own and the ally’s utility:
UW1 =  [ (x1   xA)2 + UA2 (x1, x2, xA)] + (1   )[ (x1   xI)2 + U I2 (x1, x2, xI)] (61)
This is equivalent to analysing a game in which, after the ally chooses wether to
dissent, it engages in a bargaining stage with the incumbent to determine the policy
to be implemented in the first period. Therefore, the parameter   represents, in this
reduced form, the ally’s bargaining power in the first period. As in the baseline model,
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I assume xC =  xI  0 and xI < 14↵ . Additionally, I assume that in the second period
the ally has no bargaining power. A discussion of the necessity and significance of this
assumption is in the main body of the paper.
We can determine the equilibrium policy choice of the incumbent, proceeding as in
the proof of Lemma 3.
Consider first a trailing incumbent. The following holds:
• Let  xA + (1   )xI   14↵¯a , then x⇤1 =  xA + (1   )xI
• Let  xA+(1  )xI < 14↵¯ , then x⇤1 = min { 14↵¯ ; [ xA+(1  )xI ][1+8↵¯ xI ]}
Consider now a leading incumbent:
• Let  xA + (1   )xI   14↵¯ .
Then x⇤1 =  x
A + (1    )xI if   > 1+4↵¯ [( xA+(1  )xI)(4↵ xI 1)](4↵¯ )2[xI( xA+(1  )xI)] , and x⇤1 = [ xA +
(1   )xI ][1  8↵¯ xI(1   )] otherwise10
• Let  xA + (1   )xI < 14↵¯ , then x⇤1 = [ xA + (1   )xI ][1  8↵ xI(1   )]
Proposition 4: For all xI   0, there exist non-measure zero sets  (xI) and B(xI) such
that if   2  (xI) and   2 B(xI) then dissent by an extreme ally occurs in equilibrium
Proof. I proceed as in the proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that 4↵¯xI(2  1) <   < 4↵¯xI
and   > 12 , and conjecture the existence of an equilibrium in which the ally chooses to
dissent. We must consider three cases:
1. (x⇤1|D = 1) =  xA+(1  )xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = [ xA+(1  )xI ][1 8↵¯ (1  )xI ]
10When  xA+(1  )xI   14↵¯ the leading incumbent’s overall utility as a function of the first period
policy has two maxima: one at  xA + (1   )xI and a second at [ xA + (1   )xI ][1  8↵¯ xI(1   )].
The condition on   identifies which one of the two is the global maximum.
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2. (x⇤1|D = 1) = 14↵¯ and (x⇤1|D = 0) = [ xA + (1   )xI ][1  8↵¯ (1   )xI ]
3. (x⇤1|D = 1) = [ xA + (1    )xI ][1 + 8↵¯  xI ] and (x⇤1|D = 0) = [ xA + (1  
 )xI ][1  8↵¯ (1   )xI ]
I will analyse each of the three cases separately.
Case 1: (x⇤1|D = 1) =  xA + (1    )xI , (x⇤1|D = 0) = ( xA + (1    )xI)(1  
8↵ xI(1   ))





    1  4↵¯ x
I
4↵ (xA   xI) (63)
  <
1 + 4↵¯ (( xA + (1   )xI)(4↵¯ xI   1))
(4↵¯ )2xI( xA + (1   )xI) (64)
Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 ( xA + (1   )xI   xA)2    (xI   xA)2 (65)
 (1   )(xI + xA)2 >  [( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))  xA]2
 [1  4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI   xA)2
 [4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI + xA)2
Let xD =  xA + (1   )xI and xD    = ( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   )) where
  = ( xA + (1   )xI)8↵¯ xI(1   ). The above reduces to
  2 + 2 (xD   xA) + 4xIxA(1   )  16↵¯ (1   )xIxA(xD   ) < 0 (66)
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Substituting   = ( xA + (1   )xI)8↵¯ xI(1   ) and dividing for 4xI(1   ) gives
 xI(4↵¯ )2(1   )( xA + (1   )xI)2 + 4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)(xD   xA) (67)
+xA   4↵¯ xA(xD   ( xA + (1   )xI)8↵¯ xI(1   )) < 0
Substituting xD =  xA + (1   )xI and solving for   gives us condition:
  > 1 +
xA   4↵¯ [ xA + (1   )xI ][2xA    xA   (1   )xI ]
(4↵¯ )2xI [ xA + (1   )xI ][2xA    xA   (1   )xI ] (68)
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exist if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1.   = max {12 , 1 + x
A 4↵¯ [ xA+(1  )xI ][2xA  xA (1  )xI ]
(4↵¯ )2xI [ xA+(1  )xI ][2xA  xA (1  )xI ]} <   <
1+4↵¯ (( xA+(1  )xI)(4↵¯ xI 1))
(4↵¯ )2xI( xA+(1  )xI) =  
2.   = 1 4↵¯ x
I
4↵¯ (xA xI)    < min {1, 1+4↵¯ x
I(2↵¯ xI 1)
4↵¯ (xA xI)(1 2↵¯ xI)} =  
3. xA > 14↵¯ 
The conditions on   ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists. The condition on xA ensures
that the range [ ,  ] exists.
Case 2: (x⇤1|D = 1) = 14↵¯ , (x⇤1|D = 0) = ( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   )













4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)   1) (71)
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Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 ( 1
4↵¯ 
  xA)2    (xI   xA)2   (1   )(xI + xA)2 > (72)
 [( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))  xA]2
 [1  4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI   xA)2
 [4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI + xA)2
Let I = 4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   )). The above can be rewritten as:
 ( 1
4↵¯ 
  xA)2    (xI   xA)2   (1   )(xI + xA)2 > (73)
 ( I
4↵¯ 





  4xIxA(1   )  1 + I
(4↵¯ )2
) > 0 (74)
By substituting I = 4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   )) and solving for   we get
condition:
1 +
 1 + 4↵¯ (2xA   xI    (xA   xI)
 2(4↵¯ )2xI(2xA   xI    (xA   xI) <   < 1 (75)
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:






4↵¯ ( xA+(1  )xI)   1)} <   <
1 =  









The conditions on   ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists. The condition on xA ensures
that the range [ ,  ] exists.
Case 3: (x⇤1|D = 1) = ( xA + (1   )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ xI ), (x⇤1|D = 0) = ( xA + (1 
 )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   )













4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)   1) (78)
Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 [( xA + (1   )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ xI )) (79)
 xA]2   [1  4↵¯  ( xA + (1   )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ xI )](xI + xA)2
 [4↵  ( xA + (1   )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ xI )](xI   xA)2 >
 [( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))  xA]2
 [1  4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI   xA)2
 [4↵¯ (1   )( xA + (1   )xI)(1  8↵¯ xI(1   ))](xI + xA)2
Let xD = ( xA + (1   )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ xI ). We can rewrite the above as:
 (xD   xA)2   (1  4↵¯ xD )(xI + xA)2   4↵¯ xD )(xI   xA)2 > (80)
 (xD   8↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI)  xA)2
 (1  4↵¯ (1   )(xD   8↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI))(xI   xA)2
 4↵¯ (1   )(xD   8↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI)(xI + xA)2
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Which reduces to
 4xIxA + 16↵¯ xDxIxA  > (81)
 (8↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI))2 + 16↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI)(xD   xA)
 16↵¯ xIxA(1   )(xD   8↵¯ xI( xA + (1   )xI))
By substituting xD = ( xA + (1    )xI)(1 + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ) and solving for   we obtain
condition:
  >
xA + 4↵¯ ( xA + (1   )xI)(1  4↵¯ xI)( xA + (1   )xI   2xA)
2xI(4↵¯ )2( xA + (1   )xI)(  xA   (1   )xI + 2xA) (82)
Thus the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1.   = max 2 {12 , x
A+4↵¯ ( xA+(1  )xI)(1 4↵¯ xI)( xA+(1  )xI 2xA)
2xI(4↵¯ )2( xA+(1  )xI)(  xA (1  )xI+2xA) } <   <
min {1, 18↵¯ xI ( 14↵¯ ( xA+(1  )xI)   1)} =  
2.   = max 2 {0, 1  12
q
xI(4↵¯ xA)2+4↵¯ (xA)2 xA
↵¯ (xA xI)2(1+4↵¯ xI) } <   <
min 2 {1+2xI(4↵¯ )2(xA xI) 
p
1+4(4xAxI ↵¯ )2(4↵¯ )2
32↵¯2 2xI(xA xI) ,
1 4↵¯ xI(1+4↵¯ xI)
4↵¯ (xA xI)(1+4↵¯ xI)} =  









The conditions on   ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists. The conditions on xA and
xI ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists.
Corollary 1: Suppose that 18↵ < x
I and 14↵ < x
A < 14↵ (1 2↵ xI) . Then, for all
  2 [0, 1), there exists a non-measure zero set  ( ) such that if   2  ( ), then dissent
by an extreme ally occurs in equilibrium
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Proof. From an analysis of the cases above we can verify that su cient conditions for
the claim (for all   2 [0, 1), there exists a non-measure zero set  ( )) to hold are:
• The binding upper bound   in case 1 is = 1
• The binding lower bound   in case 2 is = 0
• The binding upper bound   in case 2 is = 1 4↵¯ xI4↵¯ (xA xI) (which is also the lower
bound from case 1)
For the three conditions to be satisfied we need:
• 14↵ < xA < 14↵ (1 2↵ xI)
• xI > 18↵ 
Appendix B: Dissent by a Moderate Ally
In this section I consider an ally whose bliss point is to the left of the incumbent:
0 < xA < xI . In line with the rest of the paper, I maintain the assumption that
xI < 14↵ .
Proposition 1A: There exist  
m
,  m, xAm and xIm such that the incumbent’s moderate
ally chooses to dissent in equilibrium if and only if:
1. The party is trailing, but its disadvantage is not too large
( 
m
<   <  m, where  m  12)
2. Electoral cost of dissent su ciently large to turn trailing incumbent into sure loser
(     )
84
3. Both the incumbent and his ally are su ciently moderate
(xI < xIm and xA < xAm)
Proof. The proof of the first point (incumbent must be trailing) is omitted, since it is
obtained by applying the same logic used in proving Proposition 1 (i.e. it is easy to
verify given the calculations in the proof of Proposition 1 that dissent never emerges
if xA < xI and   > 12). To prove the remainder of the proposition I must analyse all
possible pairs of equilibrium policies. From above we know that in any equilibrium in
which the ally chooses to dissent (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI , and that dissent never occurs in
equilibrium if xI   14↵¯ . Therefore, we must consider two cases:
• (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = 14↵¯ , when xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    14↵¯ 
• (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 , when xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2  < 14↵¯ 
I will analyse each case separately, conjecturing the existence of an equilibrium in
which the ally chooses to dissent.
Case 1: (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = 14↵¯ 











Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
  (xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2 >  ( 1
4↵¯ 




 8↵¯ xA(1  4↵¯ xI)  (4↵¯ xI)2 + 1
(8↵¯ )2xIxA
(86)
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. 18↵¯ xI (
1







I < 14↵¯ 
3. xA < x
I
2
The conditions on xI and xA ensure that the range [ ,  ] exists.
Case 2: (x⇤1|D = 1) = xI and (x⇤1|D = 0) = xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 


















Additionally, the equilibrium condition for the faction is
 (xI   xA)2   (xI + xA)2 > (91)
 (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2    xA)2   (1  4↵¯  (xI + 8↵¯ (xI)2 ))(xI + xA)2






Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. 0 <   < min {12 , 18↵¯ xI ( 14↵¯ xI   1)}
2. xA < x
I
2
3. xI < 14↵¯ 
This concludes the proof.
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Ideology For The Future
Abstract
Do ideologically motivated parties have strategic incentives to lose? I present a
model of repeated spatial elections in which the voters face uncertainty about their
preferred policy and learn via experience upon observing their payo↵ realization.
The amount of voter learning, I show, depends on the location of the implemented
policy: the more extreme the policy is, the more information is generated. This, in
turn, creates a trade-o↵ for a party whose ideological stance is unpopular with the
electorate, between winning the upcoming election so as to secure policy influence,
and changing the voters’ preferences so as to win with a better platform in the
future. Under some conditions the party gambles on the future: chooses to lose
today, in order to change voters’ views and win big tomorrow.
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Introduction
Barry Goldwater obtained the Republican party presidential nomination in 1964, de-
spite the widespread belief that he was ideologically too extreme to win the general
election. Goldwater himself revealed that he never actually thought he could win (Gold-
water 1988: 154). Indeed, he went on to lose by a landslide against Lyndon Johnson.
Jeremy Corbyn represents a more recent instance of the ‘Goldwater phenomenon’ (Wil-
davsky 1965). Corbyn won the Labour primaries in 2015 with a 40% margin. Yet, the
general opinion was that his leadership would condemn the party to electoral irrelevance
(Toynbee 2015). Corbyn’s supporters were aware of his low electoral viability, but were
‘keener on picking a leader who shared their views, rather than someone who was likely
to lead Labour to victory’ (YouGov 2015). Indeed, ‘Labour’s new manifesto is the most
left-wing since 1983’, when the party ran on a platform labelled as ‘the longest suicide
note in history’ (Castle 2017).
These and other examples suggest that political parties sometimes choose to settle
for electoral defeat: they adopt unpopular positions, even if this means losing the
upcoming election for sure. From a rational choice perspective, this is quite puzzling.
Extant models of elections predict that instrumentally rational parties will always do
whatever it takes to win. Even if a party is motivated solely by ideology, it would
never accept a certain electoral defeat. Other authors instead argue that political
parties may be willing to lose, but work under the assumption that their members have
expressive rather than strategic motivations and care about ideological purity (Aldrich
1983, Wildawsky 1965, Roemer 2001. See also discussion in Strom 1999, Budge et. al
2010).
In this paper, I instead show that ideologically motivated parties may choose to lose
for entirely strategic reasons, without any concern for purity. A party whose ideology is
unpopular with the electorate is faced with a crucial trade-o↵, between compromising
in order to win the upcoming elections, and changing the voters’ preferences so as to
be able to win with a better platform in the future. Under some conditions, the party
gambles on the future: chooses to lose today in order to change voters’ views and win
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big tomorrow.
This paper analyses this trade o↵ within a model of repeated spatial elections with
two time periods. The players are two policy motivated parties and a representative
voter. In each period, the parties credibly commit to a policy platform along the real
line. The voter then decides whom to elect. The model has two key features. First,
the voter faces uncertainty about the exact location of her ideal policy. For example,
the voter may not know which policy is most likely to produce her preferred outcome.
Thus, we can think about her uncertainty as referring to the true state of the world,
representing the policy-outcome mapping. Secondly, the players have di↵erent priors
on the state of the world but agree to disagree, i.e. they do not update on each other’s
beliefs. I think about prior beliefs as representing a person’s convictions and world
views. Thus, while the players are aware of the fact that their priors di↵er, they do
not infer anything from the existence of this disagreement. As a consequence, the voter
may only learn via experience: she updates her beliefs upon observing the realization
of her first-period payo↵. This is a function of the implemented policy, the true state,
and of a random shock which complicates the voter’s inference problem.
A consequence of this technology is that the amount of voter learning depends on
the policy implemented in the first period. Specifically, the voter learns more about the
state of the world (and thus her ideal policy) when extreme platforms are enacted. As
the policy becomes more extreme, the distance in the expected outcome as a function
of the true state increases. As a consequence, each outcome is more informative. In
more substantive terms, if the voter likes (dislikes) the outcome of an extreme policy,
the policy is likely (unlikely) to be in line with the true state. Conversely, because
the voter only observes a noisy signal, the outcome of a moderate policy is much less
informative.
Let’s now consider the incentives faced by the two parties. The second period is
equivalent to a one-shot Downsian model: in equilibrium the parties always converge on
the voter’s preferred policy. Not so much in the first period. The party whose ideological
stance is ex-ante unpopular faces a trade-o↵, between securing policy influence and
forcing the voter to experiment. Suppose that the voter’s prior is such that her ex-ante
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preferred policy is a right-wing one, and consider the problem faced by the left-wing
party. The party always has incentives to converge towards the voter’s preferences, in
order to win the upcoming election and move the implemented platform closer to its
own bliss point. This is the usual centripetal tendency that arises in Downsian models.
However, the unpopular party also has an incentive to increase the amount of voter
learning, in hopes of changing the voter’s future policy preferences and being able to
implement a better platform tomorrow. The problem the unpopular party faces is that
it cannot achieve both goals at once.
This is a direct consequence of the voter’s ‘bias’ against the party. Given the voter’s
prior, for any pair of policies that leave her indi↵erent in the first period, the right-wing
one is always further away from zero. Thus, the popular right-wing party can win with
relatively more extreme platforms, that would generate a larger amount of information.
This creates the trade-o↵ for the unpopular party. It may move slightly closer to the
voter and win, thus minimizing the immediate policy losses. However, this would imply
that a more moderate policy is implemented and less information is generated. The
voter is unlikely to change her mind, and the party will probably have to compromise
on a right-wing platform again tomorrow. Conversely, if the unpopular party allows
its opponent to win with an extreme right-wing policy, the amount of voter learning
increases. If the voter learns that such policy is not aligned with the true state of the
world, the unpopular party will be able to win with a left-wing platform in the future.
In other words, the unpopular party must choose between compromising in order
to minimize immediate losses – but this means having to compromise again tomorrow
– and going all-in hoping to be able to win with a better platform in the future. If
the incentives to force the voter to experiment are su ciently strong, the unpopular
party chooses to gamble on the future: lose today to win big tomorrow. This paper
characterizes the conditions under which this occurs in equilibrium.
Crucially, I show that extreme policy preferences are not enough for an instrumen-
tally rational party to choose to lose. The ‘gambling’ equilibria can be sustained only
if both parties are su ciently ideological in their prior beliefs, i.e. su ciently confident
that the true state of the world is line with their own policy preferences. Intuitively, the
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unpopular party is willing to throw out the election only when it believes the gamble
is likely to be successful. However, this is not enough. In a Downsian setting, ‘it takes
two to gamble’: the popular party must also be willing to increase the amount of voter
learning. The popular party has a lot to lose from generating additional information.
If it is not su ciently confident that this will move the voter even closer to its own
preferences, the popular party is not willing to take up the gamble and the first period
has a unique equilibrium in convergence. Thus, open conflict of (ideological) beliefs is
a crucial part of the story.
The nature of electoral competition in this model is very di↵erent from the dynamics
typically emerging in spatial elections. Probabilistic voting models (e.g. Calvert 1985,
Wittman 1987, Groseclose 2001) analyze a trade-o↵ analogous to the one discussed
above: policy-motivated parties may adopt a platform that decreases their probability of
winning (although they would never accept to lose for sure). However, an instrumental
desire to win o ce still defines the nature of electoral competition. Thus, comparative
statics show both parties’ equilibrium platforms always moving in the same direction of
the median voter’s (expected) bliss point. If this ideal policy moves right both platforms
move right, with the unpopular party always ‘chasing after’ the voter. Conversely, in
the ‘gambling’ equilibria described above the unpopular party’s strategic behavior is
driven by the desire to change the voter’s future preferences. As the voter’s right-wing
bias increases, the unpopular left-wing party has more to gain and less to lose from
forcing her to experiment. Thus, as the voter’s (ex-ante) preferences move to the right,
the unpopular party may be willing to go further and further to the left. This allows
its opponent to win with a more extreme right-wing platform, thus ensuring that even
more information is generated. Therefore, we can – and do, as I discuss below – observe
empirical patterns that are consistent with the theory presented here, but are hard to
reconcile with probabilistic voting models.
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Literature Review
This paper presents a model of repeated spatial elections in which the voter faces
uncertainty about her ideal policy. While several works analyse elections under policy-
relevant uncertainty, the focus is typically on strategic communication. Politicians have
privileged information about the state of the world, and engage in a signalling game
with the electorate.1 The Maskin and Tirole’s (2004) and Canes-Wrone, Herron and
Shotts’ (2001) pandering models are obvious examples. Kartik et al. (2015) extends the
analysis considering pandering in a Downsian setting. Similarly, in Roemer (1994) voters
are uncertain of the functioning of the economy, and fully informed parties compete on
policy platforms and on theories of the world.
In this paper, I adopt a di↵erent perspective. I consider a setting in which the state
of the world (the voter’s ideal policy) is unknown to all players and, as a consequence,
the voter may only learn via experience. She updates her beliefs about her ideal plat-
form upon observing the outcome of the policy implemented in the first period. A
consequence of this technology is that the amount of voter learning is a function of
the location of the implemented policy. This creates incentives for political parties to
engage in information control. Thus, when choosing their electoral platforms, parties
consider how the policy that is implemented today influences the amount of informa-
tion the voter will receive tomorrow. O ce holders in Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2015)
and Majumdar and Mukand (2004) make similar considerations. However, both papers
present variants of the principal agent model in which the incumbent is free to choose
his preferred level of policy experimentation. Conversely, I focus on a Downsian setting
in which ‘it takes two to gamble’: a gamble takes place in equilibrium only if both
parties are willing to generate information. Additionally, in the extant literature policy
outcomes reveal information about the o ce holder’s competence. In the model pre-
sented here the voter is instead forced to experiment in order to discover her true policy
preferences.
1Kartik, Van Weelden and Wolton (2017) provide an exception. The model features no asymmetry
of information at the electoral stage, but the elected politician will discover the true state of the world
once in o ce. This induces the parties to commit to ambiguous platforms in equilibrium.
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In this perspective, this paper is most closely related to recent work by Callander
(2011) and Hirsch (2016). Callander (2011) analyses a spatial election model in which
players face uncertainty over the policy-outcome mapping, and update their beliefs upon
observing the outcome of the implemented policy. The author assumes that the players
know the slope of the policy mapping function (the state of the world), but must learn
about the realization of the variance for each policy location, i.e. the exact consequences
of each specific policy. As a consequence, small incremental policy changes reveal more
information. In contrast, the model presented here adopts a di↵erent framework to
study policy experimentation (see also Izzo, 2018). Within this framework, uncertainty
is over the fundamental underlying state of the world, and the voters’ inference problem
is complicated by the presence of a random shock. As such, it is extreme policies that
reveal more information. Further, focusing on the statically optimal choice for a policy
maker, Callander (2011) assumes myopic parties. The main contribution of this paper
is instead to investigate how dynamic considerations – i.e. the desire to change voters’
future beliefs – influence the parties’ platform choice. Such dynamic considerations also
emerge in Hirsch (2016). The author presents a principal-agent model, in which players
have heterogeneous priors about the state of the world. The principal repeatedly chooses
a policy, and the agent decides how much e↵ort to exert in its implementation. E↵ort
increases the probability that a policy tailored to the state of the world is successful,
but is wasted on a ‘wrong’ policy. Under some conditions, the principal will choose a
policy that she considers likely to be wrong, but that the agent believes to be correct,
in order to elicit ‘wasted’ e↵ort and eliminate the belief disagreement. In the model
that I present below, the unpopular party makes a similar reasoning: it may choose to
incur a loss today, in order to generate more information and win big tomorrow.
Finally, a recent working paper by Eguia and Giovannoni (2018) presents an argu-
ment analogous to the one advanced here. An o ce motivated party that experiences a
valence disadvantage may choose a radical policy today, in order to acquire ‘ownership’
on that platform. An exogenous shock to the electorate’s preferences may allow the
party to reap the benefits of this ‘tactical extremism’, and win with a higher probabil-
ity in the future. The two works nicely complement each other: Eguia and Giovannoni
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(2018) consider o ce-seeking candidates, while I focus on ideologically motivated par-
ties. Further, while in Eguia and Giovannoni (2018) changes in preferences are driven by
an exogenous shock, the main contribution of my paper is to present a model in which
these changes are instead driven by learning via experience, and arise endogenously as
a consequence of the parties’ strategic behaviour. Additionally, I do not assume any
‘stickiness’ in the platforms across periods.
The Model
The model consists of two periods, with an election in each. The players are two policy
motivated parties, L and R, and a representative voter V . Before each election, the
two parties (simultaneously) commit to a policy platform along the real line, xit 2 IR,
8i 2 {L,R} and 8t 2 {1, 2}. The voter decides whom to elect. The winner implements
the announced platform (credible commitment).
The voter faces uncertainty about the exact location of her ideal policy xV . This
policy can take one of two values that, for simplicity, I assume to be symmetric around
0: xV 2 {↵,↵} where ↵ =  ↵   0. We can think about the voter’s uncertainty as
referring to the state of the world, representing for example the shape of the policy-
mapping function. In other words, the voter does not know which policy is most likely
to produce her preferred outcome.
While the true state (i.e. true value of xV ) is unknown to all players, they hold
heterogeneous prior beliefs. Players therefore assign di↵erent probabilities  i, 8i 2
{L, V,R} to the voter’s bliss point taking a positive value. Such heterogeneous priors
are common knowledge but players agree to disagree, i.e. they do not update on each
other’s beliefs. Because this assumption is an important point of departure from the
standard tenets of Bayesian rationality, I discuss it in further depth below.
Given common knowledge of heterogeneous priors, the voter only learns via experi-
ence. She observes how much she liked - or disliked - the first-period policy, and updates
by using Bayes rule. Formally, the voter’s payo↵ realization is a noisy signal of the state
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of the world:
UVt =  (xV   xt)2 + et (1)
Where






The assumption that the noise is drawn from a uniform distribution substantially
simplifies the analysis, but is not necessary for the results.
Finally, parties are policy motivated with quadratic loss utility, and I assume that
their preferences are not a function of the state of the world. In other words, I assume
ideological dogmatism):
U it =  (xi   xt)2 (2)
8i 2 {L,R}
Where xL  0  xR.
Notice that the parties only care about ideology, i.e. assign no value to holding o ce
per se. I discuss this specific assumption, and the results’ robustness to relaxing it, in
a separate section.
To sum up, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the value of xV 2 {↵,↵}, (that remains unknown to all players)
and of the players’ priors  L,  V and  R (that become common knowledge)
2. The two parties simultaneously commit to a policy platform xi1 2 IR, 8i 2 {L,R}
3. The voter decides whom to elect
4. The winner implements the announced platform
5. The voter’s first-period payo↵s realize
96
6. Second-period elections are held, as above
7. Second-period payo↵s realize, and the game ends
To avoid trivialities, I will assume that the voter’s preferred policy is always between
the two parties’ per-period bliss points, irrespective of her beliefs: xL  ↵  0  ↵ 
xR.
Let me emphasize that the voter has no private information. As a consequence, given
any pair of platforms, the parties face no uncertainty over the electoral outcome in the
current period. However, uncertainty – and, due to heterogeneous priors, disagreement
– exist over what the voter will learn upon observing the first period policy outcome.
Finally, notice that while the model considers parties as unitary actors, it also admits
a less literal interpretation. In line with the motivational examples, the game can be
interpreted as a reduced-form version of a citizens candidates model with a primary
stage. By choosing the candidate, the activists would e↵ectively set the party’s electoral
platform. Thus, the model speaks to a recurrent argument in the literature, according
to which primaries represent a polarizing force and ideologically extreme activists are
often unwilling to compromise (Aldrich 1983, Coleman 1971, Brady 2007, Hall 2015).
Alternatively, the party’s equilibrium platform may be the result of a bargaining process
between di↵erent factions (as in Levy 2004). This interpretation would be in line with
the argument that extreme ideological factions within political parties may put a veto
on moderate platforms, even if this means losing for sure (Roemer 2001, Budge et al.,
2010).
Heterogeneous Priors and Beliefs as Ideology
Before delving into equilibrium analysis, it is important to discuss in more depth the
key assumption that underpins the results: players hold heterogeneous priors on the
state of the world, and ‘agree to disagree’ (Aumann 1976). This represents a departure
from canonical models based on the common priors assumption, i.e. the assumption
that heterogeneous beliefs can only be due to of information asymmetries. As a conse-
quence, if a conflict of beliefs becomes common knowledge, it is immediately resolved:
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individuals revise their own priors according to those held by others, and eventually
reach full mutual agreement.
In this paper I adopt a di↵erent perspective, thinking about prior beliefs as a per-
son’s ‘mental models, institutions or world views’ (Van den Steen 2011: 887). Thus,
‘individuals may simply be endowed with di↵erent prior beliefs (just as they may be
endowed with di↵erent preferences)’ (Che and Kartik 2009). In a similar vein, Callan-
der argues that ‘much political disagreements is over beliefs (...), that we may think of
as ideology’ (2011: 657). Hafer and Landa (2005, 2007) also see ideology and beliefs as
closely connected, thinking of a player’s ideology as the likelihood of being persuaded
by a left-wing argument versus a right-wing one. Analogous intuitions are presented by
Piketty (1995), Benabou and Tirole (2006) and McMurray (2016).
In line with these arguments, I model parties’ beliefs as a second dimension of their
ideology: each party is convinced that the true state of the world is aligned with its own
policy preferences. The left (right) wing party always wants to implement a left (right)
wing policy, irrespective of the state of the world. However, the party also believes that
such policy is in line with the true state. Formally, I assume that  L = 1  R = ✏, where
✏ takes an arbitrarily small value. I will then show that the results can be sustained
under less restrictive conditions, as long as both parties are su ciently ideological in
their beliefs.
Conceptualizing priors as ideology, I allow open conflicts of beliefs to be sustained
in equilibrium. Players have di↵erent ‘world views’ that translate into di↵erent beliefs
about the true state. Simply becoming aware of the existence of this conflict is not
enough to solve it. Indeed, quite the opposite. ‘Individuals with belief conflicts think
that they can persuade each other by taking actions that will produce more information,
each expecting it to prove that they were right’ (Hirsch, 2016: 70).
In addition to the scholars mentioned above, several others have allowed players to
‘agree to disagree’ (see Yildiz 2004, Smith and Stam 2004, Minozzi 2013, Ashworth and




The voter’s learning plays a crucial role in the mechanism the model identifies. Thus,
before analyzing the player’s equilibrium behavior it is important to understand how
learning occurs.
The voter’s first-period payo↵ realization is a noisy signal of the state of the world.
In other words, the voter considers how much she liked or disliked the first-period policy,
and updates her beliefs by using Bayes’ rule. The analysis reveals a crucial feature of
the learning process: the amount of information received by the voter depends on the
location of the policy implemented in the first period. Specifically, the voter learns more
about the state of the world (i.e. the location of her ideal policy) when more extreme
platforms are enacted. As the implemented policy moves away from zero, the distance
in the expected outcome as a function of the true state increases. As a consequence,
each signal is more informative. In more substantive terms, if the voter likes (dislikes)
the outcome of an extreme policy, it is likely that such policy is (is not) in line with her
true preferences. However, the outcome of a moderate policy is much less informative.
It is harder for the voter to understand whether the policy produced a good outcome
because it is in line with the true state, or despite this not being true but due to the
presence of a small shock.
This feature emerges in a very stark form in a world in which the noise et is uniformly
distributed. Denote as µV the voter’s posterior that xV = ↵, given her own payo↵
realization UV1 , the first-period policy x1 and her prior  V . The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 1. The voter learning satisfies the following properties:
(i) Her posterior µV takes one of three values: µV 2 {0,  , 1};
(ii) The more extreme the policy implemented in the first period x1, the higher the
probability that µV 6=  ;
(iii) There exists a policy x0 such that if |x1|   |x0|, then µV 6=   with probability 1.
Lemma 1 tells us that upon observing her first-period payo↵ realization, the voter
learns either everything or nothing about the state of the world. The more extreme





Figure 1: Voter’s payo↵ realization as a function of first-period policy. The thick (thin)
curves represent the case in which xV = ↵ (xV = ↵). Solid curves are the voter’s
expected payo↵ E[U v1 ], dashed ones represent E[U
v
1 ]  12 and E[U v1 ] + 12 
a formal proof of this Lemma is presented in the Appendix, the underlying reasoning
is easy to illustrate graphically.
In Figure 1, the solid lines represent the voter’s expected payo↵ as a function of the
implemented policy x1, for the two possible values of xV . Thus, the thick increasing
solid curve is  (x1 ↵)2 and the thin decreasing solid curve is  (x1 ↵)2. For any policy
di↵erent from zero, the voter’s expected payo↵ is always di↵erent in the two states of
the world. However, recall that the actual payo↵ realization is also a function of the
realization of the shock e1. The dashed curves represent therefore the maximum and
minimum possible values of the payo↵ realization, once we take the shock into account.
Suppose that the true state is positive (xV = ↵). Then, for any policy x1 the actual
payo↵ realization can fall anywhere on the line between the two thick increasing dashed
curves (representing, respectively,  (x1  ↵¯)2 + 12 and  (x1  ↵¯)2  12 ). Analogously,
if the true state is negative the payo↵ realization can be anywhere on the line between
the thin decreasing dashed curves.
The presence of the shock creates a partial overlap in the support of the payo↵
realization for a positive and negative state of the world: for any given policy x1 2
( x0, x0), there exist values of the voter’s payo↵ that may be observed whatever the
true state. Consider for example policy x, as represented in the graph. Any payo↵
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realization falling between the gray and black bullets may be observed with positive
probability under both states of the world. Straightforwardly, if the payo↵ realization
falls outside this range of overlap, it constitutes a fully informative signal. There is only
one state of the world that could have generated that specific realization: the voter
simply likes the policy too much, or too little, for this to be justified as a consequence
of the shock. Thus, upon observing her payo↵, the voter learns the true state (i.e.
discovers the true value of xV ). Conversely, any payo↵ realization that falls inside the
range of overlap is completely uninformative. Due to the assumption that the shock is
uniformly distributed, any such realization has exactly the same probability of being
observed under the two states of the world. Thus, the voter learns nothing and must go
back to her prior beliefs. The more extreme the implemented policy, the closer the gray
and black bullets get, the smaller the range of overlap and the higher the probability
that the voter will learn the true state.
Let me emphasize that my results only require that extreme policies are more infor-
mative than moderate ones. The assumption that the noise is drawn from a uniform
distribution is not necessary to generate this result. Consider for example a world in
which the noise is normally distributed with full support. The learning process would
be much smoother: any signal would be somewhat informative, but never fully so. How-
ever, it would still be the case that extreme policies generate more information. As the
implemented policy becomes more extreme, the distance in the expected outcomes as
a function of the state increases. This, in turn, increases the signal’s informativeness.2
The Voter
In what follows, I will assume without loss of generality that the voter’s prior is ‘biased’




3 Thus, I refer to the left-wing (right-wing) party as the unpopular one (popular
one). In order to simplify the presentation of the results, but without much loss of
2Indeed, all I need to sustain this result is that the noise distribution satisfies the monotonic
likelihood ratio property.
3The results hold symmetrically for  V <
1
2 . The strict inequality is necessary.
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substance, I assume that ↵  x0, i.e. even under complete information the voter’s
preferred policy is never su ciently extreme to guarantee learning with probability
one. For ease of presentation I initially consider a myopic voter. I then show that the
(qualitative) results are robust to assuming a forward looking, and fully patient, voter.
Let us focus first on the voter’s strategy. Her equilibrium behavior is straightforward:
Lemma 2. In each period, the voter elects the party whose platform is closer to her
preferred policy (given her own beliefs).
The voter’s preferred policy in the first period is a function of her prior: ↵(2 V  1).
In the second period it will instead reflect her updated beliefs: ↵(2µV  1) (where, given
Lemma 1, µV 2 {0,  V , 1}). The proof of this Lemma follows the usual argument and
is therefore omitted.
The Parties
Consider now the parties’ platform choice. Absent any future concerns, the second-
period subgame is exactly equivalent to a one-shot Downsian game. Thus, the following
Lemma holds:
Lemma 3. The second-period subgame has a unique equilibrium, in which both parties




2 = ↵(2µV   1)
The proof follows the usual argument. Divergent platforms can never be sustained
in equilibrium in the second period. If neither of the two parties is at the voter’s bliss
point, at least one of them can always increase its payo↵ by moving closer to the voter
and winning for sure. If only one of the two parties is at the voter’s bliss point, it can
always deviate to a winning platform that strictly increases its own payo↵. Suppose
instead that the parties converge on the voter’s preferred platform. Neither of them
can change the policy implemented in equilibrium by unilateral deviation. Therefore,
convergence on the voter’s preferences can always be sustained in equilibrium.
It is easy to see that the second result can be extended to the first period: the game
always has an equilibrium in which the parties converge on the voter’s preferred policy
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in both periods. However, the key argument of this paper is that this classic equilibrium
is not always unique and does not always capture the nature of electoral competition.
In what follows, I will show that the unpopular party’s strategic behavior is sometimes
driven by the incentives to gamble on the future and change the voter’s preferences,
even at the cost of losing for sure.
The Parties’ Utility
Lemma 1 shows that the location of the policy implemented in the first period has a
crucial impact on the voter learning. The more extreme the policy is, the larger the
variance in the distribution of her posterior beliefs (i.e. the larger the likelihood that
µV 6=  V ). The voter’s posterior in turns determines the platform that will be enacted
in the second period (Lemma 3). Thus, the policy implemented in the first period
has a twofold e↵ect on the parties’ expected utility. A direct e↵ect on their first-period
payo↵, and an indirect one on their expected future utility (via the voter learning). The
direct e↵ect is clear: each party’s utility decreases as the platform moves away from
its per-period bliss point. Figure 2 represents the left-wing party’s first-period payo↵.
Straightforwardly, as the policy moves to the right away from xL, the party’s utility
strictly decreases. The indirect e↵ect is more subtle. Each party is convinced that the
true state of the world is in line with its own policy preferences (i.e.  L = 1   R = ✏,
where ✏ takes an arbitrarily small value). Thus, each believes that information would
always move the voter’s future preferences closer to its own. As consequence, each
party’s expected future utility increases as the policy implemented in the first period
becomes more extreme, both to the left and to the right of 0. Recall that this expectation
is the ‘subjective’ one, as a function of the party’s own prior.
The overall impact of the first-period policy on the parties’ expected utility will
depend on the combination of the direct and indirect e↵ects. Focus again on the un-
popular left-wing party (with symmetric results holding for the right-wing one). If we
consider a left wing policy (x1 < 0) moving to the right away from xL, direct and in-
direct e↵ect go in the same direction. The party’s immediate payo↵ decreases, and as





Figure 2: Party L’s first-period utility as a function of the implemented policy
This also implies that the policy that maximizes the party’s expected utility – which I
denote as xgL – is (weakly) to the left of xL. Conversely, when a positive policy moves
further to the right, direct and indirect e↵ect have di↵erent signs. As the policy moves
to the right the party’s first-period payo↵ decreases. At the same time, however, a more
extreme policy being implemented implies that the voter is more likely to learn the true
state of the world, which increases the party’s expected future utility. If the indirect
e↵ect is su ciently strong, the party’s expected utility has a second (local) maximum
in the positive numbers, which I denote as xposL . The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 4. There exist unique e↵ and fxL such that if ↵ > e↵ and xL < fxL, then L’s
expected utility on [0,1] is non monotonic with a maximum at xposL > 0. Otherwise,
L’s expected utility is monotonically decreasing on [0,1].
The indirect e↵ect is stronger if information has a large impact on the voter’s policy
preferences: the larger ↵, the higher the expected gain from increasing the amount of
voter learning. Additionally, the more extreme the party is, the more it benefits from
moving the voter’s future preferences to the left (given concave utility). Thus, if the
conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied the indirect e↵ect dominates, and the left-wing







Figure 3: Party L’s expected utility as a function of first-period policy
the range [0, xposL ] (as depicted in Figure 3).
4 In what follows, I show that the presence
of this non-monotonicity is what allows gambling behavior to emerge in equilibrium.
Gambling on the Future
Let’s now focus on the incentives the parties face in the first period platform game.
Consider the popular party R. Recall that (by assumption) xR > ↵, where xR is
the party’s‘static’ bliss point (i.e. the policy that maximises its utility in the current
period). Additionally, since the party’s expected future utility is increasing in the
amount of voter learning, its welfare maximizing policy xgR is (weakly) more extreme
than xR. This implies that, in equilibrium, the winning platform must always be to the
right of the voter’s preferred policy (↵(2 V   1)). Given any policy to the left of this
point, the right-wing party can always find a di↵erent platform that increases both its
own and the voter’s payo↵. In particular, for any policy x < 0, the party can move to
the symmetric  x > 0. This guarantees the same amount of learning, but increases
both the voter’s and the party’s immediate payo↵. The popular right-wing party would
4Notice that, since the probability of learning is not smooth in x1, neither is the utility function: it













•• • •• •• •
Figure 4: Platforms symmetric around the voter’s preferred policy
therefore never allow its opponent to win with a policy to the left of the voter.
Should the same reasoning apply to the left-wing party, the usual Downsian dynam-
ics would emerge, thereby leading to a unique equilibrium in full convergence. Instead,
the unpopular party faces a trade o↵ between securing policy influence and forcing the
voter to experiment. This is a direct consequence of the voter’s ‘bias’ against the party.
Given  V >
1
2 , for any pair of platforms that leave the voter indi↵erent, the right-wing
one is always further away from zero (Figure 4). Thus, the popular party can win with
relatively more extreme platforms, that would therefore generate a larger amount of
information.
The unpopular party must choose between compromising today so as to move the
implemented platform closer to its preferred policy, and allowing its opponent to win
in order to increase the amount of voter learning. The party always has an incentive
to converge towards the voter’s preferred platform, so as to win the upcoming election
and move the implemented policy to the left. However, this would imply that little
information is generated, the voter is unlikely to change her beliefs, and the party will
have to compromise on a right-wing platform again tomorrow. Conversely, if the party
allows its opponent to win with an extreme right-wing policy, the probability that the
voter learns the true state increases and the party is more likely to be able to win with
a left-wing platform in the future.
If the incentives to force the voter to experiment are su ciently strong, the unpopu-
lar party gambles on the future: allows the right-wing opponent to win, in the hope that
the voter will learn that its policies are not aligned with the true state. The unpopular
party chooses to lose today in order to change voters’ views and win big tomorrow. In
what follows, I establish the conditions under which this behavior can be sustained in
equilibrium.
I denote a gambling equilibrium an equilibrium of the game in which, in the first
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period:
(i) the parties adopt platforms on opposite sides of the voter’s preferred policy:
xL
⇤
1 < ↵(2 V   1) < xR⇤1 ;
(ii) the unpopular party L loses with probability 1.
Notice that any equilibrium satisfying (i) must also meet condition (ii). As men-
tioned above, the popular party would never allow its opponent to win with a policy to
the left of the voter. Thus, any divergence equilibrium must be a gambling equilibrium.
Proposition 1 identifies necessary and su cient conditions for gambling equilibria
to exits. Proposition 2 then characterizes the range of platforms that can be sustained
in a gambling equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The exist unique cxL 2 (0,fxL) and e↵ such that gambling equilibria exist
if and only if:
• The unpopular party is su ciently extreme: xL < cxL
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences:
↵ > e↵
The thresholds are a function of the other parameters in the model. The conditions
ensure that xposL > ↵¯(2 V   1), i.e. L’s expected utility is increasing in x1 at x1 =
↵(2 V  1) (see Figure 5).5 Substantively, the expected gain from increasing the amount
of voter learning is su ciently large that the unpopular party is willing to throw out
the first-period election.
The qualitative conditions are in line with those identified in Lemma 4 (indeed, the
condition on ↵ is identical). If the voter receives no additional information, the parties
will converge on ↵(2 V   1) in the second period. Suppose instead that the voter
learns that the true state of the world is in line with the left-wing party’s ideology;
then, the second-period equilibrium policy will move to ↵. Straightforwardly, the gain







Figure 5: Players’ utility as a function of first-period policy. The solid line represents
the left-wing party’s expected utility in the whole game, while the dashed one represents
the voter’s expected utility in the first period.
from a successful gamble is therefore increasing in ↵ =  ↵. Additionally, the value of
moving tomorrow’s equilibrium policy increases as the party’s bliss point xL moves to
the left. The unpopular party is willing to gamble only when its ideological preferences
are su ciently extreme.
Further, Corollary 1 shows that gambling equilibria are ‘more likely’ to exist the
larger  V : the stronger the voter’s right wing ‘bias’, the easier it is to satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 1. The incentives to force the voter to experiment are stronger
the further away her preferences would be from the party’s, should she receive no
additional information. As  V increases, the voter’s initial preferences move further to
the right, and the gain from a successful gamble increases. In other words, the less
popular the party is to begin with, the less it has to lose and the more to gain from
changing the voter’s future preferences.
Corollary 1. The likelihood that gambling equilibria exist (in the sense of set inclusion)
increases as the voter’s right-wing bias gets stronger (i.e. @cxL@ V > 0 and @b↵@ V < 0)
Finally, Proposition 2 identifies the range of platforms that can be sustained in a
gambling equilibrium. For ease of presentation, the proposition is derived under the
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assumption that xR > x0, where x0 is the smallest (positive) policy that guarantees
learning with probability 1 (see Lemma 1). The assumption simply ensures that xgR >
xposL , where x
g
R is the right-wing party’s first-period preferred policy. The assumption
will be relaxed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique xMinL (↵¯,  V , xL)   2↵¯(2 V   1)  xposL such that
in any gambling equilibrium, platforms satisfy:
1. xR
⇤




Point 1 indicates that in any gambling equilibrium the two parties must be adopting
platforms equidistant from the voter’s preferred policy. The proof is straightforward:
for any pair of asymmetric policies at least one of the parties can deviate to a winning
platform that strictly increases its own expected utility. If xR
⇤
1 6= xgR, R can always




R, the left-wing party can move to x
pos
L
and win, while strictly increasing its expected utility. Point 2 then identifies the range
of platforms that can be sustained in a gambling equilibrium. Straightforwardly, the
unpopular party would never allow its opponent to win with a policy to the right of xposL .
The lower bound of the range is therefore always (weakly) larger than the symmetric
2↵(2 V   1)  xposL .
Notice that, in equilibrium, the voter must be breaking indi↵erence in favour of
the popular party R. With any other indi↵erence breaking rule R has a profitable
deviation to move slightly closer to the voter and increase its probability of winning. The
conjectured equilibria collapse and the parties are driven all the way to full convergence.
Thus, in a gambling equilibrium the unpopular party is choosing to lose the election with
probability one, even if an arbitrarily small deviation would be enough to win for sure.
When instead the conditions in Proposition 1 are not satisfied, electoral competition
is driven by the parties’ desire to minimize immediate losses and the classic Downsian
results hold. The game has a unique equilibrium, in which the parties converge on the
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voter’s bliss point in both periods.6
The above results show that, under some conditions, the nature of electoral competi-
tion may instead be very di↵erent from the classic dynamics emerging in spatial models.
While probabilistic voting models analyze a trade-o↵ analogous to the one presented
in this paper, electoral competition is still driven by the parties’ (instrumental) desire
to win o ce. As a consequence, comparative statics show both equilibrium platforms
always moving in the same direction as the (expected) median voter. If the voter moves
right, both parties move right in equilibrium. The unpopular party is therefore always
chasing after the voter
Conversely, in a gambling equilibrium electoral competition is driven by the unpop-
ular party’s desire to move the electorate’s future preferences closer to its own, even
at the cost of losing for sure. As the voter’s right-wing bias increases, the unpopular
party has more to gain and less to lose from forcing her to experiment. The party may
therefore be willing to go further and further to the left, thus allowing its opponent
to win with a more and more extreme right-wing platform that further increases the
amount of voter learning. The following Corollary holds:
Corollary 2. There exists a xL < cxL such that if xL > xL, then @xMinL@ V < 0: as the
voter’s right wing bias increases, the unpopular party is willing to move further to the
left in equilibrium.
This result indicates that we may observe empirical patterns that would allow us
to adjudicate between competing explanations. Indeed, recent work by Margalit et.
al (2017) presents evidence that is hard to reconcile with probabilistic voting models,
and is instead consistent with Corollary 2. The authors analyze data from OECD
countries since the post-war period, and find that parties tend to move away from the
center following an electoral loss. ‘Under standard Downsian logic, parties should move
towards the median voter in the electorate (...). If a loss implies that a party was too
far away from the median, then the predicted reaction should be a shift to the center’
(p. 4). The model presented here provides a potential explanation as for why a di↵erent
6If the conditions are satisfied there exist other equilibria, in which both parties adopt the same
platform in the range [↵(2 V   1), 2↵(2 V   1)  xMinL ], where xMinL is as defined in Proposition 2.
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pattern instead emerges in the data. Learning that the electorate is further to the right
increases the unpopular left-wing party’s incentives to gamble, potentially inducing it
to move its electoral platform further to the left away from the (median) voter .
In concluding this section, it is important to discuss the impact of a specific assump-
tion used here: parties care only about policy and derive no benefit from holding o ce
per se. To simplify the presentation of the results, the model analysed in this paper
maintains several of the key features of the standard spatial model. In particular, the
two parties must move simultaneously, and the left-wing (right-wing) party can credibly
commit even to extreme right-wing (left-wing) platforms. These assumptions are quite
restrictive but they usually bear no impact on the equilibrium results. Not so much in
this model. Indeed, in the current set-up gambling equilibria exist only if parties are
purely policy motivated. However, relaxing either one, or both, of these assumptions
would allow gambling behaviour to emerge in equilibrium even if parties care about
o ce as well as policy. Suppose for example that the two parties have full commitment
ability, but can choose the timing of their platform announcement. Then, gambling
equilibria survive as long as o ce rents are not too large. This is due to the fact that
in a gambling equilibrium both parties must have incentives to generate information.
Further, allowing for sequential moves would also refine our equilibrium predictions. In
particular, in any gambling equilibrium of the sequential moves game platforms are as
follows: xR
⇤
1 = ↵(2 V  1) xMinL and xL⇤1  ↵(2 V  1) = ↵(2 V  1) xR⇤1 , where xMinL
is as defined in Proposition 2.
Alternatively, we could assume that the parties must move at the same time but are
somewhat limited in their commitment ability. For example, Levy (2004) speculates
that an internal bargaining process between competing factions is what sustains the
credibility of electoral promises. Thus, parties can only credibly commit to policies in
the Pareto set of the party’s members. Alternatively, it may be argued that individual
politicians have no credible commitment ability, therefore a party can only propose a
platform if it is the true bliss point of one of its members (Krasa and Polborn, 2018).
There may exist some overlap in the credible sets of the two parties. Crucially, both
may be able to commit to the voter’s ideal policy. Nonetheless, as long as the right-
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most (left-most) platform that the left-wing (right-wing) party can promise is not too
extreme, gambling equilibria survive for su ciently low o ce rents.
Parties’ Beliefs and Ideology
I have so far assumed that each party assigns probability (arbitrarily close to) 1 to the
true state of the world being in line with its own ideology, i.e. each believes information
would always move the voter’s future preferences closer to its own. However, gambling
equilibria survive under less restrictive conditions. Propositions 3 and 4 generalize the
results presented in the previous section, without imposing any prior assumption on the
parties’ beliefs.
Proposition 3. There exist unique e↵, x†L, x†R and   <  V such that gambling equilibria
exist if and only if:
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences:
↵ > e↵
• The parties are su ciently extreme: xL < x†L and xR > x†R
• The parties are su ciently ideological in their beliefs:  L <   <  R
The thresholds are a function of the other parameters in the model. The first
condition is exactly as in Proposition 1. Even when it recognizes that information may
move the voter to the right (i.e.  L > 0), the unpopular left-wing party is willing to
gamble only if the stakes are su ciently high. If the voter learns that the true state
is right-wing, her second-period policy preferences move to ↵. Therefore, as ↵¯ =  ↵
increases a failed gamble becomes more and more costly. However, at the same time
the gain from a successful gamble also increases – moving the voter all the way to ↵
– and to a larger extent (given  V >
1
2). Thus, learning the true state must have a
su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences. Additionally, both parties must be
su ciently extreme in their preferences and ideological in their beliefs. Intuitively, the
unpopular party is willing to lose the first period election only if it believes the gamble
is likely to be successful. Thus, L must be su ciently confident that the true state
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is in line with its own preferences:  L must be su ciently low. However, this is not
enough. In a Downsian setting ‘it takes two to gamble’: the popular party must also
be willing to increase the amount of voter learning. The right-wing party is ready to
take the bet only if it believes information is likely to move the voter even closer to its
own bliss point:  R must be su ciently high. In the conjectured equilibria the popular
party is winning with probability 1, and implementing a right-wing platform. It is not
straightforward to see why it may have a profitable deviation. However, R has a lot
to lose from forcing the voter to experiment, especially when its ideological stances are
very popular to begin with (i.e. the voter’s prior is high). If  R is too low, the party has
an incentive to prevent information generation, and the conjectured equilibria collapse.
Further, notice that  V >  . This implies that gambling equilibria can be sustained
when the voter and the right-wing party have exactly the same beliefs ( R =  V ), or
when the two parties’ priors are arbitrarily close ( L =     " and  R =  V + ", where "
takes an arbitrarily small value). However, a disagreement between the voter and the
unpopular party is always necessary. In other words, the unpopular party must always
hold ideological beliefs. Interestingly, the higher the stakes, the smaller the minimum
disagreement required to sustain gambling in equilibrium (i.e.  V     is decreasing in
↵).
These results show that ideological beliefs are a crucial part of the story. Extreme
preferences are not enough for an instrumentally rational party to be willing to throw
out an election. The party must also be convinced that its ideology is in line with the
state of the world. Thus, ideological ‘extremism’ in both beliefs and policy preferences
is necessary for gambling behavior to emerge in equilibrium. However, the analysis also
reveals that extreme beliefs may to a certain extent substitute for extreme preferences.
Specifically, the following comparative statics hold:
Corollary 3. As the parties become more ideological in their beliefs, gambling equilibria







The intuition is clear: the more ideological a party is in its beliefs, the more it
expects to gain from forcing the voter to experiment. As a consequence, the party will
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be willing to gamble under relatively less extreme policy preferences.
Finally, Proposition 4 identifies the range of platforms that can be sustained in
a gambling equilibrium. Before stating the Proposition, let me introduce some useful
notation. Denote as x˜ the policy that maximises R’s expected utility in the range [0, x0].




Conversely, if xR > x0 the right-wing party’s expected utility has a first maximum at
x˜ and a second one at xR. Depending on the parameter values, either x˜ or xR is the
function’s global maximum. Notice that, if the conditions in Proposition 3 hold, x˜ is
always to the right of the voter’s preferred point (the conditions guarantee that R’s
expected utility is increasing in at ↵(2 V   1)).
The following holds.
Proposition 4. Suppose that x˜   xposL . Then, there exists a unique[xMinL   2↵¯(2 V  
1)  xposL such that in any gambling equilibrium platforms satisfy:
1. xR
⇤




Suppose instead that x˜ < xposL . Then, there exists a unique
]xMinL   2↵¯(2 V   1)  x˜
such that any pair of platforms satisfying:
1. xR
⇤




can be sustained in a gambling equilibrium. Further, if E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)   x˜)] 
E[UL(x˜)] then there exist also asymmetric gambling equilibria in which xR
⇤
1 = x˜ and
xL
⇤
1 < 2↵¯(2 V   1)  xR⇤1 . No other gambling equilibrium exists.
First, consider the case in which x˜   xposL , i.e. the right-wing party’s expected
utility is increasing at xposL . In this case, the equilibrium correspondence has the same
properties as identified in Proposition 2. The left-wing party would never allow its
7Recall that xR is the right-wing party’s preferred policy in a one shot game, i.e. absent learning.
x0 is the smallest positive policy that guarantees learning with probability one.
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opponent to win with a policy to the right of xposL . As such, the left-most platform that
can be sustained in equilibrium is weakly larger than 2↵¯(2 V 1) xposL . Further, the two
parties must always adopt symmetric policies. For any pair of asymmetric platforms,
R could always deviate to a winning policy that strictly increases its expected utility
(i.e. closer to x˜).
Suppose instead that x˜ < xposL . In this case, the right-wing party is never wiling
to commit to xposL . It could always deviate to x˜ and strictly increase both its own
and the voter’s payo↵. Indeed (given the definition of x˜) the same reasoning applies
to any platform in [x˜, x0]. Further, recall that xposL  x0 therefore no platform to the
right of x0 can ever be sustained in equilibrium. As such, in any gambling equilibrium
xR
⇤
1  x˜. Straightforwardly, in any equilibrium in which xR⇤1 < x˜, the two parties must
be adopting symmetric platforms. The right-wing party can otherwise always find a
winning policy that strictly increases its expected utility. Conjecture now an asymmetric
gambling equilibrium in which the right-wing party proposes x˜, and the left-wing party
commits to a policy xL1 further from the voter’s bliss point. Such an equilibrium can
never be sustained if the left-wing party can move slightly to the right of 2↵(2 V  1) x˜
and strictly increase its expected utility. If instead E[UL(2↵(2 V  1)  x˜)]  E[UL(x˜)],
the unpopular party can do nothing better than allow its opponent to win (recall that
L’s expected utility is monotonically decreasing on [2↵(2 V 1) x˜, 0] and monotonically
increasing on [0, x˜]). The conjectured equilibrium can be sustained for any xL1 if x˜ is the
right-wing party’s utility global maximum (i.e. xR < x0), and for a su ciently moderate
xL1 otherwise.
A Look at a Forward Looking Voter
I have so far worked under the assumption that the voter is myopic, and fully discounts
the future. While there are substantive reasons to defend such an assumption, it is
important to highlight that the results survive with a forward looking, and fully patient,
voter. In this section I analyze the model presented above, but allow the voter to have
a positive discount factor   > 0.
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Proposition 5. There exist unique e↵,  , ‡xL  †xL and ‡xR   †xR such that gambling
equilibria exist if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences:
↵ > b↵
• The parties are su ciently ideological in their beliefs:  L <   <  R
• The parties are su ciently extreme: xL < x‡L and xR > x‡R
The conditions guarantee that the parties’ expected utility is increasing at x1 = x
g
V ,
where xgV is the forward looking voter’s preferred policy in period one (Figure 6). This
is (analogously to what established in the previous sections) necessary and su cient for
gambling equilibria to exist. The qualitative results are as in Proposition 3: gambling
equilibria exist if and only if information has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s
future preferences, and the parties are su ciently extreme in both their ideological
preferences and ideological beliefs. However – while the conditions on ↵,  R, and  L are
exactly the same as in Proposition 3 – those on the parties’ preferences are a function
of the voter’s discount factor  . The more patient the voter is, the more extreme the
parties need to be for gambling equilibria to exist (i.e. x‡L is decreasing in   and x
‡
R
is increasing in  ). The forward looking voter’s expected utility is increasing in the
probability of learning. As a consequence, xgV is always more extreme than ↵¯(2 V   1).
As   increases, the voter’s desire to learn the true state gets stronger, and her preferred
policy moves further to the right. For gambling behavior to be sustained in equilibrium
the parties must be more and more extreme, ensuring that they have an incentive to
further increase the amount of voter learning.
Characterizing the full range of platforms that can be sustained in a gambling equi-
librium is more challenging than when considering a myopic voter. This is due to the
fact that a forward looking voter’s expected utility may not be single peaked. Indeed,
if the value of information is su ciently large, the voter’s expected utility will have a
second (local) maximum in the negative numbers (denoted as xnegV in Figure 6). Thus,








Figure 6: Forward looking voter’s expected utility as a function of first-period policy
weakly better o↵. This makes it hard to identify pairs of platforms such that the
left-wing party has no profitable deviation.
However, there must always exist a range of positive policies that provide the voter
with strictly higher utility than xnegV . In particular, there always exist a pair of policies
x 2 [0, xgV ) and x > xgV such that E[UV (x)] = E[UV (x)] = E[UV (xnegV )], and E[UV (x)] >
E[UV (x
neg
V )] for any x 2 (x, x) (see Figure 6). The existence of this range allows us to
partially characterize the equilibrium correspondence.
Proposition 6. Any pair of platforms satisfying:
1. E[UV (xL
⇤
1 )] = E[UV (x
R⇤
1 )]
2. x  xL⇤1  xgV  xR⇤1  min 2 {x, xposL , x˜}, where x˜ is the maximum of R’s
expected utility in the range [0, x0]
can be sustained in a a gambling equilibrium.
Conclusion
Political parties sometimes adopt extreme positions, even if this comes at the expenses
of their electoral success. This behavior is puzzling from a rational choice perspective,
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and is usually ascribed to ideological dogmatism and expressive concerns for ideological
purity. In this paper, I have shown that ideologically motivated parties may instead
choose to lose for entirely strategic reasons. A party whose ideology is unpopular with
the electorate faces a trade o↵, between securing immediate policy influence and chang-
ing the voter’s future preferences. If the party is su ciently extreme and ideological in
its beliefs, it may adopt the ‘strategy of changing preferences of voters, so that when
it wins at some future date, it can be with a better policy’ (Roemer, 2001: 154). The
unpopular party chooses to lose today and gamble on the future: allows its opponent to
win with an extreme policy that increases the amount of voter learning. If the gamble
is successful, and the voter learns that she dislikes the opponent’s policies, the ex-ante
unpopular party will be able to win with a better platform in the future.
As it is often the case with research papers, in completing this project I have encoun-
tered a trade-o↵ between presenting the most stylized model that would allow me to
explore and easily present the key dynamic trade-o↵ of interest, and introducing a richer
setting to delve deeper into the nature of uncertainty and the voters’ learning process.
Here, I have decided in favour of the first alternative. In particular, the model presented
in this paper embeds the assumption that the world is simple, with few unknowns (here,
an unknown state of the world representing the slope of the policy mapping function).
In principle, then, policy making is easy: in each period, the decision maker only has to
think about how likely it is that the state of the world is a right-wing versus a left-wing
one. However, learning is made di cult by the fact that policy outcomes are noisy
(i.e., realized outcomes are a function of random shocks). At the other extreme, we find
models such as Callander (2011) based on the assumption that there is no noise, but the
world itself is complex with many (or even infinite) unknowns. Policy making is hard,
and today’s outcome influences tomorrow’s decision indirectly via learning and directly
by impacting voter’s willingness to settle or keep experimenting. Thus, adopting one or
the other conceptualization of uncertainty bears important consequences on the voters’
learning process, the nature of policy making and the dynamic link between periods.
Callander assumes that players know the slope of the policy mapping function (which
in my setting would represent the state of the world). However, if we amend his frame-
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work to allow for some degree of uncertainty, then the key trade-o↵ highlighted here
should continue to hold (with extreme policies revealing more information about the
correct state). Nonetheless, it would be interesting to analyse whether further insights
emerge when we consider this richer setting, as well as whether the conditions for the
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Lemma 1: voter learning satisfies the following properties:
(i) Her posterior µV takes one of three values: µV 2 {0,  , 1};
(ii) The more extreme the policy implemented in the first period x1, the higher the
probability that µ 6=  ;
(iii) There exists a policy x0 such that if |x1|   |x0|, then µV 6=   with probability 1.
Proof. The proof of Claims 1 and 2 below is necessary and su cient to prove Lemma
1.
Claim 1: Let xt   0.
(i) A payo↵ realization U vt /2 [ (xt   ↵¯)2   12 , (xt   ↵)2 + 12 ] is fully informative.
Upon observing U vt >  (xt   ↵)2 + 12 , the players form posterior beliefs that xV = ↵¯
with probability 1. Similarly, upon observing U vt <  (xt   ↵¯)2   12 the players form
beliefs that xV = ↵ with probability 1.
(ii) A payo↵ realization U vt 2 [ (xt   ↵¯)2   12 , (xt   ↵)2 + 12 ], is uninformative.
Upon observing U vt , players confirm their prior belief that xV = ↵¯ with probability  i,
8i 2 {R, V, L}.
Symmetric results apply when xt < 0.
Proof. The proof of part (i) is trivial given the boundedness of the distribution of e,
and is therefore omitted. Part (ii) follows straightforwardly from applying Bayes rule.
Recall that the voter’s payo↵ realization U vt is a function of the implemented policy (xt)
the voter’s true bliss point (xV ) and the noise term (e): U vt =  (xV   xt)2 + e. Denote
as f(·) the PDF of e. Then,
prob(xV = ↵¯|U vt ) =
f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2) 
f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2)  + f(U vt + (xt   ↵)2)(1   )
(3)
Given the assumption that ✏ is uniformly distributed
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f(U vt + (xt   ↵¯)2) = f(U vt + (xt   ↵)2) (4)
Therefore the above simplifies to
prob(xV = ↵¯|U vt ) =   (5)
This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 proves that players either observe an uninformative or a fully informative
signal. Claim 2 shows that the policy choice determines the expected probability that
the signal will be informative. The more extreme the implemented policy, the higher
such probability.
Claim 2: Let L be a binary indicator, taking value 1 if the players learn the true value
of xV at the end of period 1, and 0 otherwise. There exists x0 = 14↵¯ such that
• For all |x1|   |x0|
Prob(L = 1|x1) = 1 (6)
• For all x1 2 [0, x0)
Prob(L = 1|x0   x1   0) = 4↵¯ x1 (7)
• For all x1 2 ( x0, 0]
Prob(L = 1|  x0  x1  0) =  4↵¯ x1 (8)
Proof. Let me first prove the existence of point x0. From Claim 1, x0 is the point such
that for any policy |x|   |x0|, the interval [ (xt   ↵¯)2   12 , (xt   ↵)2 + 12 ] is empty.
This requires
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  (xt   ↵)2 + 1
2 
+ (xt   ↵¯)2 + 1
2 
 0 (9)




To complete the proof, assume x1 2 (0, x0). The expected probability of the realized
outcome being informative is:
Prob(L = 1| , 0 < x1 < x0) =
 [Prob( (xt   ↵¯)2 + e1 >  (xt   ↵)2 + 12 )] + (1   )[Prob( (xt   ↵)2 + e1 <  (xt   ↵¯)2   12 )] (11)
Given the symmetry
Prob( (xt ↵¯)2+e1 >  (xt ↵)2+ 1
2 




Prob(L = 1|x1 > 0) = Prob( (xt   ↵¯)2 + e1 >  (xt   ↵)2 + 1
2 
)) = 4↵¯ x1 (13)
Similar calculations produce the result for x1 2 ( x0, 0].
This concludes the proof of Claim 2
and thus of Lemma 1
The Parties’ Utility
In this section I will characterize the policies xgL and x
pos
L (symmetric results apply for
the right-wing party), and present the proof of Lemma 4.
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Denote as  (x1) the probability of the voter learning the true state of the world
(as a function of the policy implemented in the first period). Given  L = ✏ ⇡ 0, the
left-wing party’s (subjective) expected utility can be written as:
  (x1   xL)2   (1   (x1))(↵¯(2 V   1)  xL)2    (x1)(↵  xL)2 (14)
Notice that the party’s utility is increasing in  (x1), given the assumption on  L.
From Lemma 1 we know that  (x1) is not a smooth function of x1: it kinks at  x0, 0
and x0. Thus, we must analyze the utility function piecewise.
Consider first the case in which xL   x0. Then, L’s expected utility as a function
of x1 has the following properties:
• In the range [ 1, x0] it is concave and non monotonic with global maximum
at xgL = xL. Every policy in this range guarantees learning with probability 1.
Thus, as x1 moves away from xL it only has a negative direct e↵ect on the party’s
payo↵.
• In the range [ x0, 0] it is strictly decreasing. As the policy moves to the right the
party’s immediate utility decreases. The probability of the voter learning the true
state is also reduced, which implies lower expected future utility
• In the range [0, x0] the party faces a trade-o↵, that is analyzed in more details
below.
• In the range [x0,1] it is strictly decreasing. Every policy in this range guarantees
learning with probability 1. Thus, as x1 moves to the right it only has a negative
direct e↵ect on the party’s payo↵.
Consider now the case in which xL >  x0. Then, L’s expected utility as a function
of x1 has the following properties:
• In the range [ 1, x0] it is strictly increasing. Every policy in this range guar-
antees learning with probability 1. Thus, as x1 moves closer to xL it only has a
positive direct e↵ect on the party’s payo↵.
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• In the range [ x0, 0] it is concave and non-monotonic with global maximum at
xgL 2 [ x0, xL]. This is the policy that solves the following maximization problem:
maximise
x1
 (x1   xL)2   (1 + 4↵ x1)(↵(2 V   1)  xL)2 + 4↵ x1(↵  xL)2




• In the range [0, x0] the party faces a trade-o↵, that is analyzed in more details
below.
• In the range [x0,1] it is strictly decreasing. Every policy in this range guarantees
learning with probability 1. Thus, as x1 moves away from xL it only has a negative
direct e↵ect on the party’s payo↵.
Lemma 4: There exist unique e↵ and fxL such that if ↵ > e↵ and xL < fxL then L’s
expected utility on [0,1] is non monotonic with a maximum at xposL > 0. Otherwise,
L’s expected utility is monotonically decreasing on [0,1].
Proof. From the discussion above we know that L’s utility is always monotonically
decreasing in the range [x0,1]. Conversely, in the range [0, x0] the party faces a trade
o↵. As the policy moves to the right the party’s immediate payo↵ decreases, while its
future expected payo↵ increases. The maximization problem is:
maximise
x1
 (x1   xL)2   (1  4↵ x1)(↵(2 V   1)  xL)2   4↵ x1(↵  xL)2




The solution to this maximisation problem is x⇤ = min 2 {max 2 {0, xL 8↵¯2 (xL V +
↵ V (1    V ))}, 14↵ }. Thus, if xL   8↵¯2 (xL V + ↵ V (1    V ))  0, the function is
monotonically decreasing on [0,1]. Otherwise, it is non monotonic with maximum at
xposL = min 2 {xL   8↵¯2 (xL V + ↵¯ V (1    V )), 14↵ }. Therefore, the condition for
non-monotonicity is xL   8↵¯2 (xL V + ↵ V (1   V )) > 0. This yelds:
127
xL <
 8↵¯3  V (1   V )






Proposition 1: The exist unique cxL 2 (0,fxL) and e↵ such that Gambling equilibria
exist if and only if:
• The unpopular party is su ciently extreme: xL < cxL
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences:
↵ > e↵
Proof. Necessary and su cient condition for gambling equilibria to exist is that L’s
expected utility is increasing at x1 = ↵¯(2 V   1), i.e. xposL > ↵¯(2 V   1). Notice that
↵¯(2 V   1) < 14↵¯ (given the assumption that ↵¯ < 14↵¯ ). Thus, we do not have to worry
about the case in which (16) has a corner solution at 14↵¯ , and the condition is:
xL   8↵¯2 (xL V + ↵¯ V (1   V )) > ↵¯(2 V   1) (19)
The above can be satisfied if and only if the LHS id decreasing in xL. Thus, we
obtain:
xL <
 ↵¯(2 V   1)  8↵¯3  V (1   V )






The proof of Corollary 1 follows straightforwardly from above.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique xMinL (↵¯,  V , xL)   2↵¯(2 V   1)  xposL such that








Proof. The proof for Points 1 is provided in the main body of the paper. Here I pro-
vide the proof for point 2. xMinL is the left-most platform that L is willing to adopt
in equilibrium. First of all, notice that xMinL   2↵¯(2 V   1)   xposL : L would never
allow its opponent to win with a platform to the right of xposL . In other words, for any
pair of platforms satisfying Point 1 and such that xMinL < 2↵¯(2 V   1)  xposL , L would
have a profitable deviation to move to xposL . It follows that x
Min
L = 2↵¯(2 V   1)  xposL
when 2↵¯(2 V   1)   xposL   0. Recall, in fact, that the party’s utility is monotonically
increasing on [0, xposL ]. Suppose instead that 2↵¯(2 V  1) xposL < 0. Then, the following
Corollary holds:
Corollary 1A: Suppose that 2↵¯(2 V   1) xposL < 0. Then, xMinL = max 2 {2↵¯(2 V  
1)  xposL , xˆ}, where xˆ  0 is such that E[UL(xˆ)] = E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)  xˆ)]
Proof. First of all let me prove the existence of a (unique) policy xˆ.
Claim 1. There exists a unique policy xˆ  0 such that: (i) E[UL(xˆ)] = E[UL(2↵(2 V  
1)   xˆ)], (ii) for any x < xˆ, E[UL(x)] > E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)   x)] and (iii) for any
xˆ < x < 0, E[UL(x)] < E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)  x)].
Proof. Given xposL > 2↵(2 V   1), L’s expected utility is monotonically increasing on
[0,↵(2 V   1)]. It follows straightforwardly that:
E[UL(x)] < E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)  x)] (22)
When x = 0. Additionally, it is easy to see that the following holds:
E[UL(x)] > E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)  x)] (23)
When x   x0 (since both x and 2↵(2 V  1) x guarantee learning with probability
1, but x is always closer to xL).
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Thus, there must exist (at least) one policy xˆ 2 ( x0, 0) such that
E[UL(xˆ)] = E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)  xˆ)] (24)
The uniqueness of xˆ follows straightforwardly from the fact that E[UL(2↵(2 V  
1)   x] is monotonically decreasing on [ x0, 0], while E[UL(x)] is either monotonically
decreasing or concave with maximum at xgL (see analysis at p. 35).
Claim 1 (along with Point 1 in Proposition 2) implies that xMinL   xˆ: for any pair
of platforms symmetric around the voter and such that xL
⇤
1 < xˆ, L has a profitable
deviation to make an arbitrarily small move to the right and win for sure. Further,
recall that L’s expected utility is monotonically decreasing on [2↵(2 V   1)   xposL , 0]8
and monotonically increasing on [0, xposL ]. Additionally (as discussed in the main body),
notice that xMinL must always be to the right of 2↵(2 V   1)   xposL . Thus, it follows
straightforwardly from Claim 1 that xMinL = max 2 {2↵¯(2 V   1)  xposL , xˆ}.
This concludes the proof of Corollary 1A
and Proposition 2.
Corollary 2: There exists xL < cxL such that if xL > xL, then @xMinL@ V < 0: as the
voter’s right wing bias increases, the unpopular party is willing to move further to the
left in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that xL > xL, where the condition guarantees that xL   8↵¯2 (xL v +
↵¯ v(1   v)) < min{ 14↵¯ , 2↵¯( V   1)}.9 Then, xMinL = 2↵¯( V   1)  xL   8↵¯2 (xL v +
↵¯ v(1   v)). Thus, xMinL is decreasing in  V i↵:
4↵¯ + 8↵¯2 (xL + ↵¯(1  2 V )) < 0 (25)
8It is straightforward to verify that 2↵(2 V   1)   xposL is always to the right of the function’s
maximum on [ x0, 0].





2↵¯2 (2 V   1)  1
2↵¯ 
(26)
From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that gambling equilibria exists if and only
if the following condition is satisfied:
xL <
 ↵¯(2 V   1)  8↵¯3  V (1   V )
8↵¯2  V   1 (27)
It is easy to verify that the RHS in condition (27) is strictly smaller than the RHS




Proposition 3: There exist unique e↵, x†L, x†R and   <  V such that gambling equilibria
exist if and only if:
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences :
↵ > e↵
• The parties are su ciently extreme: xL < x†L and xR > x†R
• The parties are su ciently ideological in their beliefs :  L <   <  R
Proof. As in Proposition 1, necessary condition for the conjectured equilibria to be
sustained is that xposL > ↵(2 V   1):
xL   8↵2 (xL( V    L) + ↵ V (1   V )) > ↵(2 V   1) (28)
The above can be satisfied only if the LHS is decreasing in xL. Thus we obtain
xL <
 ↵(2 V   1)  8↵3  V (1   V )
8↵2 ( V    L)  1 (29)









However this is not su cient. It is also necessary for the right-wing party’s utility
to be strictly increasing at x1 = ↵(2 V   1).10 R’s expected utility on [0, x0] is:
E[UR(x1)] =  (x1   xR)2   (1  4↵ x1)(↵(2 V   1)  xR)2
 4↵ x1[ R(↵  xR)2 + (1   R)(↵  xR)2]
Thus @E[UR(x1)]@x1 =  2(x1  xR)+ 4↵ (2↵(2 V   1)  xR)2  4↵ ( R(↵  xR)2+(1 
 R)(↵  xR)2). The equilibrium condition is therefore:
  ↵(2 V   1) + xR + 8↵2 (xR( R    V )  ↵ V (1   V )) > 0 (32)
Which can be rewritten as:
xR >
↵(2 V   1) + +8↵3  V (1   V )
8↵2 ( R    V ) + 1 (33)
Which requires
 R >  V   1
8↵2 
(34)
Proposition 4: Suppose that x˜   xposL . Then, there exists a unique[xMinL   2↵¯(2 V  
1)  xposL such that in any gambling equilibrium platforms satisfy:
1. xR
⇤




Suppose instead that x˜ < xposL . Then, there exists a unique
]xMinL   2↵¯(2 V   1)  x˜
such that any pair of platforms satisfying:
10Notice that, given xR > ↵, this is always true under the assumption that  R ⇡ 1, which was used








can be sustained in a gambling equilibrium. Further, if E[UL(2↵(2 V   1)   x˜)] 
E[UL(x˜)] then there exist also asymmetric gambling equilibria in which xR
⇤
1 = x˜ and
xL
⇤
1 < 2↵¯(2 V   1)  xR⇤1 . No other gambling equilibrium exists.
Proof. The proof proceeds as for Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.
Proposition 5: There exist unique e↵,  , ‡xL  †xL and ‡xR   †xR such that gambling
equilibria exist if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Learning the true state has a su ciently large impact on the voter’s preferences:
↵ > e↵)
• The parties are su ciently ideological in their beliefs:  L < gamma <  R
• The parties are su ciently extreme: xL < x‡L( ) and xR > x‡R( ))
Proof. First of all we must calculate the voter’s optimum xgV . This is the policy that
solves the following maximization problem:
maximise
x1
  V(x1   ↵)2   (1   V)(x1   ↵)2    (1  4↵ x1)[ V(↵(2 V   1)  ↵)2 + (1   V)(↵2 V)2]
subject to x1  1
4↵ 
(35)
xgV = min{ 14↵ ,↵(2 V   1) + 8 ↵3  V (1    V )}. Given ↵ < x0 = 14↵ , xgV = ↵(2 V  
1) + 8 ↵3  V (1    V ). Thus, necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of
gambling equilibria are:




2 (xR( R    V )  ↵ V (1   V ))  ↵(2 V   1)  8 ↵3  V (1   V ) > 0 (37)
These reduce to
xL <
 ↵(2 V   1)  (1 +  )8↵3  V (1   V )
8↵2 ( V    L)  1 (38)








↵(2 V   1) + (1 +  )8↵3  V (1   V )
8↵2 ( R    V ) + 1 (41)
 R >  V   1
8↵2 
(42)
Proposition 6: Any pair of platforms satisfying:
1. E[UV (xL
⇤
1 )] = E[UV (x
R⇤
1 )]
2. x  xL⇤1  xgV  xR⇤1  min 2 {x, xposL , x˜}, where x˜ is the maximum of R’s
expected utility in the range [0, x0]
can be sustained in a a gambling equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds as for Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.
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Do We Get the Best Candidates When
We Need Them the Most?
Abstract
Do the right candidates for o ce choose to run at the right time? I analyze a
model of repeated elections in which politicians di↵er in the probability of being
competent. Voters update their beliefs about the o ce holder’s ability upon ob-
serving his performance in o ce. In each period, the country faces either a safe
situation or a crisis. A crisis has two key features: it exacerbates the importance
of the o ce holder’s competence and, as a consequence, the informativeness of his
performance. I show that electoral accountability has the perverse consequence
of discouraging good candidates from running in times of crisis. Precisely when
the voter would need him the most, the politician who is most likely to be com-
petent chooses to stay out of the race in order preserve his electoral capital. In
contrast with results in the existing literature, this adverse selection emerges even
if running is costless and if o ce is more valuable than the outside option.
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Introduction
A growing empirical literature highlights that the quality of political leaders has a
critical impact on a country’s performance (e.g. Jones and Olken 2005, Besley, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, it then becomes essential to
understand under which conditions high-quality politicians are willing to run for o ce
in the first place. One question is particularly important to evaluate the e↵ectiveness
of democratic elections in improving voters’ welfare: do the right candidates self-select
at the right time? More specifically, are the most competent politicians willing to run
for o ce during times of crisis, when competence matters the most?
The formal literature has so far placed little emphasis on this question. Most extant
models of elections in fact take the pool of candidates as exogenous, focusing instead on
voters’ ability to identify good politicians to be (re)elected and bad ones to be thrown
out. A small recent literature allows for endogenous candidate entry, thereby analysing
the equilibrium supply of good politicians. However, these works typically consider
a static setting, focusing on which types self-select into politics and highlighting the
di culty of attracting competent politicians if o ce rents are too low compared to
private market salaries. Little attention is instead paid to when the right candidates
are willing to run, if a longer planning horizon is considered.
In this paper, I adopt a very di↵erent perspective. I consider a world in which
potential candidates are career politicians, for whom o ce is always more valuable than
the outside option. As such, entering the race is always the statically optimal choice for
all potential candidates, irrespective of their expected ability and the conditions in the
country. I show that this does not always hold true when we take into account their
dynamic incentives. Under some conditions, ‘good’ candidates are not willing to run
for o ce during times of crisis. The politician who is most likely to solve the crisis also
has the most to lose from failing. As such, precisely when the voter would need him the
most, he chooses to stay out of the race in order to preserve his electoral capital for the
future. In contrast, the ‘worst’ (in expectation) potential candidate is always willing to
take the gamble, and run for o ce during challenging times. Thus, the voters gets the
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wrong candidates at the wrong time. Crucially, this adverse selection does not arise due
to weak electoral incentives, as it is the case the extant literature. Quite the opposite,
it emerges precisely as a perverse consequence of accountability.
In the baseline model I consider a game with two time periods and an election in
each. The players are two potential candidates and a representative voter. Potential
candidates are career politicians, that di↵er from each other in the probability of be-
ing competent (a politician’s true type is unknown to all players). In each period, the
politicians simultaneously choose whether to run for o ce. The model is one of pure
selection: the o ce holder’s performance results in either a good or a bad governance
outcome, with the probability of producing a good outcome a function of the incum-
bent’s true type. Politicians are o ce motivated, an their (per-period) payo↵ from
holding o ce is always higher than their outside option. This payo↵ consists of both
monetary and ego-rents: while monetary rents are always accrued in the same measure,
ego rents represent the legacy payo↵ that an o ce holder only enjoys when he delivers
a good performance.
The crucial element of the model is that in each period the country either experiences
a crisis, or a period of ‘business as usual’. A crisis (economic or otherwise) is an
exogenous shock that has two key features: it amplifies the impact of the o ce holder’s
competence and, at the same time, the informativeness of his performance. In other
words, precisely because competence matters the most during times of crisis, this is
also when the governance outcomes reveals most information about the o ce holder’s
ability. In particular, I assume that both competent and incompetent politicians are
always able to deliver a good performance during normal times. In contrast, the o ce
holder’s ability determines the probability that he would successfully manage a crisis.
A crisis therefore provides the voters with a ‘test’ of the incumbent’s quality.
Consider the incentives a career politician faces. In the last period election, a politi-
cian must only evaluate the expected value of holding o ce today. This is always higher
than the payo↵ from staying home, therefore all potential candidates are always willing
to enter the race. Not so much in the first period. When politicians choose whether to
run for o ce, they must consider both the expected payo↵ from being elected today,
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and how it influences the chances of being elected tomorrow. Suppose that the country
is hit by a crisis in the first period. This has two consequences. First, the o ce holder’s
performance will reveal information about his true ability, and therefore influence his
future electoral prospects. Second, the value of holding o ce today is lower than the
expected rents from being in o ce the second period: a crisis may not arise again to-
morrow, therefore the probability that the o ce holder will be able to deliver a good
performance and enjoy the associated legacy payo↵ is higher in the second term. In
this sense, the first period o ce holder is taking a gamble. The lower the probability
of being competent, the riskier this gamble.
Given the reasoning above, it may seem counter-intuitive that precisely the politi-
cian who is most likely to be competent would decide to stay out of the race during
challenging times. However, while this politician has the highest chances of surviving
a crisis, he also has a valuable electoral advantage. As a consequence, information can
only hurt his future electoral chances, and this politician experiences fear of failure.
Under some conditions, he will therefore choose to stay out of the race when a crisis is
likely to arise, so as to prevent the voter from learning about his true ability. In con-
trast, the worst (in expectation) potential candidate never has anything to lose from
holding o ce in the first period. Indeed, holding o ce during times of crisis can only
increase his future electoral chances, by allowing him to prove himself. As such, he
always has incentives to gamble on his own success, and is willing to enter the race
under both states of the world. Thus (under some conditions) only the worst candidate
is willing to run for o ce during challenging times.
The second result of the paper shows that, by influencing the pool of candidates that
self-select in equilibrium, an exogenous shock can also impact the electoral e↵ect of in-
cumbency. I consider a setting in which incumbency does not provide any advantage (or
disadvantage) in terms of campaign resources or name recognition. Nonetheless, while
incumbency status has no e↵ect on electoral performance during periods of ‘business as
usual’, an o ce holder that runs for re-election in times of crisis may experience either
an advantage or a disadvantage.
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In a robustness section I analyse several variants of the model, relaxing some of the
most restrictive assumptions imposed in the baseline set-up (in a separate section I also
introduce an amended version of the game, in which politicians live for more than two
periods but only care about the monetary rents from o ce). I show that while the
adverse selection documented in this paper can me more or less severe, it is unlikely
that any democracy may be immune from it. Indeed, the source of this ine ciency
seems to lie precisely in the accountability relationship between the voters and their
representatives. The problem that the voters face is that they cannot credibly commit
to ignoring valuable information that may be generated about the incumbent. Precisely
when competence matters the most, the o ce holder’s performance reveals most infor-
mation about his true ability. The politician who is most likely to be competent also
has the most to lose, and is unwilling to take the gamble. As a consequence, the more
the voters would want a competent politician in o ce, the less likely they are to get
one. This highlights how the nature of the results presented in this paper di↵ers from
the findings in the extant literature, where adverse selection instead emerges due to low
powered electoral incentives.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on the endogenous supply of good politicians
(Caselli and Morelli 2004, Messner and Polborn 2004, Besley 2005, Dal Bo, Dal Bo
and Di Tella 2006, Mattozzi and Merlo 2008, Fedele and Natticchioni 2013, Brollo
2013).1 This literature has so far focused mainly on how an individual’s outside option
in the private market influences his decision to run for o ce. Political ability and
private market salary are assumed to be correlated, therefore good politicians also
have a higher opportunity cost of holding o ce. This potentially generates an adverse
selection, whereby low ability individuals are more likely to enter politics.
1Other scholars analyse endogenous entry, but focus on settings in which potential candidates di↵er
in motivations (see Callander 2008) or ideology (see Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate,
1997), rather than quality.
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As highlighted above, this paper adopts a completely di↵erent perspective. It con-
siders a world in which potential candidates are career politicians, for whom the value
of holding o ce is always higher than the expected payo↵ from the private market.
Thus, rather than looking at the financial considerations that drive self-selection into
politics, I focus on how politicians’ dynamic electoral incentives influence the timing of
their entry decision.
The crucial feature of this model is to allow exogenous shocks to the country’s
conditions to influence the endogenous opportunity cost of holding o ce. As such, this
paper is in close conversation with a recent literature in formal theory, that highlights
how events outside of the o ce holders’ control may nonetheless impact their electoral
fortunes, by altering the inferences voters draw upon observing their performance in
o ce (see Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2017 and 2018). These
works complement the model presented here, since they take the pool of candidates as
given and focus instead on how crises influence o ce holders’ e↵ort choice.
Finally, this model connects with several papers that analyse political actors’ incen-
tives to gamble, within the framework of a multi-armed bandit model (e.g. Strulovici
2009, Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2018). In these works, political actors must choose
between a risky and a safe policy. The consequences of a risky choice inform voters and
politicians about the underlying state of the world, or the o ce holder’s true ability.
In contrast, the outcome of a safe policy reveals no additional information. The crucial
assumption is therefore that o ce holders are always free to choose to generate more or
less information. In this paper, I instead assume that the informativeness of governance
outcomes is determined exogenously by the ‘riskiness’ of the situation the country faces.
Politicians cannot choose which arm of the bandit to pull, they can only choose whether
to play.
The Baseline Model
I study the endogenous supply of competent candidates by analysing a game of repeated
elections with two time periods. At the beginning of the game, each party P 2 {1, 2}
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draws one potential candidate CP from the pool of its members. Politicians di↵er in
the probability of being competent. Specifically, each politician is one of two types,
good or bad: ✓i 2 {G,B} 8i 2 {C1, C2}. A politician’s type is unknown to all players,
including the politician himself. This reflects the assumption that political ability is
more than the product of a pre-determined and identifiable skill-set. As such, it can
never be verified ex-ante, but only discovered via experience. Players share common
beliefs that politician CP is a good type with probability qP (formally, party P draws
from a pool containing a proportion qP of good types). I will assume that q1 > q2. I
will therefore refer to C1 as the ex-ante advantaged potential candidate, and to C2 as
the disadvantaged one.
At the beginning of each period, the two potential candidates simultaneously choose
whether to run for o ce. If CP chooses to stay out of the race, party P is unable to
field a viable candidate and it resorts to a reserve candidate RP , which is known to be
a bad type with probability one (this assumption is without loss of generality). The
existence of the reserve candidates R1 and R2 is imposed for purposes of presentation
in order to avoid equilibria with uncontested elections, but otherwise has no e↵ect on
the results. Once the candidates are endogenously determined, a representative voter
V chooses whom to elect.
In each period, the country either faces a normal situation, or it is hit by a negative
shock: !t 2 {N,S} 8t 2 {1, 2}. A shock is an exogenous crisis: it may represent a period
of economic hardship, a war, or even a natural disaster. The key feature of a shock is
that it amplifies the e↵ect of the o ce holder’s type on his performance: competence
matters the most during times of crisis. Specifically, in each period the o ce holder
produces either a good or a bad governance outcome ot 2 {g, b}, 8t 2 {1, 2}. The
governance outcome is a good one whenever a crisis does not arise, or if it arises but
the o ce holder is able to solve it. Otherwise, the outcome is a bad one. The o ce
holder’s type determines the probability that he is able to solve a crisis. A good type
always produces a good outcome under a negative shock, whereas a bad one does so
with probability   2 [0, 1]:
• prob(ot = g|!t = N, ✓t = G) = prob(ot = g|!t = N, ✓t = B) = 1
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• prob(ot = g|!t = S, ✓t = G) = 1
• prob(ot = g|!t = S, ✓t = B) =   < 1
This specific parametrization is adopted for simplicity, but is not necessary for the
results. Notice that the parameter   can be interpreted as the complexity of the crisis,
but also as the country’s resiliency. For example, when a country can count on a
competent bureaucratic apparatus, it is more likely to survive a negative shock even if
an incompetent type is in o ce.
Arguably, there are substantive reasons to defend the assumption that competence
matters the most in times of crisis. However, it is also important to highlight that if we
allow players to live for more than two periods the key qualitative result of the paper
(i.e., the voter is less likely to get the best candidate precisely when she needs him
the most) would continue to hold under the opposite assumption, that is if crises mute
rather than amplifying the impact of the o ce holder’s type. I will discuss this further
in a separate section.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the state of the world !t realizes after the
election has taken place. Players share common prior beliefs that prob(!t = S) = p¯,
with !t i.i.d. in each period. In a robustness section, I relax this assumption and
allow the probability of a crisis in the second period to be a function of the first period
incumbent’s performance. At the beginning of each period, players also observe a public
signal indicating the likelihood of a crisis arising during the upcoming term. Formally,
players observe a signal   2 {N,S}, accurate with probability  > 12 (prob( t = S|!t =
S) = prob( t = N |!t = N) =  > 12).
Finally, we must specify the players’ payo↵s. The voter cares about governance
outcomes. She pays a cost   > 0 in each period in which ot = b, whereas the payo↵
from a good outcome ot = g is normalized to 0. Politicians are o ce motivated. The
value of holding o ce has two components: monetary rents K > 0 and legacy payo↵s
  > 0. While the monetary rents are always accrued by the o ce holder, the legacy
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payo↵s are conditional on delivering a good performance.2   may represent the ‘warm
glow feeling’ politicians experience when they produce a good governance outcome,
or (in a reduced-form) the instrumental value of a good performance. Since the aim
of this paper is to focus on the endogenous opportunity cost of o ce, I assume that
a politician’s outside option is always lower than his per-period payo↵ from being in
o ce. Politicians’ utility when out of o ce is therefore normalized to 0. Finally, since
the focus of this paper is on politicians’ incentives and disincentives to hold o ce, I
assume that running is costless. However, because I consider a deterministic election
process, this assumption has no impact on the qualitative results other than avoiding
equilibria with uncontested elections.
To sum up, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws the potential candidates’ types ✓C1 , ✓C2 2 {G,B} and the first
period state of the world !1 2 {N,S}
2. The players observe a public signal  1 2 {N,S}, accurate with probability  
3. C1 and C2 simultaneously choose whether to run. If party P 2 {1, 2} is unable
to field a viable candidate it resorts to the reserve RP .
4. The voter decides whom to elect
5. The first period state of the word !1 realizes
6. The fist period governance outcome o1 realizes
7. The second period starts and nature draws !2 2 {N,S}
8. The game proceeds as above
To avoid trivialities, I will exclude equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. Since
running for o ce is costless, this implies that a politicians’ entry decision is conditional
on winning the election.
2In a two-period setting the assumption that   > 0 is necessary to obtain the results. In a separate
section I consider a longer time horizon, and I show that the ine ciency documented in the baseline
model survives even if the o ce holder’s payo↵ is not a function of his performance.
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Notice that this is a model of pure selection: the o ce holder’s performance is de-
termined by his true ability and the state of the world, and I do not allow politicians
to invest in (costly) e↵ort in order to improve their expected performance and electoral
chances. The choice to abstract from this moral hazard problem is purely for presenta-
tion purposes and, as long as the governance outcome remains informative at all levels
of e↵ort, relaxing this assumption would not alter the main message of the paper.
Analysis
In this section I solve the two-period game and identify the conditions under which
adverse selection emerges in equilibrium. Consider first the voter’s electoral decision.
The voter cares exclusively about governance outcomes. In each period, she therefore
elects the candidate that is most likely to deliver a good performance. Straightfor-
wardly, her first period electoral choice is simply a function of her prior beliefs over
the candidates’ ability. In contrast, the incumbent’s performance informs the voter
choice in the second period election. This paper builds on a key intuition: the infer-
ences that voters draw upon observing the governance outcome are a function of the
state of the world. Thus, the same outcome may convey di↵erent information under
di↵erent environment conditions. In other words, crises have an informational value.
Precisely because crises amplify the e↵ect of competence on outcomes (i.e., for any out-
come ot 2 {g, b}, |prob(ot|!t = S, ✓t = G)   prob(ot|!t = S, ✓t = B)| > |prob(ot|!t =
N, ✓t = G)   prob(ot|!t = N, ✓t = B)|), they also increase the informativeness of the
incumbent’s performance: when the country is hit by a negative shock, the voter is
able to draw more precise inferences on the o ce holder’s type. In particular, given
the specific parametrization adopted here, both types are always able to deliver a good
outcome under a normal state of the world, therefore the o ce holder’s performance
is completely uninformative. In contrast, an exogenous crisis provides the voter with
a ‘test’ of the incumbent’s political ability, and therefore an opportunity to learn. De-
note as µi(Ii,!1, o1) the posterior probability that politician i is a good type, given his
incumbency status Ii 2 {I, ;}, the first period outcome and state of the world. Recall
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that qi is the prior probability that politician i is a good type. The following Lemma
holds:
Lemma 1. Suppose that !1 = N . Then, the incumbent’s performance reveals no in-
formation about his type, and the voter’s posterior is always equal to her prior beliefs.
Suppose instead that !1 = S. Then, the voter always obtains new information: for all
outcomes o1 2 {g, b} and all politicians i 2 {C1, C2}, µi(I, S, o1) 6= qi.
This implies that even if a shock is fully exogenous, it may influence the incumbent’s
electoral chances. Indeed, the voter’s decision in the second period may be di↵erent
under di↵erent states of the world, even fixing the governance outcome. In particular,
both C1 and C2 would be ousted after producing a bad outcome and would be re-
elected after producing a good outcome under a crisis.3 However, a good performance
during normal times always guarantees C1’s survival, but is never enough for the ex-ante
disadvantaged C2 to get re-elected.
With this in mind, let us now focus on the potential candidates’ incentives. As
highlighted above, the model considers a world in which potential candidates are career
politicians, for whom the expected per-period value of holding o ce is always higher
than the outside option (K +  [1  prob(!t = S| t)+ prob(!t = S| t)(qi+(1  qi) )]  
K > 0). Further, recall that I assume running to be costless. Absent any future electoral
considerations, it is therefore straightforward to verify that both viable candidates C1
and C2 always have a dominant strategy to run for o ce in the second period. Excluding
equilibria in weakly dominated strategies, the following holds:
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium of the game, both viable candidates C1 and C2 choose
to run for o ce in the second period.
Not so much in the first period. When choosing whether to run or stay out of the
race, politicians consider both the expected value of holding o ce today and, given
Lemma 1, how it influences the probability of being elected tomorrow (i.e., the endoge-
nous opportunity cost of o ce). Both are a function of the state of the world. The
3To avoid trivialities, I assume that µC2(I, S, g) > q1, where µC2(IC2 ,!1, o1) is the posterior prob-
ability that C2 is a good type, given his incumbency status IC2 2 {I, ;}, the first period outcome and
state of the world.
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per-period expected value of o ce is always lower in times of crisis (!1 = S), since a
politician who turns out to be incompetent may be unable to deliver a good outcome
and enjoy the associated legacy payo↵s. Consider instead the opportunity cost of hold-
ing o ce in the first period. Under a normal state of the world (!1 = N) the voter will
obtain no new information upon observing the governance outcome (the voter’s pos-
terior on the incumbent’s type is always equal to her prior). Therefore, holding o ce
today does not influence the probability of being elected tomorrow. In contrast, if a
crisis arises the incumbent’s performance will reveal information about his true ability.
The o ce holder then risks exposing himself as a bad type and losing the second period
election.
Given the above reasoning, it follows straightforwardly that politicians have no
reason to stay out of the race when  1 = N . The public signal indicates that a crisis is
unlikely to arise during the first term, more precisely that a crisis today is less likely than
a crisis tomorrow (recall that, given the martingale property of beliefs, the expected
posterior probability of a shock in the second period is always equal to the prior p¯).
As such, the expected rents from holding o ce today are higher than the expected
value of o ce in the future. Then, irrespective of the opportunity cost in terms of
future electoral chances, both potential candidates always choose to enter the race when
 1 = N . Suppose instead that the public signal indicates that a crisis is likely to arise
 1 = S. Now, holding o ce in the future is, in expectation, more valuable. A potential
candidate may therefore be worried that, if the crisis materializes, his performance in
o ce would expose him as an incompetent type and hurt his electoral chances in the
second period. Straightforwardly, this risk is higher the lower the probability of being
a good type. This reasoning may lead us to conclude that positive selection emerges in
equilibrium: the politician is most likely to be able to solve a crisis has the strongest
incentives to run. Instead, the analysis shows that the opposite is true:
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, both C1 and C2 always run for o ce under  1 = N .
Consider instead  1 = S. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The public signal is su ciently accurate ( >  )
(ii) C2 is su ciently unlikely to be a good type (q2 < q¯2)
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(iii) A bad type is su ciently unlikely to deliver a good outcome under a crisis
(  <  ¯)
Then, there exists an interval [q2, q¯] such that when q1 2 [q2, q¯], C1 chooses to stay out
and Party 1 resorts to the reserve candidate R1. Instead, C2 always chooses to enter
the race.
Proposition 1 presents a very stark ine ciency result: in equilibrium, the voter gets
the wrong candidates at the wrong time. The ex-ante disadvantaged C2, which has the
lowest expected quality, is always willing to run for o ce. Instead, it is the politician
who is most likely to be competent that sometimes chooses to stay out of the race.
To make matters even worse, he does so precisely when the voter would need him the
most: the country is very likely to experience a crisis (the public signal is negative and
su ciently informative), competence really matters in times of crisis (  <  ¯), and the
alternative is really bad (q2 < q¯2).
To understand this result, let us focus first on the strategic incentives faced by the
disadvantaged C2. Straightforwardly, C2 would always lose the first period election if
C1 chooses to enter the race. Since running is costless, C2 is indi↵erent between entering
the race and staying out. Suppose instead that C1 chooses to sit the first period election
out. Now, C2 must consider how holding o ce today would influence the probability
of being elected tomorrow. Perhaps counter intuitively, holding o ce during times of
crisis would always improve C2’s future electoral prospects, irrespective of how unlikely
he is to be able to deliver a good governance outcome. C2 will only win the second
period election if the voter updates positively about his type, or negatively about C1’s
ability. If C1 stays out of the race in the first period, the voter will obtain no new
information about his competence. As such, C2 will always lose tomorrow’s election if
he chooses to stay home today. The only way to improve his future electoral prospects
is to prove himself: prove able to deliver a good governance outcome even after being
hit by a negative shock. In other words, the ex-ante disadvantaged politician never has
anything to lose from holding o ce in times of crisis, since new information can only
increase his future expected payo↵. Running for o ce in the first period therefore always
weakly increases both his immediate and future expected payo↵. Thus, irrespective of
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how likely a crisis is to arise, and how unlikely he is to be able to solve it, C2 always
has incentives to gamble on his own success, and has a weakly dominant strategy to
enter the race under both realizations of the public signal.4
The ex-ante advantaged C1 faces very di↵erent incentives. He is more likely to be
able to solve a crisis if it arises, and deliver a good governance outcome. He therefore
has a higher expected payo↵ from holding o ce today, and a higher likelihood of being
re-elected tomorrow. However, C1 also has a valuable electoral advantage that he does
not want to waste. Because of this advantage, information can only hurt his future
electoral performance: if the voter learns nothing new, C1 always wins for sure in the
second period. As a consequence, he would want to prevent the voter from learning
about his true ability so as to maximize his future electoral chances. In other words,
C1 experiences fear of failure: he has incentives to avoid a gamble, even if it is likely
to succeed. Therefore, when the public signal indicates that a crisis is likely to arise
in the first period, C1 faces a trade-o↵. If he chooses to stay out of the race, his
immediate payo↵ decreases as he foregoes the rents from holding o ce today. However,
if he chooses to run, he risks exposing himself as a low type and therefore wasting
his electoral capital and losing tomorrow, when holding o ce is in expectation more
valuable. The problem that he faces is that there is no safe strategy. If he chooses
to run, he gambles on his own success. That is, on the probability of being able to
deliver a good performance even under a crisis. If he chooses not to run, he gambles on
his opponents failure. That is, on the probability that if a crisis arises C2 will not be
able to solve it and win re-election in the second period. C1’s equilibrium choice will
therefore depend on the expected value of holding o ce today versus tomorrow, and
on the relative riskiness of the two gambles. The equilibrium conditions are intuitive.
When a crisis is very likely, C2 is unlikely to reveal himself as a good type, and C1 is
not su ciently confident in his own ability, he chooses to stay out of the race so as to
preserve his electoral capital for the future.
4Notice that the same holds for the reserve candidates R1 and R2, who are therefore always willing
to represent their respective party in the general election.
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In concluding this section it is important to emphasize that the nature of the inef-
ficiency documented in Proposition 1 is very di↵erent from analogous results presented
in the literature. Extant works highlight the di culty of attracting good politicians if
o ce rents are too low to compensate for their outside option in the private market.
In other words, adverse selection emerges due to weak electoral incentives. Here, the
opposite is true. In this model, running is costless and holding o ce is always more
valuable than the outside option. The ine ciency documented above emerges precisely
as a perverse consequence of electoral accountability. The problem that the voter faces
is that she can never credibly commit to ignoring valuable information that may be re-
vealed about the incumbent. Precisely because competence matters the most in times
of crisis, this is also when governance outcomes are most informative. The politician
who is most likely to survive a crisis is also the one who has the most to lose, and is
therefore unwilling to take the risk. As such, these results speak to an open debate in
the literature: is voter competence is actually good for voters? Scholars have argued
that a rational and more informed electorate may paradoxically induce o ce holders to
exert less e↵ort, or adopt worse policies (see Ashworth et al. 2014). This paper suggests
that the problem may run even deeper: voters’ inability to commit to ignoring informa-
tion about the incumbent’s performance may prevent them from attracting competent
politicians to o ce in the first place.
Discussion and Robustness
For the purpose of simplifying the presentation and thus focusing on the key intuition
underlying the results, the model analysed here considers a stylized environment with
a binary state of the world and governance outcome, and imposes parameter values
such that outcomes are only informative during periods of crisis. These are very stark
assumptions, but are not necessary for the emergence of the ine ciency documented
above. As highlighted by the discussion in the previous section, the key property of
the model that underpins the results is that crises amplify the impact of the o ce
holder’s type and, at the same time, the informativeness of his performance. Governance
outcomes are most informative precisely when competence matters the most.
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Ashworth et al. (2017) show that this property holds more generally, even under
a less stylized information environment. They look at a world in which, similarly to
the model presented here, governance outcomes are the output of a production function
that depends on the incumbent’s type and two shocks: the observable disaster (i.e.,
the state of the world) and an unobservable idiosyncratic shock. Their general model
then backs away from any specific functional form assumption. Their results thus hold
for any production function increasing in type and decreasing in disaster intensity, any
distribution of the state of the world, and any (symmetric) distribution of the random
shock satisfying a strict monotonic likelihood ratio property. For our purposes, their
key finding is to show that ‘governance outcomes are more informative (resp. less
informative) following larger disasters, if disasters amplify (resp. mute) the e↵ect of
type’ (2017, p. 12). In other words, exactly as in the stylized setting considered here,
outcomes are most informative when competence matters the most. It is crucial to stress
that Ashworth et al. (2017) do not allow for endogenous candidate entry (indeed, in
their model politicians are dummies, that do not take any strategic action). As such,
their work should be considered as a complement to this paper, indicating that the
ine ciency highlighted in Proposition 1 holds beyond the specific assumptions adopted
here.
A second assumption imposed in the model is that governance outcomes influence a
politician’s payo↵ only when in o ce. Intuitively, relaxing this assumption will mitigate
the adverse selection documented above. However, as I show below, the ine ciency is
never eliminated altogether. In the following paragraphs I introduce several variants of
the baseline model and informally discuss the results’ robustness. All the formal proofs
are in Appendix B.
There are several ways in which the o ce holder’s poor performance may negatively
a↵ect the other potential candidates’ payo↵s. First, we may argue that governance
outcomes directly influence politicians’ utility even when they are out of o ce. Suppose
then that politicians, just like the voter, su↵er a cost    whenever a bad governance
outcome is produced. Denote Ig a binary indicator taking value 1 when ot = g, and 0
otherwise. A politician’s per period payo↵ is then R + Ig    (1   Ig)  when in o ce,
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and  (1   Ig)  otherwise. As in the baseline model, all politicians are always willing
to run under  1 = N . Similarly, C2 has no reason to stay out of the race in times of
crisis, since holding o ce always can only increase both his expected payo↵ today and
his electoral chances tomorrow. Consider now the problem that the ex-ante advantaged
C1 faces. Straightforwardly, his incentives to run are higher than in the baseline model.
If he chooses to stay out of the race, and free-ride on his opponent, he increases the
risk of incurring the cost of of a poor governance outcome. We may be tempted to
conclude that, for a su ciently large  , C1 would always be willing to run when C2 is
very likely to be a bad type. Instead, as in the baseline model, the opposite is true.
The qualitative results are in fact exactly as indicated in Proposition 1: C1 chooses to
stay out of the race precisely when his opponent is very likely to fail (i.e., q2 and  
su ciently low). C1 is willing to increase the risk of su↵ering the cost   today, in order
to maximise the probability of getting to o ce tomorrow, when a good performance is
easier to deliver. Crucially, this holds for any value of  . The other comparative statics
go in the expected direction: as   increases, C1 is more likely to enter the race (in the
sense of set inclusion).
Alternatively, just like in the baseline model, we may argue that politicians only
care about their own performance in o ce. Nonetheless, governance outcomes may
indirectly influence a politician’s expected payo↵, irrespective of his incumbency status.
For example, a bad outcome in the first period may increase the probability of a crisis
arising (again) in the second. To account for this possibility, assume that prob(!2 =
S|o1 = g) = p¯ and prob(!2 = S|o1 = b) = ↵p¯, where ↵ 2 (1, 1p¯). As above, free-riding
now comes with a cost for C1: a bad outcome today decreases the expected value
of holding o ce tomorrow. This tends to increase C1’s incentives to run, but does
not alter the conclusions from the baseline model: C1 chooses to stay out of the race
precisely when his opponent is most likely to deliver a poor performance. Importantly,
this holds even if a bad outcome in the first period pushes the probability of a future
crisis arbitrarily close to one (i.e., ↵ is arbitrarily close to 1p¯). A similar reasoning
applies if we assume that crises are always exogenous (i.e., the probability that !2 = S
is not a function of o1), but a bad governance outcome decreases the country’s future
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resiliency ( ). In other words, the first-period o ce holder’s poor performance reduces
the probability that the country would survive a future shock if an incompetent type is
in power. 5
Finally, the baseline model assumes that the o ce holder always obtains the same
payo↵ from a good performance, irrespective of the state of the world. However, we
could argue that producing a good governance outcome under a crisis should yield a
higher legacy payo↵ than performing well during normal times. Suppose then that the
o ce holder’s legacy payo↵ is ⌫(!t) , where ⌫(N) = 1 and ⌫(S) > 1. Straightforwardly,
for a su ciently large ⌫(S), C1’s expected overall payo↵ from entering the race in the
first period is increasing in the probability of a crisis. Perhaps more surprisingly, the
likelihood that he chooses to run (in the sense of set inclusion) never is. Recall that C1
is always guaranteed re-election if he gets to o ce during normal times. Irrespective of
how large is the legacy payo↵ from solving a crisis, increasing the probability of a shock
can therefore only reduce the likelihood that C1 stands for o ce in the first period.
Thus, the assumption that o ce holders would obtain a larger legacy payo↵ in times
of crisis alleviates the ine ciency documented above, but does not alter the quality of
the results: the more the voter needs a competent politician in o ce, the less likely she
is to get one.
This section has highlighted that the crucial ine ciency identified in Proposition
1 can be more or less severe, but it is unlikely that any democracy may be immune
from it. Indeed, this ine ciency seems to lie at the very core of the accountability
relationship between voters and politicians.
The Electoral E↵ect of Incumbency
The results in Proposition 1 indicate that exogenous crises influence the pool of candi-
dates that are willing to run in equilibrium. In the baseline model, I consider an open
seat election. However, if we think about an incumbent running for another term, a
5Formally, prob(o2 = g|!2 = S, ✓I = B, o1 = g) =   and prob(o2 = g|!2 = S, ✓I = B, o1 = b) =   ,
where   2 [0, 1]. ✓I denotes the type of the second period o ce holder.
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question emerges naturally: do exogenous shocks influence the incumbent’s electoral
chances? In particular, is the electoral e↵ect of incumbency di↵erent under di↵erent
states of the world? In this model, incumbents do not enjoy an exogenous advantage
(or disadvantage) in terms of resources or name recognition. In what follows I will also
fix the priors on the candidates’ ability, so that there is no impact of incumbency status
on voters’ perception of political competence. I therefore focus exclusively on whether
endogenous candidate entry generates an electoral e↵ect of incumbency, and how this
changes from times of crisis to periods of business as usual.
To analyse this question, suppose that C2 is the incumbent o ce holder at the
beginning of the game (so that q2 is the posterior probability that he is a good type,
given the prior and his performance at t=0). Further, suppose that o ce holders face a
term limit of two. Therefore, if C2 is re-elected in the first period, he cannot run again
in the second.6 The replacement (potential) candidate for Party 2 is then drawn in the
second period from a pool with a proportion qr of good types.
To understand the electoral impact of incumbency, I compare the probability that
C2 wins the first period election in the baseline model (i.e., when the election is open
seat) with his first period electoral performance under incumbency status. This is
essentially equivalent to comparing C1’s incentives to run in the first period in the two
cases. In order to generate continuous probabilities, I assume that q1 is drawn at the
beginning of the game from a uniform distribution on [q2, µC2(I, C, g)] (recall that I
assume q1 < µC2(I, S, g)).
The results show that no e↵ect of incumbency emerges when the players observe a
public signal indicating normal times. In contrast, depending on the expected quality
of Party 2’s replacement candidate, either an incumbency advantage or a disadvantage
arises when  1 = S. Additionally, irrespective of whether the e↵ect of incumbency is
positive or negative, it is always increasing in the signal’s accuracy:
Proposition 2. Incumbency status has no e↵ect on C2’s electoral chances under  1 =
N . Suppose instead that  1 = S. Then, C2 experiences an incumbency disadvantage
6If no term limits are imposed, the politicians’ incentives are exactly as in the baseline model, and
incumbency status never has any e↵ect on electoral performance.
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whenever qr > q1, and an advantage whenever qr < q1. In both cases, the e↵ect of
incumbency is increasing in the signal’s accuracy  .
The first result is straightforward. Irrespective of whether the election is an open
seat one, C1 is always willing to run for o ce under  1 = N . Therefore, C2 always loses
the first period election with probability 1, and incumbency status has no e↵ect on his
electoral performance. Suppose instead that a negative signal  1 = S is observed at the
beginning of the first period, indicating a crisis is likely to arise. First, let qr > q1. In
this case, C1 has no electoral capital to preserve for future elections. Indeed, in order
to win the second period election he needs the voter to update positively about his
type. Thus, C1 has no reason to stay out of the race, and will always choose to run
in equilibrium. This, in turn, generates an incumbency disadvantage: C2 wins with
strictly positive probability in the open seat election, but loses for sure when he runs as
the incumbent o ce holder. This disadvantage increases in the signal’s accuracy, since
C1’s incentives to run in the open seat election (conditional on  1 = S) are weaker the
higher the probability of a crisis arising.
Suppose instead that qr < q1: C1 always wins the second period election if the
voter receives no new information about his type. Here, incumbency status has a
positive e↵ect on C2’s electoral performance. To understand this result, consider the
incentives C1 faces in the open seat election. When he chooses not to run for o ce,
C1 gambles on his opponent’s failure. Thus, he must take into account the risk that
a crisis arises, and C2 is actually able to solve it. Conversely, when C1 must decide
whether to run against a term limited incumbent, he does not need to worry about
the o ce holder’s expected performance. Indeed, if C1 stays out of the race today, he
always wins tomorrow’s election. C1’s incentives to run are stronger in the open seat
election, and C2 experiences an incumbency advantage. Notice that the source of this
incumbency advantage is exactly the reverse of the ‘scare o↵’ e↵ect typically discussed
in the literature (Cox ane Katz 1996, Levitt and Wolfram 1997). C1 is more likely (in
the sense of set inclusion) to stay out of the race precisely because he has nothing to
fear from the (term limited) incumbent.
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An analogous reasoning explains why this incumbency advantage is increasing in
the signal’s accuracy  . As  increases, so does the posterior probability that a crisis
will occur in the first period. As a crisis becomes more likely, both C1’s expected payo↵
from holding o ce today and his probability of being re-elected tomorrow decrease.
Thus, a increase in  always has a direct negative e↵ect on C1’s incentives to run.
However, in the open seat election an indirect e↵ect also emerges. Recall that C2 would
be re-elected only upon producing a good governance outcome under a crisis. Thus, as
 increases, staying out of the race becomes a riskier gamble for C1. The direct e↵ect
dominates, therefore his incentives to run are always decreasing in  . However, due
to the indirect e↵ect the decrease is at a slower rate in the open seat election. As a
consequence, C2’s incumbency advantage is increasing in the probability of a negative
shock.
Isolating the Information Channel
In the baseline model exogenous shocks influence politicians’ expected utility from o ce
via two channels: legacy (i.e., the expected value of holding o ce today, which here is
assumed to be always lower in times of crisis) and information (i.e., the informative-
ness of the governance outcome, which in turn influences politician’s future electoral
chances). When we assume that politicians only live for two electoral cycles, both chan-
nels are necessary to generate the ine ciency documented in Proposition 1: if   = 0
all potential candidates always choose to run for o ce in equilibrium. Since the value
of holding o ce is the same in both periods, a politician would in fact never give up
o ce today in order to increase his electoral chances tomorrow. Suppose instead that
we allow players to consider a longer time horizon. Would adverse selection emerge in
equilibrium even if we assume that ! influences politicians’ expected utility only via
the information channel (i.e.,   = 0)?
Answering this question is especially relevant in light of the results in Ashworth et
al. (2017). As discussed in the robustness section, the authors show that governance
outcomes are more informative (resp. less informative) following a crisis, if crises amplify
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(resp. mute) the e↵ect of type. The more competence matters, the more the voter learns
upon observing the incumbent’s performance. As such, if the information channel alone
is enough to generate the adverse selection documented in the baseline model, the key
ine ciency result presented in this paper holds irrespective of whether we assume that
competence matters most in times of crisis or during periods of ‘business as usual’. If
crises mute the e↵ect of the o ce holder’s type, then the voter benefits the most from
a competent politician during normal times. However, this is also when outcomes are
most informative. As a consequence, the politician who is most likely to be competent
experiences fear of failure and has incentives to stay out of the race, running for o ce
only during periods of crisis.
In what follows, I introduce an amended version of the model, in which politicians
live for more than two periods, and the value from holding o ce is not a function of
their performance. I will show that, if politicians are su ciently patient, the adverse
selection documented in the baseline model continues to emerge in equilibrium.
The Infinite Horizon Model
Consider a game that lasts for infinitely many periods, t 2 {1, 2, ...,1}. At the be-
ginning of the game each party P 2 {1, 2} randomly draws a potential candidate from
the pool of its members, containing a proportion qP of good types. Let q1 > q2. In
each period, each potential candidate decides whether to run for o ce or not. The
voter then makes her electoral decision. O ce holders are subject to a two-terms limit.
When an incumbent leaves o ce — whether because he hits the term limit, decides to
stand down, or is outvoted — he cannot re-enter the pool of candidates. His party then
draws a replacement (potential) candidate from the same pool. Notice that all politi-
cians belonging to the same party are ex-ante identical.7 This allows me to consider,
in the equilibrium analysis, a generic potential candidate from Party 1 and a generic
potential candidate from Party 2. As in the baseline model, when party P is unable to
7There is a slight technical di culty associated with the fact that the pool depletes over time.
To bypass this problem, I assume that whenever a party draws a new potential candidate, another
politician with the same true type is born into the pool.
156
field a viable candidate it resorts to the reserve candidate RP , that is known to be a
bad type with certainty.
In each period the country experiences either a normal situation or a crisis, !t 2
{S,N}. Players share common prior beliefs that prob(!t = S) = p¯, with !t i.i.d. in
each period. At the beginning of each period players observe public signal   2 {S,N}.
For purposes of simplicity, I will assume that prob( t = S|!t = S) = prob( t = N |!t =
N) = 1   ✏, where ✏ takes an arbitrarily small value. In other words, the signal is
(almost) perfectly informative. Notice that ✏ is assumed to be strictly larger than 0
to ensure that the voter is never indi↵erent between candidates of di↵erent expected
quality. The production function for the governance outcomes is exactly as in the
baseline model.
Politicians care exclusively about the material rents from o ce K > 0, and discount
future payo↵s by a common factor   2 (0, 1). A politician’s payo↵ when out of o ce is
normalized to 0. The voter cares about governance outcomes, and I assume that she fully
discounts the future (i.e., she maximises per-period payo↵). This ensures that, in each
period, the candidate who is most likely to be competent wins the election irrespective
of incumbency status. This is not necessarily true in equilibrium with a forward looking
voter. When choosing between a term limited incumbent and a challenger that is less
likely to be competent but can run again in the following period, a forward looking
voter would under some conditions elect the challenger. This is because the term limit
would otherwise prevent her from e ciently using all the available information when
making her electoral decision in the next period.
Finally, as in the two-period version, I assume that µt,2(I, S, g) > q1, where µt,2(I,!t 1, ot 1)
is the posterior probability that an incumbent from Party 2 is a good type given the
previous period state of the world and governance outcome.
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Analysis
The aim of this section is to verify that, under some conditions, the adverse selection
documented in Proposition 1 emerges in equilibrium.8 In this model, the problem that
politicians face is to choose the right time to enter the electoral arena, so as to maximize
the chances of remaining in o ce for two consecutive period. As such, (given   < 1)
they may face a trade o↵ between getting to o ce today, and waiting for a better time
in order to maximize their re-election chances. 9
Consider first a randomly drawn potential candidate from Party 1. This politician is
ex-ante more likely be competent than any randomly drawn challenger from the other
party. As such, he is always guaranteed re-election for a second term if he gets to
o ce during normal times, when no new information is generated about his type. His
incentives are therefore exactly as in the baseline model. He is always willing to run
under !t = N , but may decide to stay out of the race during periods of crisis in order to
preserve his electoral capital and maximise the probability of getting to o ce when re-
election is more likely. Straightforwardly, the higher the probability of being competent
q1, the stronger the incentives to run irrespective of the state of the world.
Interestingly, the opposite holds for a potential candidate from Party 2. As in the
baseline model, this politician has incentives to gamble on his own success. Irrespective
of how likely he is to fail, he is therefore always willing to run during times of crisis.
Perhaps more surprisingly, if he is su ciently likely to be a good type, a potential
candidate from Party 2 may instead want to stay out of the race under normal times.
Recall that governance outcomes are uninformative under !t = N . Therefore, an
incumbent from Party 2 would only be re-elected if his potential challenger decides
to sit the election out. Conversely, a negative shock potentially allows the ex-ante
disadvantaged incumbent to prove himself, thereby increasing the probability that he
wins re-election even if the challenger decides to run. As such, politicians from Party 2
maximise the probability of being elected for two consecutive terms if they get to o ce
8In future iterations of the paper I will complete the analysis by characterising the Markov perfect
equilibria of the infinite horizon game for all parameter values.
9Recall that the two-term limit implies that all incumbents will always run for re-election.
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during challenging times. This, in turn, generates incentives to stay out of the race
during normal ones.10 Interestingly, as mentioned above, these incentives are stronger
the higher the probability of being competent. When q2 is high, a randomly drawn
politician from Party 2 that gets elected during challenging times is very likely to
survive to a second term. The opportunity cost of getting to o ce during normal times
is too high, and the politician would rather wait for a period of crisis.
The above discussion highlights that the incentives that arise in this model are
similar to those emerging in the baseline. The next proposition establishes that the
equilibrium results are as well:
Proposition 3. There exist unique bq2, b , and b  such that, if
(i) A randomly drawn potential candidate from Party 2 is su ciently likely to be a
bad type
0  q2 < bq2
(ii) The probability that a bad type delivers a good outcome under a crisis is su -
ciently low
0    < b 
(iii) The politicians’ discount factor is su ciently highb  <   < 1
then, the game has an equilibrium in which any potential candidate drawn from Party
2 runs under both states of the world, whereas viable candidates drawn from Party 1
only run during normal times. During periods of crisis, Party 1 resorts to the reserve
candidate R1.
Notice that the qualitative conditions are in line with those in Proposition 1.11
However, in contrast with the results of the baseline model, adverse selection can emerge
in equilibrium for any value of q1. For a su ciently high discount factor, potential
candidates from Party 1 choose to stay out of the race in times of crisis even if the
probability of being competent is arbitrarily close to 1.
10Recall that I assume that when an incumbent is ousted he can never re-enter the pool of candidates.
11It is important to highlight that, following from the discussion above, conditions (i) and (ii) are
necessary both to ensure that politicians from Party 1 choose to stay out under !t = S and that
politicians from Party 2 are willing to run under !t = N .
159
Conclusion
Do the right candidates choose to run at the right time? I have addressed this question
by analyzing a model of repeated elections, in which potential candidates are career
politicians that di↵er in the probability of being a competent type. The key feature
of the model is that, in each period, the country faces either a normal situation or a
crisis. A crisis amplifies both the importance of the o ce holder’s competence, and
the informativeness of governance outcomes. I have shown that, in a world with these
features, electoral accountability may have the perverse consequence of discouraging
good candidates from running precisely when the voter needs them the most. The
politician who is most likely to be competent has the most to lose from information. As
a consequence, if a crisis is likely, he experiences fear of failure: under some conditions,
he chooses to stay out of the race so as to preserve his electoral capital for the future.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, both C1 and C2 always run for o ce under  1 = N .
Consider instead  1 = S. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The public signal is su ciently accurate ( >  )
(ii) C2 is su ciently unlikely to be a good type (q2 < q¯2)
(iii) A bad type is su ciently unlikely to deliver a good outcome under a crisis
(  <  ¯)
Then, there exists an interval [q2, q¯] such that when q1 2 [q2, q¯], C1 chooses to stay out
and Party 1 resorts to the reserve candidate R1. Instead, C2 always chooses to enter
the race.
Proof. In the main body I have provided the proof that both candidates always choose
to enter the race under  1 = N , and that C2 is always willing to run even under
 1 = S. Consider instead C1’s incentives under  1 = S. Let p1 = prob(!1 = S| 1 =
S) =  p¯ p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) . C
1’s expected utility from running in the first period is:
K + q1[2  +K] + (1  q1)[1  p1(1   )][  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )] (1)
C1’s expected utility from staying home instead is:
[K +  (q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1   ))][1  p1 + p1(1  q2)(1   )] (2)
Thus, C1 chooses not to run in period 1 if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
[K +  (q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1   ))][1  p1 + p1(1  q2)(1   )] > (3)
K + q1[2  +K] + (1  q1)[1  p1(1   )][  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )]
Which reduces to:
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q1 < 1  (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1  2    q2(1   ))] = q1 (4)
Given q1 > q2, the above requires:
(1 q2)p1(1  )(2 +K  p¯(1 2  q2(1  ))) ( +K)(1+q2p1(1  )+ p1) > 0 (5)
The condition establishes an upper bound q2 < q2, and must always be satisfied at
q2 = 0. This requires:




(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1  2 )]   (  +K) = p1 (7)
Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) , the above establishes a lower bound  >  and
must always be satisfied at  = 1. This requires:
  +K
(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1  2 )]   (  +K) < 1 (8)
The above establishes an upper bound   <   (and it is always satisfied at   = 0).
Proposition 2: Incumbency status has no e↵ect on C2’s electoral chances under  1 =
N . Suppose instead that  1 = S. Then, C2 experiences an incumbency disadvantage
whenever qr > q1, and an advantage whenever qr < q1. In both cases, the e↵ect of
incumbency is increasing in the signal’s accuracy  .
Proof. The first point follows straightforwardly from the proof of Proposition 1, and so
does the existence of an incumbency disadvantage under qr > q1. Suppose instead that
qr < q1. C1’s utility from running in period 1 is exactly as in the baseline:
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K + q1[2  +R] + (1  q1)[1  p1(1   )][  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )] (9)
Conversely, if C1 chooses not to run he will always win the second period election.
His expected utility is therefore:
K +  (q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1   )) (10)





q1 < 1  (  +K)
p1(1   )[  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )] (12)
C2’s incumbency advantage is therefore:
1  (  +K)
p1(1   )[  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )]   (13)
[1  (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)
p1(1   )(2  +K    p¯(1  2    q2(1   ))) ] > 0
Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯ , it is easy to verify that the advantage is increasing
in  .
Proposition 3:There exist unique bq2, b , and b  such that, if
(i) A randomly drawn potential candidate from Party 2 is su ciently likely to be a
bad type 0  q2 < bq2
(ii) The probability that a bad type delivers a good outcome under a crisis is su -
ciently low 0    < b 
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(iii) The politicians’ discount factor is su ciently highb  <   < 1
then, the game has an equilibrium in which any potential candidate drawn from Party
2 runs under both states of the world, whereas viable candidates drawn from Party 1
only run during normal times. During periods of crisis, Party 1 resorts to the reserve
candidate R1.
Proof. Denote as U eP (Ht, t, et) the expected discounted payo↵ of a non-incumbent po-
tential candidate from party P 2 {1, 2} if he chooses to enter the race at time t.
Ht 2 {1, 2} indicates the identity of the potential candidate with the highest proba-
bility of being a good type. et 2 {I, ;}, where et = ; denotes that the race at time
t is open seat and et = I that the incumbent from the other party is running for
re-election. U oP (Ht, t, et) denotes the expected discounted payo↵ of a non-incumbent
potential candidate from party P if he chooses to stay out of the race at time t.
As discussed in the main body, non-incumbent potential candidates from Party 1
are always willing to run under  t = N , and non-incumbent potential candidates from
Party 2 are always willing to run under  t = S. Further, all incumbents are always
willing to run for re-election.
Consider instead a potential candidate from Party 2 under  t = N . In the conjec-
tured equilibrium, he is always indi↵erent between running for o ce and staying home
if the election is open seat, since he would lose with probability 1. Consider his entry
decision when an incumbent from Party 1 is up for re-election, and performed poorly
in the previous period. In the conjectured equilibrium, his expected discounted payo↵
is:
U e2 (2, N, I) = K +  Kp¯ (14)
Since he would only win re-election for a second term if the public signal indicates
a crisis and therefore the (new) potential candidate from Party 1 chooses to stay home.
His expected discounted payo↵ from a deviation would instead be:
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 (p¯U e2 (1, S, ;) + (1  p¯)U e2 (1, N, ;)) (15)
Where
U e2 (1, S, ;) = K +  K[p¯+ (1  p¯)(q2 + (1  q2) )] (16)
And
U e2 (1, N, ;) = U o2 (1, N, ;) =  2(p¯U e2 (1, S, ;) + (1  p¯)U e2 (1, N, ;)) (17)
Remember that the public signal is (almost) perfectly informative (since I assume
prob( t = S|!t = S) = prob( t = N |!t = N) = 1   ✏), and I can therefore ignore the
arbitrarily small probability that a crisis arises after a signal  t = N .
Solving for U e2 (1, N, ;) we obtain that the deviation is not profitable if and only if
the following condition is satisfied:
K +  Kp¯ >  Kp¯
(1 +  (p¯+ (1  p¯)(q2 + (1  q2) ))
1   2(1  p¯) (18)
Rearranging we obtain:
q2 <
1   2(p¯2 + (1  p¯)(1 +  p¯))
 2p¯(1  p¯)(1   )  
 
1    (19)
Since, q2 > 0 the above requires:
  <
1   2(p¯2 + (1  p¯)(1 +  p¯))
 2p¯(1  p¯) (20)
Consider now a non-incumbent potential candidate from party 1 under  t = C.
Intuitively, his incentives to run are stronger when a term limited incumbent is up for
re-election (as compared to an open seat election). As such, it is su cient to show that
the equilibrium is robust to a deviation in this case.
Considering the case in which Ht = 1, Party 1’s potential candidate expected dis-
counted payo↵ in the conjectured equilibrium is:
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U o1 (1, S, 2) =  ((1  p¯)U e1 (1, N, ;) + p¯U o1 (1, S, ;)) (21)
Where
U e1 (1, N, ;) = K(1 +  ) (22)
And
U o1 (1, C, ;) =  [1  (q2 + (1  q2) )](p¯U o1 (1, C, 2) + (1  p¯)U e1 (1, N, 2) (23)
+ [q2 + (1  q2) )]p¯(U o1 (2, C, 2) + (1  p¯)U e1 (2, N, 2))
With U e1 (2, N, 2) = U
o
1 (2, N, 2) =  (p¯U
o
1 (1, S, ;)+(1 p¯)U e1 (1, N, ;)) and U e1 (1, N, 2) =
U e1 (1, N, ;).
His expected discounted payo↵ from a deviation is instead:
K +  K(q1 + (1  q1) ) (24)
Solving for U o1 (1, S, ;) and rearranging we obtain that the deviation is not profitable
if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
(K +  K) (1  p¯)(1  q2)(1   ) +  (p¯+ (1  p¯)(q2 + (1  q2) )
1   2p¯[p¯+ (1  p¯)(q2 + (1  q2) )] > K +  K(q1 + (1  q1) )(25)
Rearranging we obtain:
q2 <
(1 +  p¯)[ (1 +  )(1  p¯)  (1   p¯)(1 +  (q1 + (1  q1) ))]




(1 +  p¯)[ (1 +  )(1  p¯)  (1   p¯)(1 +  (q1 + (1  q1) ))]
 (1  p¯)(1   )[1   2(1  p¯(1  q1)(1   ))]  
 
1    > 0 (27)
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The above condition establishes an upper bound   <  ˜.  ˜ > 0 requires
(1 +  p¯)[ (1 +  )(1  p¯)  (1   p¯)(1 +  q1)] > 0 (28)
The LHS is increasing in  , fails at   = 0 and is always satisfied at   = 1. The
condition therefore establishes a lower bound   > b 
Thus, the conjectured equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
• 0 < q2 < bq2 = min{1  2(p¯2+(1 p¯)(1+ p¯)) 2p¯(1 p¯)(1  )    1   , (1+ p¯)[ (1+ )(1 p¯) (1  p¯)(1+ (q1+(1 q1) ))] (1 p¯)(1  )[1  2(1 p¯(1 q1)(1  ))]  
 
1  }
•   < b  = min{ ˜, 1  2(p¯2+(1 p¯)(1+ p¯)) 2p¯(1 p¯) }
•   > b 
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Appendix B: Robustness
In this section I formally analyse the variants of the baseline model introduced in the
Discussion and Robustness section.
Governance outcomes directly influence politicians’ payo↵s
Consider an amended version of the baseline mode in which politicians’ payo↵s are as
follows:
• K + Ig    (1  Ig)  when in o ce
•  (1  Ig)  when not in o ce
Where Ig is a binary indicator taking value 1 if ot = g and 0 otherwise.
In equilibrium, C1 chooses not to run in the first period if and only if the following
condition is satisfied:
p1(1   )(1  q2)( (1  (1   )(1  q1)p¯)  (1   )(1  q1) p¯   +K) (29)
 p1 (1  q2)(1   )p¯ 
+(1  p1)( (1  (1   )(1  q1)p¯)  (1   )(1  q1) p¯+K) >
K + q1(2  +K)
+(1  q1)(1  (1   )p1)( (1  (1   )p¯)  (1   ) p¯+   +K)
 p1(1   )(1  q1)((1   )(1  q2) p¯+  )
This reduces to:
q1 < 1  (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1) +  (1   )(1  q2)p1(1 +  p¯)
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1  2    q2(1   )) +  (1 + p¯ )] = q1  (30)
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Given q1 > q2, the above requires:
(1  q2)p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1  2    q2(1   )) +  (1 + p¯ )] (31)
 (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)   (1   )(1  q2)p1(1 +  p¯) > 0
The LHS is decreasing in q2, therefore the condition establishes an upper bound
q2 < q2  and must be satisfied at q2 = 0.
p1(1  )(2 +K  p¯(1 2 )+ (1+p¯ )) [( +K)(1+ p1)+ p1(1  )(1+ p¯)] > 0 (32)
The inequality can only be satisfied if the LHS is increasing in p1. Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) , the above establishes a lower bound  >    and must always be satisfied
at  = 1:
(1  )[2 +K  p¯(1 2 )+ (1+ p¯ )]  [( +K)(1+ )+ (1  )(1+ p¯)] > 0 (33)
The above is concave in  , and always at   = 0, therefore the condition establishes an
upper bound   <   .
A bad governance outcome increases the probability of a crisis
arising in the future
Suppose that politicians only care about their own performance in o ce, and consider
an amended version of the baseline model where the probability of a negative shock in
the second period is a function of the first period governance outcome:
• prob(!2 = C|o1 = g) = p¯
• prob(!2 = C|o1 = b) = ↵p¯, where ↵ 2 (1, 1p¯)
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C1 will choose not to run in period 1 if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
[K +  (q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1   ))](1  p1) (34)
+p1(1  q2)(1   )][K +  (q1 + (1  q1)(1  ↵p¯(1   ))] >
K + q1[2  +K] + (1  q1)[1  p1(1   )][  +K +  (1  p¯(1   )]
This reduces to:
q1 < 1  (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(↵(1  q2)(1   )   )] = q1↵ (35)
Given q1 > q2, the above requires:
1  q2   (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(↵(1  q2)(1   )   ] > 0 (36)
Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) , the above establishes a lower bound  >  ↵ and
must always be satisfied at  = 1:
(1  q2)(1   )[2  +K    p¯(↵(1  q2)(1   )   )]  (  +K)(1 + q2(1   ) +  ) > 0(37)
The LHS is decreasing in q2, therefore it establishes an upper bound q2 < q2↵ and
must always be satisfied at q2 = 0:
(1   )[2  +K    p¯(↵(1  q2)(1   )   )]  (  +K)(1 +  ) > 0 (38)
The LHS is concave in   and always satisfied at   = 0. Thus, it establishes an upper
bound   <  ↵.
A bad governance outcome decreases the country’s future re-
siliency
Suppose that politicians only care about their own performance in o ce, and the prob-
ability of a crisis in the second period is exogenous. Consider an amended version of the
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baseline model in which the first period governance outcome influences the probability
that o2 = g if the country experiences a crisis and the o ce holder is a bad type:
• prob(o2 = g|!2 = C, ✓I2 = B, o1 = g) =  
• prob(o2 = g|!2 = C, ✓I2 = B, o1 = g) =   , where   2 [0, 1]
C1 chooses not to run in the first period if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
p1(1  q2)(1   )[K +  [q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1    ))] + (39)
(1  p1)[K +  [q1 + (1  q1)(1  p¯(1   ))]] >
K + q1(2  +K) + (1  q1)(1  p1(1   ))(K +  (2  p¯(1   )))
This reduces to:
q1 < 1  (  +K)(1 + q2p1(1   ) +  p1)
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1   (1 +  )  q2(1   ))] = q1  (40)
Given q1 > q2, this requires:
(1 q2)p1(1  )[2 +K  p¯(1  (1+ ) q2(1  ))] ( +K)(1+q2p1(1  )+ p1) > 0
(41)
The above establishes an upper bound q2 < q2 . Thus, the condition must be
satisfied at q2 = 0. This requires:
p1(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1   (1 +  )]  (  +K)(1 +  p1) > 0 (42)
Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) , the above establishes a lower bound  >    and
must always be satisfied at p1 = 1:
(1   )[2  +K    p¯(1   (1 +  )]  (  +K)(1 +  ) > 0 (43)
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The LHS is concave in  , and it is always satisfied at   = 0. The condition therefore
establishes an upper bound   <   .
State-dependent legacy payo↵s
Consider an amended version of the baseline model in which an o ce holder’s legacy
payo↵ from a good performance is higher under !t = C:
• K if ot = b
• K +   if ot = g and !t = N
• K + ⌫(!t) , where ⌫(S) > 1 and ⌫(N) = 1
C1 chooses not to run in the first period if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
[K +  (1  p¯+ ⌫(S)p¯(q1 + (1  q1) ))][1  p1 + p1(1  q2)(1   )] > (44)
K + q1[K +  (2 + (p1 + p¯)(⌫(S)  1)] + (1  q1)[1  p1][  +K +  (1  p¯+ ⌫(S)p¯ )]
+(1  q1)p1 [⌫(S)  +K +  (1  p¯+ ⌫(S)p¯ )]
This reduces to:
q1 <
p1((1  2    q2(1   ))(K +  (1  p¯(1   ⌫(S)))) +  (1   ⌫(S)))  (K +  )
p1(1   )( (1 + ⌫(S)) +K    p¯(1  2⌫(S)    ⌫(S)q2(1   )) = q1⌫(S)
(45)
Given q1 > q2, the above requires:
p1[(1  2    q2(1   ))(K +  (1  p¯(1   ⌫(S)))) +  (1   ⌫(S))]  (K +  ) (46)
 q2[p1(1   )( (1 + ⌫(S)) +K    p¯(1  2⌫(S)    ⌫(S)q2(1   ))] > 0
The LHS is decreasing in q2, therefore it establishes an upper bound q2 < q2⌫ and
must always be satisfied at q2 = 0:
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p1((1  2 )(K +  (1  p¯(1   ⌫(S)))) +  (1   ⌫(S)))  (K +  ) > 0 (47)
Substituting p1 =
 p¯
 p¯+(1  )(1 p¯) , the above establishes a lower bound  >  ⌫ and must
always be satisfied at  = 1:
(1  2 )(K +  (1  p¯(1   ⌫)) +  (1   ⌫(S)))  (K +  ) > 0 (48)
The LHS is concave in  , and it is always satisfied at   = 0 The condition therefore
establishes an upper bound   <  ⌫ .
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